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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
I have been of a philosophical turn of mind since my youth, and following an 
extended period of work in science, I have been a student of philosophy for a 
number of years. I have looked to both philosophy and science for fundamen-
tal knowledge and understanding of the world and ourselves, and for an un-
derstanding of how the various areas of knowledge are established and cohere. 
 Certainly science obtains fundamental knowledge; and it is reasonably 
clear how it does so and that scientific knowledge coheres, as its reference to 
an empirical base and its continuous striving for theoretical unity are inherent 
in scientific practice. Science itself does not have much to say about its prac-
tice though, perhaps because, as Einstein said, “The whole of science is noth-
ing more than a refinement of everyday thinking.”1 It is only the behavioural 
sciences and philosophy that have much to say about scientific practice. 
 Turning to philosophy, what does it contribute to our understanding of 
the world and ourselves? Here I am thinking of the basic philosophical areas 
of metaphysics and epistemology rather than special areas such as moral phi-
losophy. This is a question that has been a puzzle for me to answer and has 
thus become the subject of this investigation. Initially I was inclined to the 
view that philosophy has made a positive contribution to the development of 
our understanding and knowledge of the world and ourselves, at the very least 
as an arena of speculative skirmishing preparatory to the entry of science.2 
However, as the investigation proceeded evidence has accumulated that has 
inclined me to a more critical view of philosophy. 
 Wilfrid Sellars says that 
The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in 
the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possi-
ble sense of the term.3
However, Sellars is making an assumption here that can legitimately be 
doubted, namely that there is a way in which things hang together beyond that 
which can be discovered by science. Many, especially those with scientific 
experience, doubt this. One who doubts it is Ronald Giere, a one-time physi-
cist turned naturalistic philosopher of science. He writes: 
 
                                                   
1 Albert Einstein, “Physics and Reality”, p. 59 
NOTE ABOUT REFERENCES: Page numbers in a footnote refer to the source from which the 
quoted material is taken, as indicated in the list of references at the end, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
2 I do not need to rely on my memory for this, as I have early drafts of this essay stating that 
view. 
3 Wilfrid Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man”, p. 1 
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. . . I now believe there are no special philosophical foundations to any sci-
ence. There is only deep theory, which, however, is part of science itself. And 
there are no special philosophical methods for plumbing the theoretical 
depths of any science. There are only the methods of the sciences them-
selves. Moreover, the people best equipped to engage in such pursuits are 
not those trained as philosophers, but those totally immersed in the scien-
tific subject matter—namely scientists. 
. . . The philosophical goal, in short, has been to provide some extrascientific 
foundation for scientific claims. This project now seems to me merely a 
modern, secular version of the medieval project of providing philosophical 
proofs of the existence of God.4
 
This is the view that is maintained in this essay: to attempt to go beyond the 
empirically based reality obtained through everyday experience and thinking 
and its scientific refinement and extension to a metaphysical reality which is 
independent of the human mind is destined to fail. It is destined to fail be-
cause belief in the existence of such a reality, going beyond empirical evidence 
as it does, can only be an act of faith which, like belief in the existence of God, 
acts as an impediment to productive thought: that is, it leaves us with the 
illusion of an understanding that we do not possess. 
 A good example of the tendency of philosophers to by-pass empirical facts 
is shown in their struggle with the phenomenon of pain, which they have at-
tempted without success to fit into one or another idealized philosophical 
stereotype. Here is a scientist’s summary of these attempts. 
Indeed, a little digging into the philosophical literature uncovers just about 
every conceivable position regarding what pain is. Some philosophers and 
neurophysiologists argue that pain is completely objective; it is either intrin-
sic to the injured body part, a functional state, a set of behavioral reactions, 
or a type of perception. Some philosophers and psychologists argue that 
pain is completely subjective; it is either essentially private and completely 
mysterious, or it does not correlate with any biological markers but is com-
pletely non mysterious. A few philosophers disagree with both conceptions 
and hold that pain is not a state at all;  it either does not exist as we com-
monly conceive of it or it is an attitudinal relation. Furthermore, each of 
these positions has become grist for someone’s mill in arguing either that 
pain is a paradigm instance of a simple conscious state or that pain is a spe-
cial case and should not be included in any general theory of the mind.5
And here is a philosopher’s account of the value his discipline typically places 
on scientific facts. 
Very few today still believe that philosophy is a disease of language and that 
its deliverances, due to disturbances of the grammatical unconscious, are 
neither true nor false but nonsense. But the fact remains that, very often, 
philosophical theory stands to positive knowledge roughly in the relation-
                                                   
4 Ronald N. Giere, Explaining Science; A Cognitive Approach, pp. xvi-xvii 
5 Valerie Hardcastle, “The Nature of Pain”, p. 295 
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ship in which hysteria is said to stand to anatomical truth. Freud said, fa-
mously, that hysteria appears to have no knowledge of physiology, for its pa-
ralyses and tics, its incapacities and pains, are located by the sufferer where 
there is no objective possibility of their occurring. Philosophers erase enti-
ties in defiance of common sense and postulate entities of which there is not 
the slightest possibility of scientific confirmation. Parsimonious with one 
hand and profligate with the other, philosophers behave not only as though 
they had no knowledge of scientific truth but as if philosophy had its own 
authority, and not only did not need but could not use information from sci-
ence.6
 Evidence of philosophy’s failure is clear to everyone: philosophy has 
hardly progressed toward a resolution of the issues central to it in two and a 
half thousand years. Most philosophers acknowledge this, but view the failure 
as a virtue in disguise; or at least two virtues: 
 
Virtue I: Philosophy has a function of stimulating speculative inquiry which 
often develops into science; or putting it another way, successful phi-
losophy is renamed science; and 
Virtue II: There are fundamental philosophical problems that are not address-
able by scientific method, namely problems concerning the mind–
world relationship. 
 
These two supposed virtues in justification of philosophy are examined in this 
essay in Parts I and II respectively. 
 Consider Virtue I, which is almost universally subscribed to. Let us look, 
for example, to two of the philosophers already quoted. Sellars writes: 
Philosophy in an important sense has no special subject-matter which 
stands to it as other subject-matters stand to other special disciplines. If phi-
losophers did have such a special subject-matter, they could turn it over to a 
new group of specialists as they have turned other special subject-matters to 
non-philosophers over the past 2500 years, first with mathematics, more re-
cently psychology and sociology, and, currently, certain aspects of theoreti-
cal linguistics.7
Giere also subscribes to this idea: 
 There is another philosophical tradition of equal antiquity. This tradition 
views philosophy simply as the search for a general understanding of the 
world—including the activities of human beings. It is this tradition that over 
the centuries gave birth to the special sciences that now dominate the intel-
lectual world.8
 
In Part I the idea that philosophy stimulates science is investigated historically 
                                                   
6 Arthur C. Danto, foreword to C.L. Hardin, Color for Philosophers, p. ix 
7 Sellars, op. cit., p. 2 
8 Giere, op. cit., p. xvii 
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(neglecting historiographic considerations, which would not contribute to the 
investigation), and the conclusion reached is that the idea is a philosophical 
myth. Science is stimulated by certain socio-political conditions, principally 
freedom of the individual from religious and undue political domination, a 
reasonable level of economic well-being, the stimulus of intercultural contact, 
and the development of technology as an accepted means to economic ad-
vancement. These conditions, apart from the last, were approached temporar-
ily in ancient Greece, especially in the pre-Socratic period, though not closely 
enough for a sustained development of science; they were realized briefly in 
Renaissance Italy prior to the sentencing of Galileo by the Inquisition, and 
then to a sufficient extent in post-Reformation north-western Europe and 
Great Britain to bring about the sustained development of science that we 
have witnessed since that time. Rather than philosophy stimulating science, it 
was science, both incipient and developed, as well as the conditions that lead 
to it, that acted as the stimulus for philosophy, while whatever influence phi-
losophy has had on science has in most cases acted as an impediment to its 
creative spirit. Science is not mature philosophy, but is a quite distinctive 
development. 
 Now consider Virtue II, that there are special philosophical problems 
concerning the mind–world relationship that are not addressable by science. 
Are there are such problems? We note certain facts relevant to their purported 
existence. 
(a) There is no agreed observational or suppositional base for these problems. 
Philosophers often say that philosophy is hard. It is certainly not hard in the 
way that theoretical physics is hard: physics is hard to invent, but it is rela-
tively easy to express because it is clear what it is about; philosophy is easy to 
invent, but is hard to express because it is not clear what it is about, or that it 
is about anything. It is not clear what philosophy is about because, unlike 
physics, it has no agreed observational or suppositional base—the base itself is 
often considered a philosophical issue. It is also not clear what it is about 
because much of it is based upon aspects of introspectively acquired notions 
that are not objectively communicable. Lack of an agreed observational base, 
or absence of one, assuredly removes a problem from scientific consideration. 
And, one might add, it removes it from any systematic consideration—what is 
the philosophical problem of consciousness? 
(b) Philosophy appears to attempt little more than a speculative ordering of 
our common experience, which is the limit of its observational base, thus 
reflecting the idiosyncrasies of our animal constitution and our local environ-
ment, natural, cultural and scientific. This is in sharp contrast to science, 
which develops the ordering of experience by extending experience itself be-
yond the constraints of our natural endowment and environment. Thus phi-
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losophy seeks to interpret the world in terms of the human mental constitu-
tion and human interests; or, as such interpretation must be communicated in 
everyday language, philosophy is concerned with how to talk about things, not 
with examining things themselves in the scientific way. Granted that seeking 
interpretations of our experience in everyday language is what philosophy is 
concerned with, it is easily seen how any philosophical proposal to this end 
cannot be amenable to scientific practice and is destined to fail: common, or 
common philosophical, language is not the medium in which such interpreta-
tions are expressible, because such a language does not possess the references 
that are required for effective interpretation, namely the scientific references 
from which fundamental knowledge derives. This aspect of philosophy also 
shows how its influence can act as an impediment to the creative spirit of 
science, for scientific creation requires the development through empirical 
reference of concepts with which philosophy is unfamiliar and is in conse-
quence inclined to oppose. 
(c) It is maintained that some philosophical problems are inherently insolu-
ble, not for the reasons given in (a) and (b), but because of inherent limita-
tions in our capacities, or as McGinn terms it9, because such problems are 
“cognitively closed” to us. An example is the current philosophical interest in 
the philosophical “hard problem” of consciousness, which has been stimulated 
by the comparatively recent general acceptance of the fact that we are purely 
physical structures, rather than dualities of mind and matter: how could the 
conscious awareness that we experience arise from our purely physical struc-
ture? As the problem in the form presented arises purely on the basis of intro-
spection—for none of us can ever know another’s consciousness in the sense of 
the hard problem of consciousness—there is no objective observational base to 
which the problem may be referred. A cognitively closed problem is not so 
much philosophically insoluble as philosophically unformulated. 
In none of cases (a), (b) or (c) can there be found a philosophical problem that 
is not addressable by science. 
 In Part II of this essay an attempt is made to show that all philosophical 
problems concerning the mind–world relationship are either amenable to 
scientific investigation and analysis or are not substantial problems at all. This 
is done by setting out a minimal description of the facts that both accommo-
dates the scientific perspective and enables philosophical concerns with the 
mind–world relationship to be dissolved. This addresses (a) by providing an 
observation base that, consonant as it is with known facts, cannot be denied, 
and that gives an essential role to subjective experience, and it addresses (b) 
by recognizing aspects of the mind–world relationship that lie beyond familiar 
                                                   
9 Colin McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness, p. 3 
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experience. A by-product of this procedure is the dissolution of the problems 
relating to subjective experience, namely the problem of qualia and the hard 
problem of consciousness. 
 As a result of the analysis of Part II, it is maintained that there are no 
essentially philosophical problems. 
 
If this thesis seems unduly clear to a philosopher (clearly wrong?), 
then he must have misunderstood what it says.10
                                                   
10 With acknowledgement to Alan Greenspan, as reported in The Economist, March 27th, 
2004, p. 18 
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PART I: Does Philosophy Lead to Science? 
1. Introduction 
Summary: The aim is to investigate the part played by philosophy in 
the acquisition of knowledge and understanding, both in association 
with and independently of science. Only non-normative philosophy is 
considered. 
This essay is concerned to discover the role of philosophy in the acquisition of 
knowledge and understanding. The acquisition of knowledge and understand-
ing is a process that has underlain the development of civilization for the last 
two and a half thousand years, with notable acceleration in the last four hun-
dred years. It is therefore relevant to look at the historical record to see what 
part philosophy has played in this process. As the advent of science is central 
to modern developments, the interaction of philosophy with science is of par-
ticular relevance to the issue, as also are claims that philosophical enquiry 
gives access to knowledge that is closed to science. 
 Philosophy is a broad discipline with pliant boundaries. On one side it 
could be envisaged as bounded by science, on another side by ethics, on an-
other aesthetics, and on a fourth side by history and politics. All but the first of 
these categories are to be thought of as concerning normative issues. Thus 
‘ethics’ here means normative ethics, concerned with what is good and bad, in 
contrast with meta-ethics, the analysis of moral issues, which is near the 
boundary with science and might be informed by a study of anthropology for 
example. Also adjoining science are the philosophy of science, the philosophy 
of history, and so on. This essay is concerned primarily with the vicinity of the 
philosophy–science boundary. Philosophy could once have been said to oc-
cupy most of the field of knowledge and understanding, but as the observa-
tional underpinnings of intellectual enquiry have developed philosophy has 
come to occupy a diminishing central region, proportionally diminished by the 
growth of science. 
2. Does Philosophy Lead to Science? 
Summary: The idea that science emerges from philosophy is ques-
tioned. Did not the scientific revolution free thought from the shack-
les of Aristotelianism? 
Many, particularly philosophers, see the acquisition of knowledge by science 
as a process in which philosophy shows the way, or at least provides the basic 
structure for scientific thinking, thus giving philosophy an important part of 
its justification as a discipline. John Searle, for example, writes: 
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‘Philosophy’ is in large part the name for all those questions which we do not 
know how to answer in the systematic way that is characteristic of science. 
These questions include, but are not confined to, the large family of concep-
tual questions that have traditionally occupied philosophers: what is truth, 
justice, knowledge, meaning, and so forth. For the purposes of this discus-
sion [about the scientific study of consciousness] the only important distinc-
tion between philosophy and science is this: science is systematic knowl-
edge; philosophy is in part an attempt to reach the point where we can have 
systematic knowledge. This is why science is always ‘right’ and philosophy is 
always ‘wrong’: as soon as we think we really know something we stop call-
ing it philosophy and start calling it science. Beginning in the seventeenth 
century, the area of systematic knowledge, that is, scientific knowledge, in-
creased with the growth of systematic methods for acquiring knowledge.11
One could take exception to Searle’s characterization of science as systematic 
in its method of acquiring knowledge: what characterizes science is its method 
(if that is an appropriate name for it; ‘scientific practice’ might be more ap-
propriate), not just that it is systematic in applying it. For philosophy is also 
systematic in applying method, though perhaps not a method of acquiring 
knowledge so much as a critical method that may or may not facilitate the 
acquisition of knowledge. Concerning Searle’s claim about philosophy leading 
to science, it can at least be allowed that foundational stages of enquiry have 
often been accepted as falling partly within the province of philosophy. For 
example, Aristotle’s physics is best regarded as a philosophical precursor of 
mechanics. But was it (in Searle’s words) an attempt, even in part, to reach 
scientific knowledge? That does not appear to have been its aim, and it is 
generally accepted that Aristotle’s physics and cosmology impeded the devel-
opment of science more than it helped. 
 However, this example gives a negative evaluation of philosophy only if 
Aristotle’s physics and cosmology can rightly be called philosophy and Gali-
leo’s physics and cosmology called science. William James makes this general 
observation: 
 It is obvious enough that if every step forward which philosophy makes, 
every question to which an accurate answer is found, gets accredited to sci-
ence the residuum of unanswered problems will alone remain to constitute 
the domain of philosophy, and will alone bear her name.12
 
This differs slightly from Searle’s claim. Whereas Searle imagines scientists 
taking philosophers’ ideas and turning them to scientific use, James, philoso-
pher–scientist that he was, imagines philosophers themselves turning the 
ideas to scientific use, and thereupon being called scientists. As we know, in 
this world there is amongst unexamined propositions as much myth as fact, 
                                                   
11 John R. Searle, “How to Study Consciousness Scientifically”, p. 20 
12 William James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 22 
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and to expose myth we must seek out its factual reference, if any. James refers 
to Galileo, whom he describes as a philosopher in the original sense of the 
word, a universal sage, and quotes Galileo in support of this description: 
“Galileo said that he had spent more years on philosophy than months on 
mathematics.”13 If Galileo implied by this that he was himself a philosopher, 
he certainly did not mean that he was a universal sage, but could only have 
meant that he was a natural philosopher, that is, a physicist. But it is more 
likely that Galileo was referring to the years it took him to free himself from 
the unproductive, teleological, Aristotelian approach to science in which he 
was schooled and which he first taught, and to his years in dispute with the 
entrenched Aristotelian philosophers who opposed him after he had freed 
himself of it. And by ‘mathematics’ Galileo no doubt meant the mathematical 
study of motion that he inaugurated as one of the first scientists in the modern 
sense, where mathematical description yields precise prediction—the book of 
nature is written in the language of mathematics, he said. As an example of his 
dispute with Aristotelians, when a new astronomical body appeared in the sky 
in 1604, Galileo established that it showed no parallax, implying that it could 
not have been a sublunar phenomenon, but must have belonged to the celes-
tial sphere. This contradicted Aristotle’s principle that change cannot occur in 
the celestial sphere, where things are composed of an unchanging substance 
called quintessence, unlike the sublunar region, including the earth, which is 
constituted by the four elements, earth, water, air and fire. Cremonini, the 
professor of philosophy at Padua, wrote in defence of Aristotle (or at least 
Aristotle as interpreted for the Catholic Church by Thomas Aquinas) that 
ordinary measuring processes do not apply to the celestial sphere. Galileo, 
who was professor of mathematics at Padua, 
. . . replied by publishing (over an assumed name) a little dialogue between 
two peasants, written in rustic Paduan dialect, in which he made a peasant 
reason better than the celebrated professor. . . . Galileo’s peasant spokesman 
asked what philosophers knew about measuring anything. It was the 
mathematicians, he said, who had to be trusted in measurements, and they 
did not care whether the thing seen was made of quintessence or polenta, 
because that could not change its distance.14
 Can this activity of Galileo be accurately and fairly described, as Searle 
might have it, as a scientist turning philosophical ideas to scientific use, or as 
James would like to see it, as a philosopher making a step forward in philoso-
phy but with science taking the credit? The facts are quite clear: Galileo’s 
achievement was not a development within a prevailing philosophy; on the 
contrary, it formed a major part of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth 
                                                   
13 James, op. cit., p. 21 
14 Stillman Drake, Galileo, p. 39 
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century, whereby man at last began to free himself from the shackles of a two 
thousand year old philosophical system by means of a completely new way of 
looking at things, which was to look to the observable facts and see what em-
pirical laws they may exemplify. Galileo’s discoveries are called scientific and 
not philosophical because they are scientific and not philosophical, because 
Aristotle and Galileo belonged to entirely different traditions, with different 
aims and different methods of approach. It is these differences that underlie 
and epitomize the difference between philosophy and science. 
 In defence of this thesis, could James have pointed to Galileo’s use of 
mathematics as a scientific development of Pythagorianism? It is unlikely that 
James would have done so, as his quotation was of Galileo’s contrasting phi-
losophy with mathematics. In any case, Pythagoras’s idea was that numbers 
are the basic stuff of the world, whose structure can be discovered by mathe-
matical thought alone, and this was not a philosophical idea with a scientific 
future, as Plato’s and Kepler’s attempts to make something of it illustrate. 
 Perhaps James chose his example unwisely; for have there not been many 
subsequent cases of philosophy leading on to science, for instance the atomic 
theory of the Greeks leading eventually to the modern atomic theory of phys-
ics and chemistry? To understand the mutual development of philosophy and 
science we need to investigate the historical record, and as philosophy and 
science do not exist in isolation from other historical and social movements, it 
is necessary to take those movements into account. There are two important 
movements intimately associated with philosophy and science whose inclu-
sion in any enquiry enable some insight to be obtained into their relationship, 
namely religion in connection with philosophy and technique in connection 
with science. 
3. Comte’s Account of Scientific Development 
Summary: Comte’s Law of development through the theological, 
metaphysical and scientific states is examined. Comte finds the ori-
gin of science in philosophy, but does not explain how philosophy 
arises or how science emerges from philosophy. He takes no account 
of the origins of science in technique. 
It is useful to begin with an account of the sequential development of religion, 
philosophy and science put forward by Auguste Comte in 1822. He proposed a 
“fundamental Law, to which the mind is subjected by an invariant necessity”, 
according to which mankind progresses through the three states, Theological, 
Metaphysical (philosophical) and Positive (scientific). 
 
 5. In the Theological state, the human mind directs its researches mainly 
towards the inner nature of beings, and towards the first and final causes of 
all the phenomena which it observes—in a word, towards Absolute knowl-
edge. It therefore represents these phenomena as being produced by the di-
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rect and continuous action of more or less numerous supernatural agents, 
whose arbitrary intervention explains all the apparent anomalies of the uni-
verse. 
 6. In the Metaphysical state, which is in reality only a simple general 
modification of the first state, the supernatural agents are replaced by ab-
stract forces, real entities or personified abstractions, inherent in the differ-
ent beings of the world. These entities are looked upon as capable of giving 
rise by themselves to all the phenomena observed, each phenomenon being 
explained by assigning it to its corresponding entity. 
 7. Finally, in the Positive state, the human mind, recognising the impos-
sibility of obtaining absolute truth, gives up the search after the origin and 
destination of the universe and a knowledge of the final causes of phenom-
ena. It only endeavours now to discover, by a well-combined use of reason-
ing and observation, the actual laws of phenomena—that is to say, their in-
variable relations of succession and likeness. The explanation of facts, thus 
reduced to its real terms, consists henceforth only in the connection estab-
lished between different particular phenomena and some general facts, the 
number of which the progress of science tends more and more to diminish.15
 
Observe that when Comte refers to ‘the human mind’ he is thinking of the 
collective mind, as embodied in a culture; and when Comte speaks of progress 
toward a positive state, he is thinking of the development within a culture of a 
state not already known to it as fully developed elsewhere, of participation in 
the creation of science. 
 Comte likens philosophy to religion with its supernatural causal agents 
replaced by abstract causal agents, and in their all encompassing forms, with 
God replaced by Nature. Explanation for both religion and philosophy is teleo-
logical, where ‘cause’ means final cause (in Aristotle’s terminology). In the 
Positive state explanation is no longer teleological, final cause having been 
replaced by efficient cause, where action is as described by scientific laws; for 
as Comte writes: 
Man gradually accustomed himself to consider only the facts themselves. In 
that way, the ideas of these metaphysical agents gradually became so dim 
that all right-minded persons only considered them to be the abstract names 
of the phenomena in question. It is impossible to imagine by what other 
method our understanding could have passed from frankly supernatural to 
purely natural considerations, or, in other words, from the Theological to the 
Positive Régime.16
Just as in the highest forms of religion and philosophy multiple causal agents 
are replaced by the single causal concepts of God and Nature, in the Positive 
state a multiplicity of unconnected natural laws tend to be reduced to a unified 
system of laws, a general theory: 
                                                   
15 Auguste Comte, Course in Positive Philosophy, §§5-7 
16 Comte, op. cit., §21 
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. . . the ideal of the Positive system, towards which it constantly tends, al-
though in all probability it will never attain such a stage, would be reached if 
we could look upon all the different phenomena observable as so many par-
ticular cases of a single general fact, such as that of Gravitation, for exam-
ple.17
How do natural laws and the theories that subsume them arise? After noting 
that “All competent thinkers agree with Bacon that there can be no real 
knowledge except that which rests upon observed facts”, Comte writes of the 
function of “Theological conceptions” that 
. . . there were two difficulties to be overcome: the human mind had to ob-
serve in order to form real theories, and yet had to form theories of some 
sort before it could apply itself to a connected series of observations. The 
primitive human mind, therefore, found itself involved in a vicious circle, 
from which it would never have had any means of escaping, if a natural way 
out of the difficulty had not fortunately been found by the spontaneous de-
velopment of Theological conceptions. These presented a rallying point for 
the efforts of the mind, and furnished materials for its activity. This is the 
fundamental motive which demonstrates the logical necessity for the purely 
Theological character of Primitive Philosophy . . .18
Consequently, of the functions of “Metaphysical conceptions” he writes: 
 21. It is easily seen that our understanding, which was compelled to pro-
gress by almost insensible steps, could not pass suddenly, and without any 
intermediate stages, from Theological to Positive philosophy. Theology and 
Physics are so profoundly incompatible, their conceptions are so radically 
opposed in character, that, before giving up the one in order to employ the 
other exclusively, the human intelligence had to make use of intermediate 
conceptions, which, being of a hybrid character, were eminently fitted to 
bring about a gradual transition. That is the part played by Metaphysical 
conceptions, and they have no other real use.19
Comte fits his theory to the historical record by selecting for the inauguration 
of the Positive state, 
. . . the great movement imparted to the human intellect two centuries ago 
[1620’s], by the combined influence of the precepts of Bacon, the concep-
tions of Descartes, and the discoveries of Galileo. It was then that the spirit 
of the Positive Philosophy began to assert itself in the world, in evident op-
position to the Theological and Metaphysical spirit; for it was then that Posi-
tive conceptions disengaged themselves clearly from the superstitious and 
scholastic alloy, which had more or less disguised the true character of all 
the previous scientific work.20
Perhaps Comte includes Descartes because he was a fellow countryman, for 
                                                   
17 Comte, op. cit., §8 
18 Comte, op. cit., §15 
19 Comte, op. cit., §21 
20 Comte, op. cit., §28 
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despite his mathematical orientation Descartes was more philosopher in the 
Aristotelian mould than scientist in the Galilean21, believing that he could find 
the truth about the physical world in his own mind on only casual acquaint-
ance with it, and of whose major scientific work, The Principles of Philosophy, 
Hall writes: 
 The Principles was a triumph of fantastic imagination which happens, 
unfortunately, never once to have hit upon a correct explanation. . . . the 
Principles of Philosophy sorely tried the patience of more empirically 
minded scientists even in the next generation. . . . But Descartes had 
cheated. He had not consulted their laborious notebooks nor had he really 
faced the intricacies of any single phenomenon of nature. He had failed to tie 
theory . . . to the detailed facts of investigation; he had not even attempted to 
do so. Nor had he scrupled—this perhaps worst of all—to feign hypotheses 
which he did not believe to be true in order to fabricate an explanation. And 
his pretence of geometrical certainty (“I wish nothing to be taken for truth 
but that which is deduced with so much rigour that it could serve as a dem-
onstration in mathematics”) was by this fact alone made farcical. Descartes, 
in short, was so imaginative a theorist that he had jeopardized the principles 
of explanation and the very metaphysics which seemed valid to the empiri-
cists themselves, by elaborations only too patently false.22
 Comte’s thesis is a good starting point for an investigation of the develop-
ment of knowledge and understanding, for it is strikingly modern in many of 
its ideas: for example, its recognition that effective observation depends on the 
pre-existence of theory, which itself cannot come into existence without prior 
observation. On the other hand, Comte’s personification of ‘the human mind’, 
and his account of its struggle to escape the vicious theory–observation circle 
reads like the teleology of Aristotle. Comte’s account is historicist: his ‘Law’ 
‘explains’ as inevitable only the developments which it describes, but not why 
modern science arose only in Western Europe, why philosophy arose only in 
ancient Greece, why nascent Greek science did not survive its birth, or why 
Rome had no original philosophy or science. 
 Of the factors that contribute to the rise of science, Comte identifies only 
one, the speculative source of scientific theory, which he says is religion via 
philosophical speculation. Here he is promulgating the same myth that Searle 
and James subscribe to. It is not true that science necessarily draws its first 
inspiration from philosophy, for often, as noted above, science has to struggle 
to free itself from philosophical preconception. Nor is it true that there is a 
vicious theory–observation circle. The ready identification of vicious circles is 
a destructive philosophical practice, due to too narrow a focus on causal influ-
                                                   
21 “Descartes, born to uncover the errors of antiquity, and to substitute his own.”—Voltaire. “If 
I err, I exist.”—St. Augustine. From Bernard Pullman, The Atom in the History of Hu-
man Thought, p. 157 
22 A. Rupert Hall, From Galileo to Newton, p. 120-122 
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ence and too rigid an interpretation of language, on the construction of over 
simplified formal models—the world is far more complex than any philoso-
pher ever dreamt of. The truth is that science obtains its theoretical ideas from 
wherever it can—from the resources of science, from technical practice, from 
commonly accepted concepts (which may or may not be influenced by phi-
losophy)—which it then gradually refines in the light of developing empirical 
and theoretical knowledge. The influence of philosophy and religion often run 
counter to this by binding concepts in a formal straightjacket. Here is the view 
of Richard Feynman, a leading modern physicist: 
 
People may come along and argue philosophically that they like one [alter-
native theory] better than another; but we [physicists] have learned from 
much experience that all philosophical intuitions about what nature is going 
to do fail. One just has to work out all the possibilities, and try all the alter-
natives. . . . philosophically you like them or do not like them; and training is 
the only way to beat that disease. 
. . . mathematics is a deep way of expressing nature, and any attempt to ex-
press nature in philosophical principles, or in seat-of-the-pants mechanical 
feelings, is not an efficient way23
 
 What is not clear from the above quotations from Comte is that Comte’s 
concept of ‘positive philosophy’ is a quite circumscribed version of the modern 
concept of science, for it contains only facts and empirical laws (despite 
Comte’s reference to theory), and eschews anything that could be interpreted 
as at all metaphysical (including the atom: see Section 9). It is probably for 
this reason that Comte relegates the essential heuristic element of science to 
philosophy rather than recognizing it as part of science itself. 
4. Aristotle to Newton: Science Leads the Way 
Summary: Philosophical truth is conformity to philosophical pre-
cepts, which reflect either superficial observation or previously ac-
cepted scientific theory. Mathematical truth is conformity to facts or 
to summary laws. With the Aristotelian cosmology, mathematical 
truth was in service to philosophical truth—the facts had to fit the 
theory. From Aristotle to Newton mathematical truth gradually took 
control, with philosophical truth following unwillingly behind. 
At this point it is convenient to return to the differences noted earlier between 
science and philosophy as epitomized by the different approaches of Galileo 
and Aristotle. This difference is as old as the dual cosmological systems of 
Aristotle and Ptolemy. Indeed it is older, as such a duality existed with the 
Babylonians, who on the one hand had a mythological account of the creation 
of the world and the heavenly abode of the gods and the earthly abode of man, 
and on the other hand had an extensive record of astronomical observations 
                                                   
23 Richard Feynman, The Character of Physical Law, pp. 53, 57 
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from which they were able to predict lunar and solar eclipses with some accu-
racy without knowing anything about the solar system and without reference 
to their cosmological mythology. In the dual systems of Aristotle and Ptolemy, 
Aristotle was concerned with what has been called philosophical truth. This 
means that his cosmological system was required to conform at its inception 
to his total theory of the world, with his theory of natural motion, whereby 
objects move to their natural abode, with the doctrine of the four elements, 
and so on. This system was not mathematical, in fact it did not arise in re-
sponse to any detailed observation, and thus it possessed no predictive power, 
apart from conformity to everyday superficial observation. On the other hand, 
the Ptolemaic system was concerned with quantitative description of the ob-
servable, with what is called mathematical truth, with ‘saving the phenomena’, 
as it was phrased. This system was a mathematical construction conforming 
broadly with Aristotle’s cosmology and with Plato’s geometric idealism, elabo-
rated with additional mathematical constructs (epicycles etc.) so as to yield a 
reasonably precise predictive capability, which was its sole object. In the dual-
ity of Aristotle and Ptolemy we see a primitive progenitor of modern science, a 
pre-scientific system, comprising theory on one side and technique on the 
other. In mature science there is a continual interaction between theory and 
technique, while here there is a rigid conformity of technique to theory, theory 
being pure philosophy, drawing its inspiration largely from mythology but 
virtually nothing from technique. Please refer to Figure 1 at the end of Part I 
for a graphical depiction of these connections. 
 From the point of view of mathematical truth, the conformity of the 
Ptolemaic system to patterns insisted on for philosophical truth could be put 
aside without loss, and if gain in mathematical understanding could be 
achieved by doing so, there would be an incentive to do it. Gain in mathemati-
cal understanding was the main driving force behind Copernicus’s change 
from an earth centred to a sun centred planetary system, and when eventually 
the overwhelming mass of evidence forced philosophy to conform to tech-
nique, we are witness to the birth of modern science. But at the time of Coper-
nicus the evidence was far from overwhelming, and his change to a sun cen-
tred planetary system was more likely to be seen as posing a direct threat to 
philosophical truth as promulgated by the religious establishment, unless, of 
course, it could be presented as motivated by no more than the pursuit of 
mathematical convenience. Here was presented 
 
. . . an ineluctable dilemma: is the supposed motion of the earth a mathe-
matical fiction or does Copernicus maintain that the earth is not immobile in 
the centre of the world, but revolves on its axis as well as about the sun? 
 The first readers of De Revolutionibus had no cause to be alarmed about 
this dilemma, for the work itself is preceded by a preface, entitled To the 
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Reader, About the Hypothesis of This Work, in which it is stated that the au-
thor merely wished to accomplish the task of an astronomer, namely to 
make it possible to calculate the celestial motions with the aid of hypotheses, 
but that the formulation of such hypotheses by no means implies the asser-
tion that they are true [i.e. philosophically true], nor even that they are 
probable. Astronomy cannot provide any certainty on this point; whoever 
takes for truth the suppositions it has made for a different purpose will leave 
this science a greater fool than he was when he started.24
 
This preface was written not by Copernicus but by a Lutheran theologian, 
Andreas Osiander, in order to forestall possible controversy. It is not clear 
whether Copernicus would have approved the preface: no doubt there would 
have been a dilemma for him too had he been confronted with the need to 
decide where the truth lay, for as a canon of the Church his world view was 
anchored in Aristotelian church dogma, while as an astronomer he was inevi-
tably drawn to a perception dictated by mathematical exigency. What we see 
in the case of Copernicus is a change driven entirely by considerations internal 
to astronomical and mathematical technique and in opposition to philosophi-
cal/religious dogma. Fortunately for Copernicus the Church at that time, and 
for the next sixty years, was accommodating of both philosophical and 
mathematical truth, as long as they did not interact, thus allowing Coperni-
cus’s revolutionary transformation to become known in the astronomical 
community, even though it was generally accepted only as a technical devel-
opment. 
 As a result of the Protestant Reformation and the ensuing increased activ-
ity of the Catholic Inquisition, by the time Galileo had reached middle age the 
Church was much less inclined to be so accommodating of dissent. Had Gali-
leo followed the advice of Cardinal Bellamine to 
. . . treat the Copernican system ex suppositione, i.e. merely to assert that the 
planetary phenomena can be saved more easily by taking the sun as centre of 
the world rather than the earth25
Galileo would no doubt have avoided direct confrontation with the Church. 
But Galileo, who was more physicist than astronomer, could, and did, argue 
for the Copernican system from both the physical and astronomical points of 
view—it was he who was first able to effectively answer some of the main 
physical objections to a non-stationary earth by the introduction of a non-
Aristotelian physics. He could not, therefore, bring himself to accept the old 
formula that the Copernican system was philosophically false though mathe-
matically true; for him, philosophical truth meant physical truth as he con-
ceived of physics—the earth really did move. Hence Galileo’s eventual con-
                                                   
24 E.J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, p. 296 
25 Dijksternhuis, op. cit., p. 385 
  
 18
frontation with the Inquisition. Philosophical truth was gradually catching up 
with mathematical truth. 
 As a result of the persecution of Galileo, the centre of scientific develop-
ment moved to north-western Europe, and by Newton’s time Aristotelian 
cosmology had been superseded by Kepler’s mathematical refinement of Co-
pernicus, while physics had still to free itself completely from its Aristotelian 
precepts. Descartes’s The Principles of Philosophy (referred to earlier, Section 
3) gives a good representation of the state of philosophical truth about this 
time. First, in Descartes one finds the same reliance on intuitive insight as a 
source of truth as one finds in Aristotle. Second, Descartes subscribed to the 
Aristotelian tenets that an absolute vacuum is impossible (conceptually and 
therefore physically), and that physical influence between inanimate bodies is 
possible only through immediate contact. He therefore postulated vortices of 
infinitely divisible particles as a medium for transmitting influence between 
bodies separated by apparently empty space, such as planets, and streams of 
screw-like particles for transmitting magnetic attraction and repulsion. Third, 
Descartes adopted and modified Galileo’s concept of inertia, proposing that a 
body move at constant speed in a straight line unless acted upon by another 
body. This principle of inertia was later adopted by Newton for his first law of 
motion. However, according to Descartes, a body’s motion is impeded by the 
particles that fill space, resulting in the circular inertial motion assumed by 
Galileo. Fourth, Descartes believed, with Galileo, that mathematics is the key 
to scientific truth. But he did not believe this in the way Galileo did: for Galileo 
mathematics is the language of science, the means for its expression; for Des-
cartes the world is a purely geometric construct—matter is extension—a view 
which derives from Plato, and ultimately from Pythagoras, and is closely asso-
ciated with the first feature of Descartes’s philosophy, his reliance on intuitive 
insight. Descartes represents the philosophical truth of his time, and his influ-
ence was such, except in England, that it remained dominant long after New-
ton had shown that most of Descartes’s scientific notions were false. 
 Newton’s foremost achievement was the establishment, on observational 
grounds, of a unified system of dynamics combining a universal law of gravita-
tional attractive force between any two bodies with laws of motion applicable 
to any body subject to a force. This system was also unifying, accounting for an 
extraordinary range of physical phenomena in the universe, from planets to 
earth-bound projectiles, from the tides to the shape of the earth. Newton’s 
process of discovery was, in a basic simplified form, as follows. By likening the 
orbit of the moon to the path of a projectile launched from the earth at just 
sufficient speed as not to return to the earth’s surface, Newton first came to 
understand the unity of planetary and local motion. Thus the same gravita-
tional attraction applies to planets as to earth-bound objects, so planets as 
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well as earth-bound objects undergo acceleration in the direction of an attrac-
tive force. Thence, combining a gravitational attractive force of unspecified 
form with an extended law of inertia (Newton’s second law of motion), 
whereby force is defined as proportional to acceleration, and applying this to 
the planets so as to accommodate Kepler’s second and third laws of planetary 
motion, Newton obtained a law of gravitational attractive force between any 
two bodies which is inversely proportional to the square of the distance be-
tween their mass centres, and conversely can be used to derive a more accu-
rate version of all three of Kepler’s laws than Kepler himself stated. Thus New-
ton writes: 
 Hitherto we have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea 
by the power of gravity, but have not yet assigned the cause of this power. 
This is certain, that it must proceed from a cause that penetrates to the very 
centres of the sun and planets, without suffering the least diminution of its 
force; that operates not according to the quantity of the surfaces of the parti-
cles upon which it acts (as mechanical causes are want to), but according to 
the quantity of solid matter which they contain, and propagates its virtues 
on all sides to immense distances, decreasing always as the inverse square of 
the distances. Gravitation towards the sun is made up of the gravitations to-
wards the several particles of which the body of the sun is composed.26
 Like many a great discovery, once made it can readily be comprehended, 
because most of the component parts were already in the scientific commu-
nity, there for the assembling so to speak, though not all quite in the form 
required, and accompanied by many superfluous components with the poten-
tial to confuse the process of discovery unless confidently rejected, these latter 
being principally those incorporated into Descartes’s Principles. 
 Newton’s achievement owed almost nothing to the philosophical truth of 
his time, and was contrary to it in its central idea of gravitational attraction, 
for, as is clearly stated by Newton (quoted above), it postulated influences 
acting at distances of unlimited extent across empty space, contrary to the 
philosophically correct Aristotelian physical principles adopted and promul-
gated by Descartes. Science was now leading philosophy in a new direction. 
5. Reactions to Newton 
Summary: Newton’s physics was at first regarded as mathemati-
cally true, but philosophically false. But as its fecundity became ap-
parent, it assumed the mantle of philosophical truth, with attendant 
attempts to show it to be true a priori. 
How can one make philosophical sense of such a theory as Newton’s? Newton 
himself at first found it unsatisfactory, but was unable to find an explanation; 
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hence his famous statement Hypotheses non fingo27:  
But hitherto I have not yet been able to discover the cause of those proper-
ties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is 
not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hy-
potheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or 
mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.28
By this Newton meant that he made no proposal as to philosophical truth, as 
Descartes had done, merely as to mathematical truth—and hence the title of 
his work, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, The Mathematical 
Principles of Natural Philosophy (compare Descartes’s The Principles of Phi-
losophy). The distinction is expressed unambiguously by Berkeley: 
As for attraction, it was certainly introduced by Newton, not as a true, physi-
cal quality, but only as a mathematical hypothesis. . . . to be of service to 
reckoning and mathematical demonstrations is one thing, to set forth the 
nature of things is another.29
Keith Campbell claims that 
Many a scientist, Newton included, hoped that one day gravitation would be 
shown to be (that is, reduced to) a complicated set of collisions, on the 
ground that action at a distance was impossible.30
But what of the nature of collision? Newton later speculated that collision 
could itself be reduced to action at a distance: 
 Have not the small Particles of Bodies certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, 
by which they act at a distance, not only upon the Rays of Light for reflect-
ing, refracting, and inflecting them, but also upon one another for producing 
a great Part of the Phænomena of Nature?31
 Faced with the phenomenal success of a theory in opposition to many 
prevailing philosophical precepts, what reaction might be expected from the 
philosophical establishment? Newton’s fellow countrymen were on the whole 
more accepting of his theory than Continental Europeans. Locke, who prior to 
Newton’s Principia had written that bodies interact by impulse and nothing 
else, changed his mind: 
It is true I say that bodies operate by impulse, and nothing else. And so I 
thought when I wrote it; and can yet conceive no other way of operation. But 
I am since convinced by the judicious Mr. Newton’s incomparable book, that 
it is too bold a presumption to limit God’s power on this point by my narrow 
conceptions. The gravitation of matter towards matter, by ways inconceiv-
able to me, is not only a demonstration that God can, if he pleases, put into 
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29 George Berkeley, De Motu, Section Section 17-18 
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bodies powers, and ways of operation, above what can be derived from our 
idea of body, or can be explained by what we know of matter, but is also an 
unquestionable and everywhere visible instance that he has done so. And 
therefore, in the next edition of my book, I shall take care to have that pas-
sage rectified.32
An appeal to God alone (or any vague abstraction) can establish nothing—or 
anything, according to one’s disposition and ingenuity: but to get onto firm 
ground one needs to appeal to God’s facts, as Locke was prepared to do. The 
lingering influence of Descartes is illustrated by Leibniz, of whose rejection of 
action at a distance Russell ascribes to a Cartesian prejudice.33 Leibniz’s rejec-
tion of Newton is supported by his following intemperate remarks. 
Thus we see that matter does not naturally have the attraction mentioned 
above, and does not of itself go in a curve, because it is not possible to con-
ceive how this takes place, that is to say, to explain it mechanically, whereas 
what is natural ought to be able to be rendered distinctly conceivable, if we 
were admitted into the secrets of things. This distinction between what is 
natural and explicable and what is inexplicable and miraculous removes all 
the difficulties: in rejecting it we should be upholding something worse than 
occult qualities, and in so doing we should be renouncing philosophy and 
reason, and throwing open sanctuaries for ignorance and idleness, by a stu-
pid system which admits not only that there are qualities which we do not 
understand (of which there are only too many), but also that there are some 
which the greatest mind, even if God provided him with every possible ad-
vantage, could not understand—that is to say they would be either miracu-
lous or without rhyme or reason. It would indeed be without rhyme or rea-
son that God should perform miracles in the ordinary course; so that this 
do-nothing hypothesis would destroy equally our philosophy which searches 
for reasons, and the Divine wisdom which provides them.34
That the rejection derived from a Cartesian prejudice is explained in Leibniz’s 
correspondence with Clarke. 
For it is a strange fiction to regard all matter as having gravity, and even to 
regard it as gravitating towards all other matter, as if every body had an 
equal attraction for every other body in proportion to mass and distance; 
and this by means of attraction properly so called, and not derived from an 
occult impulsion of the bodies. Whereas in truth the gravitation of sensible 
bodies towards the centre of the earth must be produced by the movement of 
some fluid. And the same is true of other gravitations such as those of the 
planets towards the sun or towards one another. A body is never moved 
naturally except by another body which impels it by touching it; and after 
this it goes on until it is hindered by another body touching it. Any other op-
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eration on bodies is either miraculous or imaginary.35
 As, in matters amenable to the scientific approach, it is apparently not the 
role of philosophy to lead the way, then, perhaps, its role is rather to follow on, 
tidying up the logical loose ends, subjecting it to critical analysis in the So-
cratic manner, or showing that the brilliant achievements of science are after 
all inevitable products of the human mind. Philipp Frank offers the following 
description of how philosophy followed on. 
 
 But presently the confirmation of these principles by the increasing range 
of physical facts that could be derived from them changed the attitude of the 
philosophers too. If we examine the general opinion toward the end of the 
eighteenth century we notice a complete revolution. The law of inertia and 
the law of gravitation were no longer regarded as absurd; on the contrary, 
they were declared more and more to be self-evident, derivable from pure 
reason, the only way in which the human mind can understand nature. 
 As an example of this changed attitude we can point to Immanuel Kant’s 
“Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science”, which was published in 1786. 
We find in this book all the theorems of Newton’s Mathematical Principles 
of Natural Philosophy, but they are transformed, so to speak, into a petrified 
state. Newton had invented bold generalizations in order to cover a large 
range of facts that had formerly defied all attempts at rational approach. All 
these general statements, which seemed to Newton’s contemporaries so new, 
so amazing, so absurd, are now quoted as self-evident. Kant claimed to have 
demonstrated that the law of inertia can be derived from pure reason; he 
claimed that the recognition of that law is the only assumption under which 
nature is conceivable to human reason.36
6. Philosophy Rationalizes Science 
Summary: A priori demonstrations of Newton’ physics rest partly on 
an assumed a priori principle of causation. While causation may be 
a presupposition of modern science, it is not an a priori principle, but 
is empirically established, having come into full use only with the 
failure of earlier non-causative principles. The basic human ten-
dency is to seek explanation, whether causal or otherwise. Attempts 
of philosophers to rationalize science are of no value, and can only 
impede its development. A mature science develops from its own re-
sources. The mark of a scientific proposition is the openness of its 
proponents to its falsification. 
The fact that it took two thousand years to discover that one of the keys to a 
successful mechanical description of nature is the law of inertia, and that it 
was then discovered by the scientific enterprise, does not of course preclude 
that it may be derived from pure reason, or that it may be discovered in one’s 
mind by a minimal prompting from empirical reality in the manner of the 
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slave boy’s recollection of geometry in Plato’s Meno. 
 Kant was not the first to propose a derivation of the law of inertia on an a 
priori basis: Jean le Rond d’Alembert proposed such a derivation in 1743 
which is quite clearly expressed, and therefore easily seen to be invalid37. 
Kant’s argument is more difficult, because of his convoluted efforts to incorpo-
rate both empirical and necessary components into physical laws. 
Although Kant was as firmly persuaded as any empiricist that detailed 
knowledge of the physical world could be arrived at only by observation and 
experiment, he was also sure that physics has an unshakeable a priori basis 
that makes it worthy of the name of science. . . . The main object of the 
Metaphysical Foundations is to demonstrate the second of these points by 
means of an examination of the idea of matter.38
 Kant’s argument is in outline as follows. Corresponding to his three transcen-
dental relational principles of substance, causality and community, in me-
chanics there are the three synthetic a priori principles of pure natural sci-
ence, namely the conservation of mass, the law of inertia and the equality of 
action and reaction. Applying these principles to Kepler’s (empirical) laws of 
planetary motion yields the universal law of gravitation (this is a similar deri-
vation to Newton’s described earlier, Section 4), which consequently is more 
than an inductive law, as it possesses both empirical and necessary compo-
nents. Kant commented on the outcome of this process: 
 
 It is . . . a remarkable appearance in the field of science that there was a 
moment where its progress appeared to be terminated, where the ship lay at 
anchor and there was nothing further to be done for philosophy in a certain 
field [Kant has transformed Newton into a petrified state]. Kepler’s three 
analogies had enumerated the phenomena of orbital motion of the planets 
completely [this ignores the fact that Newton modified them], although still 
only empirically, and mathematically described them without yet providing 
an intimation of the moving forces, together with their law, which may be 
the cause thereof. 
 Instead of Kepler’s aggregation of motions containing empirically as-
sembled rules [exhibiting mathematical truth only], Newton created a prin-
ciple of the system of moving forces from active causes [exhibiting philoso-
phical truth, formerly regarded as mathematical truth by Berkeley].39
 
Thus was mathematical truth rationally transformed into philosophical truth. 
It appears that the necessary component in Kant’s derivation of the universal 
law of gravitation enters via the transcendental principles and their corre-
spondence to the principles of natural science: in particular, the correspon-
dence between causality and the law of inertia, which presumably means that 
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these are in some way equivalent. Concerning the law of inertia Kant writes: 
Life means the capacity of a substance to act on itself from an inner princi-
ple, . . . of a material substance to determine itself to motion or rest as al-
teration of its state. . . . all matter as such is lifeless. This, and nothing more, 
is what the proposition of inertia says.40
Thus if the law of inertia corresponds to lifelessness, then lifelessness must 
correspond to causation. 
 To explore this conclusion further, consider the first two statements of 
d’Alembert’s argument (referred to above) which relate to the part of the law 
of inertia concerning a body at rest: 
 
A body at rest will remain so, as long as an external cause does not move it. 
For a body cannot be brought into motion by itself, since there is no reason 
why it should move in one direction rather than another.41
Suppose a body move from rest in a certain direction. How do we explain this 
change? If the body is animate and the movement is voluntary, we seek a 
reason by considering the state of its mind (Latin animus, mind). If the body 
is inanimate, say an alarm clock that dances around on the mantle shelf, we 
may ascribe the reason for its motion to itself. If the body is any piece of mat-
ter at all, there are two alternatives: (1) If there is no obvious external cause, 
such as impact with another body, we seek the reason for its motion within 
itself by, in a sense, ascribing animus to it. This alternative appears to be the 
earliest that occurs in human development, either in individual development 
from birth or in the development of culture, and is the only practical alterna-
tive where explanation of human action is required. Modern man may in cer-
tain circumstances display the same primitive tendencies when confronted 
with behaviour of complex phenomena of which he has but little understand-
ing, such as a computer or the weather. This ascription of animus clearly has a 
descriptive function in explanation, in a similar way to myth, enabling pat-
terns of change to be identified and committed to memory, but it has limited 
predictive capability in the physical world, as the failure of its advanced for-
malization in Aristotelian physics demonstrates. This failure brings us to the 
second way of explaining change. (2) Given that there are circumstances in 
which it is unprofitable to ascribe animus to matter, in order to achieve an 
ability to explain the movement of bodies composed of such matter, or to 
predict their future movement, it is natural to look for some causal explana-
tion. The causal alternative has, of course, always been followed in man’s 
manipulation of the material world in circumstances where he has been able 
to develop a precise knowledge of its behaviour, such as in the routine execu-
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tion of technique. The extension of this alternative beyond the practical into 
the theoretical arena marked the birth of modern science. First, Galileo made 
a detailed examination of what it was, in the gravitational fall of a body say, 
that needed to be explained. Second, Descartes devised hypotheses to explain 
motion in terms of the only known inanimate cause of motion, impact be-
tween bodies. These were shown by Newton to be false. Third, Newton con-
structed a theory of force which explained most of the large scale movements 
of inanimate matter known at the time. One exception was magnetism, which 
continued to be regarded as of an animate nature until it too was examined 
quantitatively and incorporated into the causal structure of physics.42
 From this discussion it can be seen that there are two tacit assumptions 
underlying d’Alembert’s statements. First, animus cannot be successfully 
ascribed to all matter for the purpose of explaining its spontaneous move-
ment. This is clearly not self-evident: it is empirical, based on the failure of 
alternative (1) in the physical world. It took man thousands of years to escape 
from it, an escape which was impeded by its being embedded in an influential 
philosophical system. Second, there is the idea that one should seek a causal 
explanation in circumstances where one’s concern is with matter as essentially 
lifeless. This also is not self-evident. Causation as a principle that may be prof-
itably applied to the study of nature only came into full effect with the scien-
tific revolution, as we have seen. In the way it functions causation represents a 
guiding principle for scientific practice, the seeking of explanation by means of 
quantitative, unified, causally inspired theory: causation thus has a heuristic 
function. But this principle is not only not self-evident, it is false at the level 
where quantum theory provides the appropriate description. 
 Where gods are irrational and the decisions of autocrats are unpredict-
able, the idea of cause as a principle of investigation of natural phenomena 
hardly arises. This offers a clue as to the conditions that are propitious for the 
development of modern science, one of the questions we observed earlier that 
Comte’s Law does not answer. A.N. Whitehead makes the following proposal. 
 
 I do not think, however, that I have even yet brought out the greatest con-
tribution of medievalism to the formation of the scientific movement. I mean 
the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with 
its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying general princi-
ples. Without this belief the incredible labours of scientists would be without 
hope. It is this instinctive conviction, vividly poised before the imagination, 
which is the motive power of research:—that there is a secret, a secret which 
can be unveiled. How has this conviction been so vividly implanted in the 
European mind? 
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 When we compare this tone of thought in Europe with the attitude of 
other civilizations when left to themselves, there seems but one source for its 
origin. It must come from the medieval insistence on the rationality of God, 
conceived as with the personal energy of Jehovah and with the rationality of 
a Greek philosopher. Every detail was supervised and ordered: the search 
into nature could only result in the vindication of the faith in rationality. 
Remember that I am not talking of the explicit beliefs of a few individuals. 
What I mean is the impress on the European mind arising from the unques-
tioned faith of centuries. By this I mean the instinctive tone of thought and 
not a mere creed of words. 
 In Asia, the conceptions of God were of a being who was either too arbi-
trary or too impersonal for such ideas to have much effect on instinctive 
habits of mind. Any definite occurrence might be due to the fiat of an irra-
tional despot, or might issue from some impersonal, inscrutable origin of 
things. There was not the same confidence as in the intelligible rationality of 
a personal being. I am not arguing that the European trust in the scrutability 
of nature was logically justified even by its own theology. My only point is to 
understand how it arose. My explanation is that the faith in the possibility of 
science, generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific 
theory, is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology.43
 
What makes causation appear self-evident is that it is natural to us, immersed 
as we are in our post-Newtonian culture, to interpret our natural disposition 
to seek explanation as a disposition to look for causes, whereas explanation 
may at a more primitive level be sought by looking for reasons for action. It 
was as a post-Newtonian that Kant looked at the world and interpreted his 
own intuitions. However he was partly correct when he wrote: “. . . all matter 
as such is lifeless. This, and nothing more, is what the proposition of inertia 
says.” A more precise conclusion from the above discussion is this: given that 
natural phenomena do not admit of scientific explanation on the assumption 
that matter is animate, the principle of causation may be adopted, applicable 
to both animate and inanimate matter, and from this follows the law of inertia 
in so far as it is concerned with matter at rest. 
 At the base of Kant’s rationalization of physics do not lie necessary princi-
ples of space, time, causation and matter, but empirical propositions any or all 
of which may be false. What function does such a rationalization serve to carry 
out? From the point of view of the furthering of knowledge and understand-
ing, the only function is to block it, at least as far as philosophy is concerned. 
Fortunately physics takes little notice, in its mature state, of philosophical 
claims of the necessity of empirical laws. Sambursky claims this to be true for 
all the exact sciences: 
When modern science turned its back on scholastic philosophy, and the phi-
losophy of Aristotle, it simultaneously turned its back on all philosophy. 
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Galileo and his pupils, the first members of the Royal Society in London, 
Newton, and Huyghens in Holland—all the founders of seventeenth-century 
science—were investigators of nature, not philosophers. After Descartes and 
Leibniz there were no philosophers who contributed anything of importance 
to the exact sciences. That was the parting of the ways. To-day the occasional 
contact between philosophers and scientists takes the form of an epistemo-
logical discussion confined to the meaning of the attainments of science and 
does not affect its methods.44
Shortly Kant’s system was shown to be as useless in almost every one of its 
details as the philosophical systems that had preceded it—of space, time, cau-
sation, matter, and the physical principles derived from them. However, phi-
losophical preconception continued to exert an obstructive influence on other 
emerging sciences, for example chemistry, discussed below. 
 The conclusion reached is that philosophy follows science rather than 
leads it, and that in doing this philosophy seeks to anchor science in place by a 
rationalization of its principles. This conclusion is based so far on the history 
of physics, which is fundamental to the other natural sciences and is thus of 
particular interest to philosophers. It is also a conclusion that assumes a clear 
distinction between philosophy and science, on the basis that science answers 
to observation while philosophy does not. This is not so much a contentious 
issue as one that requires elucidation. It will therefore be accepted for our 
present purposes and the elucidation postponed. Thus while philosophers may 
largely have been content with the state of physics at the end of the nineteenth 
century, in view of the fact that physics advanced from that state there were 
clearly physicists who were not content with it. Consider the example of Lord 
Kelvin, a leading physicist in the latter part of the nineteenth century. As re-
counted by David Bohm, he 
. . . expressed the opinion that the basic general outline of physical theories 
was pretty well settled, and that there remained only “two small clouds”45 on 
the horizon, namely the negative results of the Michelson–Morley experi-
ment [devised to test for the presence of the ether, which would act as the 
absolute frame of reference proposed by Newton] and the failure of [the] 
Rayleigh–Jeans law to predict the distribution of radiant energy in a black 
body.46
But as Kelvin’s two clouds indicates, the saving grace of physics is that its 
concern is with that which is open to observational test, which is not the case 
with philosophy. For, Bohm continues, 
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45 Kelvin writes in “Nineteenth century clouds over the dynamical theory of heat and light”, 
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It must be admitted that Lord Kelvin knew how to choose his “clouds”, since 
these were precisely the two problems that eventually led to the revolution-
ary changes in the conceptual structure of physics that occurred in the twen-
tieth century in connection with the theory of relativity and the quantum 
theory. 
 But there were also physicists (and other scientists) whose ideas tended to 
be held fixed by both philosophical and scientific preconceptions. To evaluate 
such cases the critical question that needs to be asked is, on what grounds 
were these preconceptions held, and on what grounds would they be given up? 
To function satisfactorily, science needs to incorporate a conservative stance, 
whereby certain non-philosophical preconceptions are left unexamined in its 
normal functioning—in what Kuhn calls ‘normal science’47. But science must 
also be open to questioning of such preconceptions when need arises by ex-
amination of their coherence and by empirical testing of theory incorporating 
both the preconceptions and alternatives to them. Where an individual scien-
tist is not prepared to open his mind to such questioning, he is acting as phi-
losopher rather than scientist, and may as a result be instrumental in imped-
ing the progress of science. 
 The case of the physicist/philosopher Mach is of interest in this context. 
Mach was a positivist of phenomenalist persuasion. As a positivist he was led 
to a criticism of Newton’s assumption of the existence of absolute space and 
time, a criticism that acted as a stimulus for Einstein’s theory of relativity. We 
may count this as scientific criticism, as it could, and did, lead to testable the-
ory. As a phenomenalist Mach opposed the reality of atoms to the end of his 
life in 1916, regarding them as entities devised merely for the purpose of orga-
nizing observational phenomena. One might ask on what grounds Mach, as a 
positivist, could distinguish between these two descriptions of the status of 
atoms, as real and as instrumental. What does the reality of a scientific entity 
consist in? If taken in its ordinary meaning, the phrase ‘the reality of a scien-
tific entity’ is a convenient description whose use depends on the degree of 
integration of the entity into scientific theory and practice: thus atoms started 
to become real when their integration began to span both physics and chemis-
try. But if taken in some absolute, metaphysical sense, as Mach apparently 
took it, this phrase refers to a philosophical notion of reality whose use is not 
decidable on any empirical basis, and so from the positivist point of view is 
meaningless. In rejecting the reality of the atom when its integration into both 
physics and chemistry was progressing rapidly, Mach was acting as a philoso-
pher. 
 The conclusion to be drawn from Mach is that a man may be a philoso-
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pher in some context, a scientist in another, and this is no doubt true to some 
degree of any of us. There would therefore be no justification in pointing to 
some famous scientist and saying, “Here is a famous scientist availing himself 
of philosophical truth”, and concluding that philosophical truth is necessary to 
creative science. (After all, there are famous scientists who believe in God.) 
What we must keep in mind is the process by which knowledge and under-
standing are achieved, not the individual actors in the process. This conclu-
sion holds not only for actors, but also for ideas: an idea may be scientific in 
one context, philosophical in another. What decides this is whether the con-
text is part of a scientific process or a philosophical process, whether the proc-
ess is characterized by an endeavour to connect the idea to observation or not. 
This way of describing the scientific and the philosophical allows that an idea 
may move from one context to the other. Thus ideas of science may be taken 
up by philosophy and petrified, and ideas of philosophy may be taken up by 
science and given life. An interesting example of an idea moving from philoso-
phy to science is atomism, which we shall now consider. 
7. Atomism to 1800 
Summary: Atomism, introduced in the fifth century B.C., appears to 
foreshadow and to be the stimulating idea for the modern concept of 
the atom. As it turned out, however, the modern concept was insti-
gated and developed entirely within the empirical constraints of sci-
ence. 
In the history of science, as in other branches of history, it is necessary from 
time to time to indulge in revision, and to see whether the general picture we 
have inherited from the past is a satisfactory account of what actually hap-
pened, or is essentially myth. This is perhaps particularly so in the history of 
science, which has often been written in a whiggish manner as an account of 
the progress of science. Authors whose views seem an anticipation of mod-
ern theories are exalted, although usually the anticipation is far from com-
plete, and the old and new theories were designed to explain different sets of 
phenomena. So it has been with atomism. Since, it is argued, the world is 
composed of atoms, those who in Antiquity or in modern times wrote in 
support of atomism were, in some strong sense, right; while those who op-
posed them were reactionary and wrong, or at least to be apologised for. 
This is absurdly unhistorical.  If we are to assess scientists of the past, we 
must judge their views not by this kind of criterion but by their consistency 
and their power to explain the phenomena then known and felt to be puz-
zling. We shall then find that some atomic theories (for to some extent every 
atomic theory which explains new phenomena is a new and different theory) 
were sound and well based; while others were naïve and speculative.48
Atomism passed through a number of phases from its inception with Leucip-
                                                   
48 David Knight, Atoms and Elements, p. 1 
  
 30
pus and Democritus in fifth century B.C. Greece to its acceptance as part of 
mature science in the early twentieth century. While ‘atom’ has changed in 
meaning from phase to phase, there has nevertheless existed a continuity of 
meaning over phases for a period of two and a half thousand years. This is an 
extraordinary record for an idea that is almost entirely intellectual in origin, 
that states something concrete about the world, and yet has no direct connec-
tion with the observable. Two sciences with a similar record that come to mind 
for comparison with atomism are geometry and astronomy, but both of these 
were sustained by direct connection with the observable. The atomism of 
Democritus was part of the metaphysical argument of his time as to the form 
of what exists, and was devised primarily in answer to Parmenides’s argu-
ment, opposing the naturalistic philosophers, that change and the void are 
impossible: for Democritus, all change derives from the motion of unchanging 
atoms in a void. The very flexibility of this idea is its strength, for the only 
possibility it excludes is the infinite divisibility of matter, a notion that corre-
sponds more to a mathematical idealization than a testable theory. 
 Reading through the history of atomism one can find foreshadowed many 
a modern idea about the atom. Brownian motion is a phenomenon whose 
quantitative explanation by Einstein is taken to mark the point when the real-
ity of the atom became generally accepted. It is named after Robert Brown, 
who in 1827 drew the scientific community’s attention to the perpetual, ran-
dom motion of pollen in water and other similar random motions, such as 
dust particles in air. Here is a description of the phenomenon: 
It is appropriate to examine with greater attention these corpuscles, the dis-
orderly motion of which can be observed in rays of sunshine: such chaotic 
movements attest to the underlying motion of matter, hidden and impercep-
tible. You will indeed observe numerous such corpuscles, shaken by invisible 
collisions, change path, be pushed back, retrace their steps, now here, now 
there, in all directions. It is clear that this to-and-fro movement is wholly 
due to atoms. First, the atoms move by themselves, then the smallest of the 
composite bodies, which are, so to speak, still within reach of the forces of 
the atom, jostled by the invisible impulse from the latter, start their own 
movement; they themselves, in turn, shake slightly larger bodies. That is 
how, starting from atoms, movement spreads and reaches our senses, in 
such a way that it is imparted to these particles which we are able to discern 
in a ray of sunshine, without the collisions themselves which produce them 
being manifest to us. 
Could this have been written by Brown? In fact it was written more than two 
thousand years earlier, by Epicurus49, of which Bernard Pullman writes, “This 
passage is nothing short of an excellent introducion to the concept of 
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Brownian motion”50. And here is Newton speculating on atomic structure, for 
which there was no evidence in his time (the initial statement of this quotation 
was referred to earlier): 
 
 Have not the small Particles of Bodies certain Powers, Virtues, or Forces, 
by which they act at a distance, not only upon the Rays of Light for reflect-
ing, refracting, and inflecting them, but also upon one another for producing 
a great Part of the Phænomena of Nature? For it’s well known, that Bodies 
act one upon another by the Attractions of Gravity, Magnetism, and Electric-
ity; and these Instances shew the Tenor and Course of Nature, and make it 
not improbable but that there may be more attractive Powers than these. For 
Nature is very consonant and conformable to her self. . . . The Attractions of 
Gravity, Magnetism, and Electricity, reach to very sensible distances, and so 
have been observed by Vulgar eyes, and there may be others which reach to 
so small distances as hitherto escape Observation; and perhaps electrical At-
traction may reach to such small distances, even without being excited by 
Friction. . . . 
 Now the smallest Particles of Matter may cohere by the strongest Attrac-
tions, and compose bigger Particles of weaker Virtue; and many of these may 
cohere and compose bigger Particles whose Virtue is still weaker, and so on 
for divers Successions, until the Progression end in the biggest Particles on 
which the Operations in Chymistry, and the Colours of natural Bodies de-
pend, and which by cohering compose Bodies of a sensible Magnitude.51
 
Given that neither Epicurus nor Newton knew anything of the modern physics 
that they appeared to foreshadow, it seems almost as if the true state of the 
atomic world could be discovered by thought alone. Putting this with a little 
more circumspection: plausible, qualitative and undetailed models for the 
structure of matter are fairly easily constructed. But we must remember that 
these are only models; the structure itself has not been easy to discover, and 
for the structure we have now, quantum mechanics, there is no single model 
expressible in terms of macroscopic phenomena. For science we need both 
models and structure with predictive capability, whereas philosophy deals 
only in models. The fact that the atomic model of Democritus has a rough 
resemblance to later scientific models does not make it scientific, or pre-
scientific—it was metaphysical, because devised as a response within a meta-
physical discourse. This metaphysical model, however, was the beginning of a 
series of atomistic models: passing from Democritus to Epicurus, Gassendi, 
and thence to Boyle and Newton. Can we say that at some point this series 
passed into a pre-scientific phase? Consider Boyle and Newton. At the time 
that these models were put forward the state of technique and scientific 
knowledge was such that it was not possible to relate atomistic assumptions to 
the observable world. Nevertheless their proposals, made by scientists on the 
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basis of scientifically developed intuition, were more useful as speculative 
starting points for future scientific elaboration than rationally argued meta-
physical proposals which are generally not as amenable to modification in the 
light of observational experience. Boyle’s and Newton’s atomisms could there-
fore be counted as belonging near the beginning of a scientific process. But 
how they are counted has little bearing on our concern with the relation be-
tween philosophy and science, because as it turned out the inauguration of 
atomism as a science was almost entirely generated from within science itself, 
owing practically nothing to philosophical or pre-scientific models. If philoso-
phy had any influence on the development of scientific atomism, it was to 
impede it. But before considering the beginnings of scientific atomism in the 
early nineteenth century, we shall take a look at the development up to that 
time of chemistry, with which atomism came to be closely associated. 
8. The Struggle to Make Chemistry Scientific, to 1800 
Summary: Turning chemistry into a science took most of the eight-
eenth century. Chemistry had first to extricate itself from the old phi-
losophical four element theory of matter. This process was exacer-
bated by the phlogiston hypothesis acting in unison with the four 
element theory, and was finally completed by Lavoisier in the 1780’s. 
It is convenient to regard the scientific development of chemistry, that is its 
development as a coherent theory backed by established experimental prac-
tice, as occurring in two stages. The first stage concerned the struggle to un-
derstand the nature of the components of a chemical reaction. It may be taken 
to have begun with the phlogiston hypothesis in the early eighteenth century 
and to have ended in the 1780’s with Lavoisier’s demolition of phlogiston, 
identification of common chemical reactants, including oxygen, and introduc-
tion of modern chemical nomenclature. Atomism played no active part in this 
stage. The second stage in the development of chemistry concerned the strug-
gle to obtain precise formulae for chemical compounds and reactions in terms 
of chemical atoms, and in so doing to establish the concept of the chemical 
atom. This stage began in 1808 with the introduction of chemical atoms by 
John Dalton, and is usually taken to have ended in 1860 when Stanislao Can-
nizzaro gave a complete method for finding chemical formulae. 
 At the beginning of the eighteenth century chemistry was in possession of 
a wealth of observational data, much of it coming from alchemy, metal work-
ing and iatrochemistry, with a variety of explanatory myths associated with 
these practices, but no coherent theory by which to make sense of chemistry as 
such. For the classification of matter there had been no improvement on the 
ancient classification by Empedocles, deriving from earlier sources still, into 
the four elements of earth, water, air and fire, except where this was rejected, 
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by Newton for example, in favour of some observationally unsubstantiated 
variant of atomism. There was also a persistent belief in the possession of 
animus by various substances, particularly the metals because of their resilient 
properties. The principal difficulties in the path of the development of chemis-
try on the theoretical side derived mainly from the four element theory and its 
subsequent formalization by Aristotle, from which it took chemistry until the 
mid-nineteenth century to fully extricate itself. These difficulties manifested 
themselves as follows. 
 Foremost was the difficulty of establishing the concept, fundamental to 
chemistry, of a material (or ‘corporeal’) substance. If earth and water are sub-
stances, then so, are air and fire. If fire is a substance, what then can it mean 
to be a substance? Does it mean only that it can produce a physical effect, or 
does it mean that it can be weighed? If the former, then if fire is a substance 
surely heat is also. Gassendi and Descartes, for example, thought that “heat, 
cold and magnetism were evidence of ‘calorifick’, ‘frigorifick’ and ‘magnetick’ 
corpuscles”52. Caloric was still current at the end of the eighteenth century, 
being included in both Lavoisier’s and Dalton’s lists of elements. On the other 
hand, if a substance is that which can be weighed, then it must be possible to 
weigh fire. Boyle believed he had weighed it: 
 
 Since so many kinds of particles were ponderable, Boyle felt that ‘calo-
rifick and frigorifick’ atoms might have a detectable weight also, and set 
about devising experiments to detect their presence with the balance. His 
experiments ‘to make Fire and Flame Stable and Ponderable’ eventually gave 
a positive result, and he concluded that he had actually weighed the sharp 
and piercing corpuscles of fire. 
 His methods were exact and scrupulous. Eight ounces of tin were care-
fully weighed out and put into a glass flask, . . .53
 
What it was that made air a substance also faced a difficulty, for it was a long 
time before satisfactory means for weighing gases were developed. In fact, as 
air and fire were the two elements possessing levity, the idea that there could 
be gases quite distinct from air had a difficult conception, as for some time all 
gases were thought of as air containing various contaminants, called ‘fumes’. 
The difficulty of weighing accurately also impeded the acceptance of weight as 
a decisive factor in chemical analysis, and this in turn facilitated the estab-
lishment of the phlogiston hypothesis. This derived from the ancient belief 
that combustion and the calcination of metals involved the giving up of some-
thing, phlogiston (from φλογ– flame), whose identity was uncertain, but was 
associated in some way with the material of fire produced in burning. For 
example, charcoal was said to contain phlogiston, which it gives up to calx 
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(oxide of a metal) to produce metal, thus making all metals compounds. And 
as metals were regarded by alchemists as alive by virtue of their attractive and 
useful properties, phlogiston was thought of as the spirit that gave life to calx. 
When it was eventually found that phlogiston had negative weight, this phe-
nomenon was identified with the Aristotelian notion of levity, in contrast with 
gravity, possessed by air and fire (and spirit), and further delayed the use of 
weight as a technique in chemistry. As the four element theory had water as an 
element, the discovery of the compound nature of water was impeded. At the 
same time this supported the phlogiston theory: for example, the discovery by 
Cavendish that combining hydrogen with oxygen produces water was inter-
preted by him as the combining of dephlogisticated water with phlogisticated 
water to produce the element water. Joseph Priesley is often credited with the 
discovery of oxygen (in 1774); but what he did was, in his own words, to isolate 
‘dephlogisticated air’ (by that time air was recognized to be a mixture). The 
phlogiston hypothesis and the four element theory were mutually supporting. 
 One might have thought that, irrespective of the want of technical devel-
opment, it would not have taken great insight or perseverance to have tried 
reversing much of this analysis, so that phlogiston becomes negative oxygen 
so to speak, water becomes a compound of hydrogen and oxygen, air becomes 
a mixture of oxygen, nitrogen and carbon dioxide, metals become elements, 
and everything falls into place. That is more or less what happened when 
Lavoisier set about his programme of experimentation and analysis of existing 
results in the 1770’s. But we can see why it took so long to reach this point. 
Insight of the order possessed by Newton in physics and Lavoisier in chemis-
try is possible only after technique has advanced sufficiently to establish un-
ambiguous experimental results, and existing prejudices have been whittled 
away sufficiently by their confrontation with those results—no amount of 
rational argument alone is going to shake a philosophical prejudice. The most 
important technical development in chemistry was the balance and the corre-
sponding incorporation of weight as a necessary criterion by which chemical 
analysis can be carried out, brought to prominence largely by Lavoisier. We 
cannot attribute the delayed chemical revolution to the phlogiston hypothesis, 
for this was only a device by which to preserve the philosophical ideas inher-
ited from the ancient past and transmitted down to the eighteenth century by 
philosophers and artisans. We observe here another instance of philosophy 
impeding the development of science. 
9. Scientific Atomism 
Summary: Dalton proposed an atomic hypothesis to account solely 
for the proportions in which elements combine chemically, no physi-
cal properties of his atoms being required for this purpose. This pro-
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posal was put forward in response to the chemical facts, owing vir-
tually nothing to traditional atomic ideas. Many chemists were re-
luctant to commit themselves to this chemical atomism without fur-
ther corroborating evidence. This reluctance was turned to outright 
rejection amongst a substantial body of chemists by the positivist 
movement, which rejected any hypothetical entity that could not be 
‘observed’, and was consequently a negative influence on the devel-
opment of atomism. 
We have observed that while atomism had by 1800 been in existence as a 
hypothesis in one form or another for over two thousand years, it had never 
commanded, let alone received, any observational confirmation, it had never 
been more than a plausible hypothesis. The accepted form of atomism in 1800 
was Newton’s (see Section 7), which reflected qualitatively what was then 
known of physics and chemistry. Being without quantitative empirical sup-
port, it stood more as a point of reference for the atomic idea than as a pro-
gramme of research. 
 John Dalton began his professional life in physics.  His investigations in 
meteorology posed the question as to why atmospheric gases do not separate 
into layers according to their densities, and also resulted in his discovery of 
the law of partial pressures, whereby the pressure of a mixture of gases is the 
sum of the pressures that each alone would exert. This led him to consider an 
explanatory model in which gases consist of Newtonian type atoms of weight 
reflecting intrinsic gas density. This was only a qualitative model, which Dal-
ton did not work out mathematically. It envisaged stationary atoms connected 
by springs and was therefore quite distinct from the models that were treated 
mathematically later in the nineteenth century in the kinetic theory of gases. 
Following the suggestion of his meteorological investigations, Dalton’s atten-
tion turned to “. . . determining the number and weight of all chemical ele-
mentary principles which would enter into any sort of combination one with 
another”54, particularly in view of Joseph-Louis Proust’s recently discovered 
Law of Constant Proportion concerning chemical composition, whereby ele-
ments combine in any given chemical composition in fixed proportions by 
weight. For example, water is formed from one unit weight of hydrogen in 
combination with eight unit weights of oxygen. This points convincingly to an 
atomic structure. Further corroboration came from the several proportions in 
which elements may combine. For example, Proust had shown that tin and 
oxygen combine in either one of the two proportions 88.1% to 11.9% or 78.7% 
to 21.3%, depending on the chemical circumstances. Expressed in this form, 
there does not seem to be a suggestion of atomic combination. When Dalton 
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expressed these proportions in the equivalent form 7.4:1 and 7.4:2, it could be 
seen (what cannot be seen in Proust’s way of writing them) that the amounts 
of oxygen that combine with tin are in the simple proportion 1:2. Another 
example is the two compounds carbon monoxide, CO, and carbon dioxide, 
CO2, whose proportions are 12:16 and 12:32. Similar examples led Dalton to 
his Law of Multiple Proportions: When the same weight of one element com-
bines with different weights of another, the different weights are in simple 
proportions. On the basis of these two laws there is a very strong indication of 
an atomic structure (though not a proof), which Dalton proposed as his atomic 
hypothesis in his book of 1808, A New System of Chemical Philosophy: 
 In all chemical investigations, it has justly been considered an important 
object to ascertain the relative weights of the simples which constitute a 
compound. But unfortunately the inquiry has terminated here; whereas 
from the relative weights in the mass, the relative weights of the ultimate 
particles or atoms of the bodies might have been inferred, from which their 
number and weight in various other compounds would appear, in order to 
assist and to guide future investigations, and to correct their results. Now it 
is one great object of this work, to show the importance and advantage of as-
certaining the relative weights of the ultimate particles, both of simple and 
compound bodies, the number of simple elementary particles which consti-
tute one compound particle, and the number of less compound particles 
which enter into the formation of one more compound particle.55
Thus Dalton proposed that elements occur in indivisible units called atoms, 
which combine chemically in simple multiples. No specific physical properties 
of these atoms needed to be assumed in order to give effect to their ability to 
combine chemically, though Dalton adhered to a physical model for which 
there was at that time no evidence. At this stage they were, in effect, only 
counting beads. In the case of two elements Dalton proposed that their atoms 
combine in one or more of the ratios 1:1, 1:2, 2:1, 1:3, 3:1, 2:3, etc., the earlier 
ratios being preferred on grounds of simplicity. Thus, as we now know, water 
is the combination of two hydrogen atoms of unit atomic weight with one 
oxygen atom of atomic weight 16, written , giving rise to a ratio by 
weight of 1:8, as observed. As, at the time, and at least until Cannizzaro (re-
ferred to in Section 8), there was no sure way of deciding the proportions in 
which atoms combine, Dalton incorrectly assumed, on the above grounds of 
simplicity, that the atoms of water occur in the ratio 1:1. It was because of this 
uncertainty that Dalton’s concept of atom was not fully accepted by chemists 
for many years. 
16
1
1
2OH
 The beginning of scientific atomism has been recounted in a few of its 
details in order to demonstrate how a scientific hypothesis can be almost 
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forced on the mind of the scientist by (1) the facts that confront him, and (2) 
the kinds of scientific model that are available to him. In the case of Newton a 
third influence could be added: (3) the mathematical (that is, structural) tech-
niques that are to hand or that can be developed where required. (Remember 
that Newton developed the calculus in order to comprehend elliptical, orbital 
dynamics and gravitational attractive forces due to complex bodies. Dalton’s 
atomic hypothesis involved only elementary mathematics.) The kind of scien-
tific model available to Dalton was the atomism that had been part of man’s 
culture since Leucippus and Democritus, and perhaps even before then and 
lost in the mists of time (as almost happened to Leucippus himself). Van Mel-
sen comments on the philosophical sources of Dalton’s atomic theory thus: 
 Now that we have seen how Dalton’s conception of the atomic theory was 
determined by the chemical science of his time, the question may be raised 
whether Dalton was also influenced by philosophic motives. As with so many 
other questions, this one may be answered both in the affirmative and in the 
negative. It all depends on the meaning of the question. The answer will be 
negative if the question is taken to mean whether Dalton deliberately chose a 
philosophic position, i.e. whether Dalton expressed his own opinion in the 
matter only after a previous examination of the philosophic foundations of 
the atomism proposed by Democritus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras, or that 
proposed by Gassendi, Descartes, and Boyle, and of the minima theory pro-
posed by Aristotle or Sennert. The answer will also be negative if the ques-
tion is taken to mean whether Dalton, without mentioning or even knowing 
of the existence of previous viewpoints, nevertheless deliberately turned his 
attention to the problems of smallest particles which had caused disagree-
ment among philosophers in former ages.56
He then goes on to consider how Dalton may have unconsciously taken over 
philosophical views of the past, such as the minima theory, which allowed the 
atoms of every element to be different from those of others, as Dalton did. It is 
not necessary to answer such questions, as the chemical data unambiguously 
point in that direction. Had atomism not existed, it is not hard to imagine its 
being invented by Dalton, or by some more brilliant mind of similar inde-
pendent streak, as an obvious way of accounting for the chemical facts con-
fronting him. In fact, the response of many chemists to Dalton’s atomic pro-
posal was that it was nothing more than that, a mere way of accounting for the 
facts of chemical composition. And at that time that was its sole, slender, but 
nevertheless compelling, connection with empirical observation, beyond 
which there could only be hope for a richer, deeper chemical theory in the 
manner of the unified theory that had been obtained for physics, one that 
would explain Dalton’s seemingly arbitrary proliferation of atoms contrary to 
the accepted view of what an atomic theory should be like. This decidedly 
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rational, if unsympathetic, assessment was the view of the majority of chem-
ists. Representative of their views are those given by Humphry Davy on pre-
senting, as President of the Royal Society, a Royal Medal to Dalton in 1826. 
[Dalton’s] first views, from their boldness and peculiarity, met with but little 
attention; but they were discussed and supported by Drs Thomson and Wol-
laston; and the table of chemical equivalents of this last gentleman separates 
the practical part of the doctrine from the atomic or hypothetical part, and is 
worthy of the profound views and philosophical acumen and accuracy of the 
celebrated author. . . . With respect to the weight or quantity in which the 
different elementary substances entered into union to form compounds, 
there was scarcely any distinct or accurate data. Persons whose names had 
high authority differed considerably in their statements of results; and stati-
cal chemistry, as it was taught in 1799, was obscure, vague and indefinite, 
not meriting the name of a science. To Mr Dalton belongs the distinction of 
first unequivocally calling the attention of philosophers [that is, chemists] to 
this important subject . . . thus making the statics of chemistry depend upon 
simple questions in subtraction or multiplication, and enabling the student 
to deduce an immense number of facts from a few well-authenticated, accu-
rate, experimental results.57
 But there was another view in distinct opposition to Dalton’s atomic hy-
pothesis, which was based on more fundamental, philosophical grounds. This 
was the positivist view, two proponents of which we have met in the persons of 
Comte and Mach, and which was also represented amongst chemists by Wol-
laston, referred to by Davy. The positivist thesis was not just that there was 
insufficient data at the time on which to base an atomic hypothesis that was 
anything more than an accounting procedure; the positivist thesis was that 
there could never be any empirical basis for an atomic hypothesis, that atoms 
of the size required, smaller than the eye would ever be able to detect, could 
never be an object of knowledge, that therefore there could be no way of decid-
ing, for example, in what proportions ‘atoms’ of hydrogen and oxygen com-
bine to produce water. Comte wanted to restrict scientific knowledge to laws, 
that is, summaries of observable regularities. Mach wanted to go further than 
this, and restrict knowledge to the elements upon which he supposed observa-
tion to be based, what became known later as sense data. For these positivists, 
anything beyond the potentially observable can never be an object of scientific 
knowledge. In the case of Comte, this doctrine could lead to absurdity: for 
example, he asserted that it is nonsensical to speculate about the chemical 
constitution of an astronomical body, as it would be impossible to ever con-
duct the necessary chemical analysis to determine it—this was shortly before 
the development of spectroscopy enabled chemists to conduct the impossible 
analysis. Observation of the far side of the moon, another Comtean impossi-
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bility, had to wait longer. Up until about 1860 it was easy for a scientist to take 
a positivist attitude to atoms, which was a similar attitude to that taken to 
gravitational attraction before it became essential for the working scientist 
and was proclaimed on philosophical grounds to have an a priori basis. Many 
chemists adhered to the positivist view of atomism. One of these was Marcel-
lin Berthelot, who had a great influence in France, as 
. . . he had a high-level government position, which gave him the power to 
interfere with the spread of ideas he disapproved of; his own official edicts 
practically banned the teaching of the atomic theory in favour of equivalent 
weights right until 1890. In fact Berthelot was an unbending equivalentist 
who limited the objective of science to devising classification schemes and 
recording relations between observable phenomena, in keeping with the 
purest positivist tradition (although he vigorously denied it). The atomic hy-
pothesis was in his view only a “source of confusion” unworthy of being 
taught in chemistry courses.58
Berthelot wrote: 
Science must be based on laws [that is, empirical laws] and not on hypothe-
ses. Laws can be proposed, debated, and definitively established, after which 
they become a solid foundation for science to progress steadily according to 
a methodology and language accepted by all. . . . Today, many chemists less 
attuned to the precision of physical notions pretend they can replace the 
strict definitions of the laws themselves with murky descriptions—
hypotheses, that is, which change with each generation, each school of 
thought, or even each individual.59
But as the kinds of observation that were made sense of by an atomic hypothe-
sis, at first purely chemical, then physical, grew in diversity and unity into a 
scientifically compelling case for atomism, positivism in its physical/chemical 
expression lost the interest of philosophers, who sought fresh fields in which 
to do battle in the newly emerging behavioural sciences. The influence of phi-
losophy on scientific development had once again, in the case of atomism, 
been negative. 
 The reason for the failure of positivism was the same as the reason for the 
failure of all philosophical dogmas, its foundation on doctrinaire assumptions, 
based solely on prevailing intuition, cultural and religious affinity and phi-
losophical prejudice, as to the limits of possibility: possible observation, pos-
sible theoretical construct, possible connection between the two. Every meta-
physics is founded on such assumptions, but positivism was distinct in at-
tempting to limit possibility in order to eliminate metaphysics, by restricting 
theoretical entities to those which could be observed ‘directly’. It failed not 
only because this attempt involved a contradiction, being itself based on a 
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metaphysical precept, but also because the limitations it assumed were based 
on a misunderstanding of what constitutes observation, a concept which they 
never succeeded in making coherent, and consequently could not reach 
agreement on. 
 It is true that scientific theory also limits possibility: if it did not, it would 
not have content. But limits to possibility in science are not laid down dog-
matically, but are hypothetical, being entailed by specific theoretical construc-
tion, and hence always open to refutation. For example, the impossibility of 
absolute space and time is not laid down as an inalienable physical principle, 
but is entailed by the positive proposals of the theory of relativity.60
10. Recapitulation 
Summary: A graphical summary of the main influences between re-
ligion, philosophy and science is presented in Figure 1 at the end of 
Part I. 
The historical evidence has been restricted thus far to the exact sciences, those 
amenable in their early development to mathematical treatment. This has 
been due to the author’s greater familiarity with these sciences and the need to 
restrict the historical evidence under consideration. It should not be con-
cluded, however, that the nature of the interaction between philosophy and 
science observed in the exact sciences is not also clearly evident in the biologi-
cal and behavioural sciences. Thus, regarding the theory of evolution, by 
which biology has achieved a scientific unity both within itself and with other 
sciences, and which has also had an enormous effect outside biology, and on 
philosophy itself, we find that this was established through the enormous 
weight of observational evidence collected by Darwin, not in consequence of 
philosophical speculation, which on the whole acted as an impediment to its 
establishment. Consider, for example, the following quotation from Ernst 
Mayr, a biologist described as one of the main architects of the modern syn-
thesis of genetic and evolutionary theory: 
Hindsight suggests that enough facts were available soon after 1859 to have 
permitted the universal acceptance of Darwin’s theories, yet they were not 
universally adopted until about 80 years later. What could have been the 
reason for this long resistance? This is what historians have long asked 
themselves, but a satisfactory answer was not found until rather recently. 
The resistance, it was found, was due to the dominance of certain almost 
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universally held philosophical ideas in the worldview of Darwin’s opponents. 
A strict belief in the literal truth of every word in the Bible was one of them. 
Its power, however, was limited, as is shown by the rapid acceptance (except 
by creationists) of Darwin’s theory of common descent. However, several 
other ideologies in conflict with Darwin’s theories were essentialism and 
finalism. . . . It is quite impossible to understand the nature of post-
Darwinian controversies unless one understands the nature of the ideologies 
opposed to Darwin.61
 From the historical evidence considered the following conclusions can be 
drawn in respect of the pursuit of knowledge. Knowledge is obtained through 
the development of technique in manipulating things, including the estab-
lishment of empirical laws, and through ensuing theoretical constructs of 
science. There is no single inspirational source for scientific theory. While a 
science is in its infancy and has little theoretical content, theory is suggested 
by analogy with theory from other sciences, and by models based on familiar 
phenomena conforming to known empirical laws. Philosophy scarcely enters 
into it. The problem with philosophical models is that they are not designed to 
satisfy an overriding empirical requirement, but to satisfy philosophical 
agenda irrelevant to and often inimical to science. When a science is mature, 
theory is created from within science, or stimulated by new empirical results, 
or by developed scientific intuition, or by theoretical developments in other 
sciences, or by progress toward unification with other sciences. Philosophy 
and science appear to be more closely associated than in fact they are because 
they both prosper in similar social contexts and because they are both con-
cerned with explanation. No doubt there is some mutual stimulation of each 
by the other’s example of free speculative activity. But as to particular devel-
opments, the relationship is asymmetrical: philosophy often inhibits scientific 
development, while scientific development stimulates philosophy to adopt 
new positions from which it may attempt to further inhibit scientific develop-
ment. (No wonder Feynman refers to philosophy as a disease (see Section 3).) 
The asymmetry is easily understood. Science develops in response to technical 
and empirical development, which in turn arise in the context of political, 
economic and cultural circumstances (including warfare). In turn, science 
stimulates the developments to which it responds, and influences its circum-
stances. Comte seems to be right in saying that philosophy developed from 
religion, adhering to the non-empirical, metaphysical nature of its progenitor. 
An examination of the Greeks bears this out (discussed in the next section). 
Just as religion seeks intellectual and political control, so does philosophy, 
which therefore seeks to control scientific development, or failing this, to 
control its interpretation. It is clearly not the business of philosophy to seek 
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knowledge, and being non-empirical, it is not possible for it to do so. All it can 
do is apply a rational gloss over common experience, including the offerings of 
science as they appear. 
11. Explanation, Technique and the Greeks 
Summary: The use of explanatory models incorporating familiar 
concepts is common to religion, philosophy and science. Only reli-
gious explanation existed until 600 B.C., when conditions in Greece 
and its colonies were congenial to the rise of the Pre-Socratic phi-
losophers. Those conditions were primarily freedom from monarchi-
cal and priestly dominance and the stimulus provided by cultural 
variety. Characteristic of the first philosophy was both its naturalis-
tic content, which was adapted to some extent from existing mythol-
ogy, and its speculative freedom. Apart from atomism, later Greek 
philosophy became unduly influenced by axiological considerations. 
Coexistent with religious and philosophical explanation was tech-
nique and craft, for which Aristotle used the terms episteme for the 
former, techne for the latter. 
 The existence of experimental science requires active interaction 
between episteme and techne, which for the Greeks was almost non-
existent, so that the Greeks cannot be said to have been engaged in 
science, but only in those two separate activities. The failure to en-
gage in science proper was due to the dominating influence of epis-
teme, as represented by Plato and Aristotle, which blocked the crea-
tion of science from within techne itself, the basis upon which science 
was finally created in the seventeenth century. This dominant epis-
teme had originated in response to the incipient science of the Pre-
Socratics. Without a scientific basis, techne gradually declined; and 
without a scientific inspirational source, Greek philosophy also de-
clined, relapsing into the dogma from which it first arose. 
It was observed in Section 10 that philosophy and science are both concerned 
with explanation. As observed in Section 6, man has a natural disposition to 
seek explanation; and because religion too is concerned with explanation, and 
provides it in the most elemental form, there is a universal presence of religion 
and myth in primitive societies. Man has always found himself confronted by 
apparently unanswerable questions concerning his existence in this world, 
and concerning the world itself. Consider, for example, the following question: 
“How can it be that in a world that has apparently existed for countless ages, 
and no doubt will continue to exist for countless ages, I will at my death have 
existed for only a brief moment of those countless ages? Why do I exist at just 
this particular time rather than at some other time? Why, indeed, is my life 
not coexistent with the world of which I feel so much a part? As it is not, then 
how is it possible that I can come into possession of knowledge of the world? 
Is it not, rather, that I can never gain knowledge of the world as it really is, 
that I am like a prisoner in Plato’s parable of the cave, where what I see is but 
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a shadow and the sounds I hear but echoes of the real world lying beyond my 
apprehension.” Or consider the unanswerable grief that is experienced on first 
learning that a loved one will never again respond to one’s voice or to the 
touch of one’s hand—what comfort can one then find but in conjuring into 
existence a world beyond that of our immediate experience where the loved 
one may dwell? There is thus the mystery of the world that exists independ-
ently of our perceiving it, the world that we can never come to know immedi-
ately—without the mediation of our own selves—but imagine that somehow 
we can be sure exists as the foundation of all our knowledge and of our very 
existence. This is the world of the gods of religion, or in philosophy it is the 
reality behind the appearance—at least for the realist of a metaphysical per-
suasion. But in the practice of science the only world is that which comes to 
knowledge by means of its own endeavours, as an object of its own theorizing. 
 Until the advent in about 600 B.C. of the first Greek philosophers, the Pre-
Socratics, the only way of coming to terms with such apparently unanswerable 
questions was through the offerings of established religion, as it has continued 
to be for the great majority of mankind. Religion usually answers such ques-
tions as the ones asked above with some notion of the eternal and the super-
natural. Thus with the Christian religion there is life everlasting, a loving God 
who watches over us and is the source of all things, and so on. This is of the 
nature of an explanation, which in its primitive form amounts to the construc-
tion of a teleological model based on familiar circumstances analogous to the 
circumstance requiring explanation. The Christian model explains life and 
death using the ideas of life everlasting, God the Father and so on, by analogy 
with the familiar circumstances of our lives. It is through its invented compo-
nents that the explanation obtains its ability to explain: the phenomenon to be 
explained is projected, so to speak, into the explanatory model, by which it 
may be comprehended. Such processes of explanation are also used in phi-
losophy and science, and enable a measure of unification and grounding to be 
achieved for our understanding: unity is attained by means of invented enti-
ties which participate in a variety of explanations, God for example, or the 
atom, while grounding derives from reference to circumstances that, because 
of their familiarity, are felt not to be in need of explanation. Standing alone, 
such explanation does not provide any predictive capability beyond that sug-
gested by the familiar processes to which it alludes. It may be no more predic-
tive than a fairy tale, and is similar to a fairy tale in its ability to allay fear and 
uncertainty: as a fairy tale is used by the authority figure of the parent to 
soothe or control the child, so the religious tale is used by the priest to placate 
or control the believer. 
 With the Pre-Socratics there was an advance in the manner of coming to 
terms with problems of the world and man’s existence in it: explanation was 
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freed from its dependence on myth handed down by religious authority and 
opened to free, individual speculation. This is generally taken to be the begin-
ning of Western philosophy. Important contributory causes of this develop-
ment were no doubt the variety of cultures and religions that Greece was ex-
posed to by virtue of its maritime trade and the absence of a priesthood, the 
effect of which was to produce scepticism of explanations emanating from 
authority, an economic and political order that supported the leisure for free 
enquiry and is tolerant of the free development of ideas, and a culture that 
valued individual creativity. Religious tolerance is part of both the political 
and the cultural conditions, and it was the religious tolerance, or at least the 
freedom from priestly dominance, in both early Greece and post-Reformation 
northern Europe, that allowed a spirit of free enquiry to prosper. These condi-
tions are not sufficient, however. Also required is cultural stimulus of the kind 
that derives from interaction and competition between cultures, which was 
vigorous in both Greece and Europe, and, together with the first conditions, 
would appear to have been sufficient for the development of a state of vigor-
ous philosophical enquiry; sufficient, that is, given a requisite complexity and 
maturity of cultural development, for we must remember that Rome never 
produced original philosophy or science. 
 It must not be assumed, however, according to Burnet, 
 
that the Greeks of historical times who first tried to understand the world 
were . . . in the position of men setting out on a hitherto untrodden path.  
The remains of Aegean art prove that there must have been a tolerably con-
sistent view of the world in existence already, though we cannot hope to re-
cover it in detail till the records are deciphered. . . . 
 On the other hand, it is clear that the northern invaders [the Achaians] 
must have assisted the free development of the Greek genius by breaking up 
the powerful monarchies of earlier days and, above all, by checking the 
growth of a superstition like that which ultimately stifled Egypt and Babylon. 
. . . It was probably due to the Achaians that the Greeks never had a priestly 
class, and that may well have had something to do with the rise of free sci-
ence among them. 62
 
The unification of understanding provided by the supernatural entities of 
religion was replaced by general metaphysical principles of a naturalistic kind, 
such as the principle that all natural phenomena derive from a single sub-
stance. For Thales, the first Pre-Socratic, that substance was water, a belief 
that no doubt ultimately derived from outside Greece: 
There are strong similarities between some of the Greek cosmological stories 
and the theogonical myths of the great river-civilizations and their 
neighbours; these similarities help to explain some details of Greek accounts 
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down to and including Thales.63
The naturalism of the Pre-Socratic philosophers is attested by Aristotle: 
Most of the first philosophers thought that principles in the form of matter 
were the only principles of all things; for the original source of all existing 
things, that from which a thing first comes-into-being and into which it is fi-
nally destroyed, the substance persisting but changing in its qualities, this 
they declare is the element and first principle of existing things, and for this 
reason they consider that there is no absolute coming-to-be or passing away, 
on the ground that such a nature is always preserved . . . for there must be 
some natural substance, either one or more than one, from which the other 
things come-into-being, while it is preserved.64
 For the Greeks there was a tendency to subject explanation to an overrid-
ing axiological constraint, a tendency which only increased with time. 
 This tendency towards axiological distinctions, the consequences of 
which were very important for science—a tendency which was carried to 
such extremes that one is inclined to speak of axiologism—as a rule appeared 
to be determined more by aesthetical and teleological points of view; one 
thing was valued above the other because it was more beautiful or better 
suited to the purpose. With this was combined the optimistic view that Na-
ture always strives to adapt itself to these human considerations. In a great 
many variants it was stated that Nature always tries to do what is good and 
profitable for man, endeavours to realize the best of what is possible, does 
nothing unreasonable, never proceeds vainly or aimlessly, and always suc-
ceeds in attaining maximum achievement by minimum effort. What was to 
be considered beautiful in this connexion was chiefly judged by arithmetical 
or geometrical standards: the numbers 3, 5, and 10 were to be preferred to 
others, and a geometrical form ranked higher as it approached nearer to 
regularity.65
There is no doubt that where explanation is not also subject to an effective 
empirical constraint, an axiological tendency can become an impediment to 
understanding and to the readiness to face the facts. This was certainly the 
case for Greek philosophy, with the sole exception of atomism. On the other 
hand, where an effective empirical constraint operates, as in modern science, 
an axiological influence in explanatory models can be of some heuristic value. 
Let us now consider the empirical side of the Greek experience. 
 Coexistent with religion and philosophy occurred the practical develop-
ment of technique or craft, whereby prediction and control of nature are 
sought. This included astronomy, metallurgy, chemistry, medicine, animal 
husbandry, agriculture and mensuration. Craft does not concern itself with 
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general theoretical principles or with the explanations of religion or philoso-
phy, but rather with an assemblage of practically effective procedures, which 
are developed for direct service in support of daily needs and cultural cohe-
sion. Thus the Babylonians had an extensive record of astronomical observa-
tion from which they were able to predict lunar and solar eclipses with some 
accuracy without knowing anything about the solar system and without refer-
ence to cosmological myth; the Egyptians had a system of mensuration for the 
purpose of surveying land periodically inundated by the Nile without develop-
ing a mathematical basis for it. Here it is useful to introduce the terms techne 
and episteme, in the sense used by Aristotle: 
Aristotle had nothing against practical knowledge, which he called techne; 
he simply did not consider it to be the same kind of thing as scientific 
knowledge, which he called episteme. . . . For Aristotle . . . the difference be-
tween techne and episteme was not a difference between application and 
theory, but was one of sources of knowledge and goals of knowledge. The 
source of technical knowledge was practical experience and its goal was, 
roughly speaking, knowing what to do next time. The source of scientific 
knowledge was reason, and its goal was the understanding of things through 
their causes.66
We might say that these two activities are attempts to answer two different 
kinds of questions: in the case of episteme, ‘why’ questions seeking reasons 
and explanations, which by the nature of explanation are often subject to 
axiological influence; in the case of techne, ‘how’ questions concerning proc-
esses, which may be termed instrumental. 
 For the Babylonians and the Egyptians techne and episteme did not draw 
on each other to any significant extent for their development, but remained 
separate activities carried out at different levels of the class structure, epis-
teme by the ruling and religious classes, techne within the lower ranks of soci-
ety. An important influence on the emergence of the Pre-Socratics was an 
opening up of the ruling class in Ionia, where they originated, to merchants 
and traders, thus allowing episteme to make some connection with techne. 
In Ionia, on the Aegean fringe of the Anatolian mainland, conditions in the 
sixth century were very different [from the ancient empires of the Near 
East]. Political power was in the hands of a mercantile aristocracy and this 
mercantile aristocracy was actively engaged in promoting the rapid devel-
opment of techniques on which their prosperity depended. The institution of 
slavery had not yet developed to a point at which the ruling class regarded 
techniques with contempt. Wisdom was still practical and fruitful. Miletus, 
where Natural Philosophy was born, was the most go-ahead town in the 
Greek world.67
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Because of the association between techne and episteme in Ionia, the Pre-
Socratics could also be described as the forerunners of Western science. How-
ever, although they are often referred to as scientists, this description is hardly 
justified by the facts (at least not if we adhere to the modern meaning of sci-
ence), for the techne–episteme connection involved no essential element of 
scientific experimentation, that is, active interaction between episteme and 
techne for the benefit of technique and for the empirical testing of theoretical 
hypothesis. 
 
 Systematic experimentation in the laboratory was first carried out in the 
seventeenth century. It was, to all intents and purposes, unknown to the 
Greeks. Thus the riddle of the backwardness of terrestrial physics in com-
parison with astronomy in antiquity resolves itself into the problem of why 
there was almost no use of the laboratory experiment in Greek science. . . . 
The very idea of such an experiment, the way in which it is conducted, the 
apparatus set up for it and the processes revealed in the course of it are all 
the result of theoretical considerations. In carrying out this purely intellec-
tual scheme the scientist produces a phenomenon which sometimes has no 
parallel in any natural process and the sole purpose of which is to confirm 
the given scientific theory. So we see that experiments of this kind are not 
intended to show how nature does function, but how it could function if the 
scientific conjecture prove to be correct. Here we have an extrapolation from 
actual to potential phenomena. The latter become actual only in the labora-
tory. In such a sense we may call an experiment unnatural. This, no doubt, is 
how it seemed to the Greeks, who would have thought it paradoxical to study 
natural phenomena by unnatural methods.68
 
 Thus in antiquity the two types of scientific activity did not merge into a 
single stream as they have gradually done in modern times, since Galileo 
and Newton. . . . 
 In view of these serious shortcomings it is astonishing to what an extent 
arbitrariness was reduced by the extraordinary flair of the Greek mind for 
rational speculation in the right direction.69
 
 With the change from Pre-Socratic to Socratic philosophy such mutual 
techne–episteme influence as had been established entered a long period of 
decline. How can this be accounted for? Farrington describes the social and 
philosophical influences making for this decline as follows. 
 In the earlier period of Greek thought, then, when the sciences were not 
distinguished from the techniques, science was plainly a way of doing some-
thing. With Plato it became a way of knowing, which, in the absence of any 
practical test, meant only talking consistently. This new kind of ‘science’, like 
its predecessor the technical mode of explanation, resulted from a change in 
the character of society. Historians of society are still disputing the precise 
degree to which the industrial techniques had, by Plato’s time, passed into 
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the hands of slaves. For our purpose it is not necessary to give a more pre-
cise answer to this question than to say that for Plato, and for Aristotle, the 
normal and desirable thing was that the citizen should be exempted from the 
burden of manual work and even from direct control of the workers. The 
kind of science they aimed at creating was a science for citizens who would 
not directly engage in the operational control of the physical environment. 
Their modes of explanation necessarily excluded ideas derived from the 
techniques. Their science consisted in being able to give the right answers to 
any questions that might be asked. The rightness of the answer mainly de-
pended on its logical consistency.70
Farrington goes on to note that the emphasis on logical consistency “was not 
all loss”, as the application of mathematics and logic proceeding from it 
sharpened the analyses issuing from the Pre-Socratic period. 
 One might be tempted to attribute the failure of the Greeks to establish a 
viable science to the failure of episteme, of Greek philosophy, to interact with 
techne, with the empirical. This failure was certainly not for want of technical 
achievement, which was phenomenal in mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, 
biology and medicine. However we have seen from consideration of modern 
cases of scientific development that it is not from philosophy that science 
should expect inspiration, but from within its own ranks, from the experi-
menters themselves, from men such as Galileo and Newton. So we should be 
asking, why did a viable science not develop from techne? Here again we can 
look to the modern scientific experience for an answer. In modern times relig-
ion and philosophy have often attempted to block scientific progress; in Greek 
times there was insufficient “critical mass” on the technical side from which to 
generate a scientific episteme, or explanatory framework, from within the 
technical ranks that could act independently of, and where necessary oppose, 
the dominant philosophical episteme that had been laid down by Plato and 
Artistotle. 
In ancient Greece the scope of experimental research remained restricted 
because the Greeks, with very few exceptions, failed to take the decisive step 
from observation to systematic experimentation. Thus hardly any links were 
formed between the few branches of science [that is, techne] which devel-
oped, and they did not expand sufficiently to produce a coherent and inter-
dependent system. The body of scientific knowledge in antiquity did not 
reach the critical mass necessary to induce the great scientists themselves to 
make an attempt at the construction of a theoretical framework which would 
unite the results of their own research and that of other branches of sci-
ence.71
Let us consider what it was that the dominant philosophy of Plato and Aris-
totle arose in response to. Burnet believes that 
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From the Platonic point of view, there can be no philosophy where there is 
no rational science. It is true that not much is required—a few propositions 
of elementary geometry will do to begin with—but rational science of some 
sort there must be. Now rational science is the creation of the Greeks, and 
we know when it began. We do not count as philosophy anything anterior to 
that.72
That is to say, the technical and mathematical achievements of the Pre-
Socratics, together with their speculative endeavours, constituted a challenge 
to philosophical analysis that was a crucial influence in bringing the philoso-
phy of Plato and Aristotle into existence in the form it assumed, and by its 
axiological orientation and lack of interest in empirical results as such (Aris-
totle’s biology notwithstanding), blocked the transformation of techne from a 
technological achievement into a scientific enterprise. 
 But technology can progress only so far without a scientific base, and so 
after about 200 B.C. it gradually declined. Farrington puts this in a social con-
text: 
Science had ceased to be, or had failed to become, a real force in the life of 
society. Instead there had arisen a conception of science as a cycle of liberal 
studies for a privileged minority. Science had become a relaxation, an 
adornment, a subject of contemplation. It had ceased to be a means of trans-
forming the conditions of life.73
And without science as a liberator of thought, philosophy itself declined, re-
verting back into dogma, from which it had once freed itself. 
 In the ancient world the mass of the population never attained, either in 
the East or the West, to a scientific and rationalistic way of thinking. Even in 
the educated section of Graeco-Roman society such a habit of mind was 
rare; and religion still governed their general view of life. I have explained 
already how philosophy, especially Stoicism, adapts itself to religion. From 
this connexion new doctrines arose, such as neo-Pythagoreanism, with its 
mysticism and predominant interest in a future life. By degrees these doc-
trines and even rationalistic Epicureanism were converted into systems, 
with every detail scrupulously worked out and accepted by its followers as 
absolutely true. Philosophical inquiry tended more and more to become 
what we call ‘dogma’. Moreover, both Stoicism and neo-Pythagoreanism 
gave a distinctly religious form to their dogmas, and reduced philosophy to a 
system decidedly more religious than philosophical. Dogma by degrees be-
came theology.74
12. Philosophical Problems and Problems with Philosophy 
Summary: The nature of reality lies in the province of science. So 
also does the question of man’s relation to reality. If there is a prob-
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lem in the development of knowledge and understanding, it is to free 
it of unproductive philosophical speculation. 
If philosophy is dependent on science, then how is it possible that there could 
be a field of knowledge not answerable to the procedures of science which is 
accessible only through philosophical endeavour? This is what the Greeks 
believed: 
If we look at Greek philosophy as a whole, we shall see that it is dominated 
from beginning to end by the problem of reality. In the last resort the ques-
tion is always, “What is real?” Thales asked it no less than Plato or Aristotle; 
and, no matter what the answer given may be, where that question is asked, 
there we have philosophy. It is no part of the historian’s task to decide 
whether it is a question that can be answered, but there is one comment he 
may fairly make. It is that the rise and progress of the special sciences de-
pended, so far as we can see, on its being asked. We find that every serious 
attempt to grapple with the ultimate problem of reality brings with it a great 
advance in positive science, and that this has always ceased to flourish when 
interest in that problem was weak. That happened more than once in the 
history of Greek philosophy, when the subordinate problems of knowledge 
and conduct came to occupy the first place, though at the same time it was 
just the raising of these problems that did most to transform the problem of 
reality itself.75
Burnet regards the problem of the nature of reality as an essentially philoso-
phical problem, because while it acts as a stimulus to scientific advance, 
The problem of reality, in fact, involves the problem of man’s relation to it, 
which at once takes us beyond pure science. We have to ask whether the 
mind of man can have any contact with reality at all, and, if it can, what dif-
ference this will make to his life.76
If the mind can have no contact with reality, then the question, ‘can the mind 
of man have contact with reality?’, which refers to reality, can have no mean-
ing, cannot be comprehended by the mind. Therefore, if the question is to 
have meaning, it can only be answered affirmatively, in which case it is no 
question at all, let alone a philosophical question. This conclusion is consistent 
with the idea that to be able to function, to be able to think, we cannot do 
without some concept of a reality with which we can make contact, just as we 
cannot do without the law of the excluded middle—these are not presupposi-
tions we make, but are bound up in the very notion of functioning and think-
ing. Given, then, that the mind can have contact with reality, what is the na-
ture of that reality, and how is the contact made? Burnet appears to accept 
that the nature of reality is a scientific problem—Newton is characteristically 
clear about this: for example, 
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There are therefore Agents in Nature able to make the Particles of Bodies 
stick together by very strong Attractions. And it is the Business of experi-
mental Philosophy to find them out.77
However, Burnet believes that the question of man’s relation to reality, the 
question as to how the mind makes contact with reality, is not addressable by 
science. On the contrary, it is proposed here, and will be argued in Part II, that 
this last question can be given a clear meaning, and progress can be made in 
answering it, only in a scientific context; that science is now in a position to 
address the problem of man’s relation to reality, as it may not have been when 
Burnet wrote (1914). The history of science and philosophy lends support to 
this. 
 If this thesis is true, then there are no inherently philosophical problems 
in the development of knowledge and understanding. But there have been 
problems arising from the involvement of philosophy in that development, for 
philosophy has not been a benign influence. This is not to lay blame on phi-
losophy, but to recognize the significance of the historical facts, in so far as 
they can be epitomized by so brief an historical selection as that given here, 
and thereby to anticipate philosophical influence in the further development 
of knowledge and understanding. 
                                                   
77 Isaac Newton, Opticks, Book 3, Query 31. Emphasis added.  
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PART II: Are There Essentially Philosophical Problems? 
1. Introduction 
Summary: A description is attempted in Part II of the facts concern-
ing the connection of philosophy and science with human experience. 
In Part I we looked at the historical relation between philosophy and science. 
Now we examine these disciplines in their relation to human experience, indi-
vidual and cultural. The aim is factual description free of philosophical specu-
lation and commitment. Given the subject matter, this is difficult, as so many 
terms useful for factual description in this area have philosophical connota-
tions. For example, ‘real’ is a useful term when used in contrast to ‘imagined’, 
but can be confused with the term as used in discussions of philosophical 
realism. ‘Representation’ is also useful, but its use may suggest a commitment 
to the philosophical representation theory of perception. Care therefore needs 
to be taken to ensure that the factual reference of general terms is clear. With 
scientific description this is assisted by the requirement of an experimental 
basis: observational basis is not sufficient, unless one is clear about observa-
tional procedures. 
 The factual description of this part is intended as a means toward the 
resolution of philosophical puzzles. The thesis maintained is that there is no 
philosophical problem that cannot be resolved by dispelling the preconcep-
tions on which it is based and treating the residue scientifically. The only 
problem is to show this. 
2. Science and Everyday Thinking 
Summary: In science theory builds upon theory, with today’s theory 
becoming tomorrow’s observation. Analogous processes of building 
are seen in the evolution of the brain and in the development of sci-
ence from sense experience via everyday thinking. Einstein regarded 
science as a systematic reconstruction of everyday thinking from its 
basis in sense experience. Once developed, the structures of science, 
the brain and everyday thinking operate seamlessly. 
In Part I we saw how the development of technique may, in propitious circum-
stances, give rise to a technically inspired imaginative capability that trans-
forms it into science. As part of science, technique then becomes the observa-
tional /experimental aspect, while the imaginative aspect is identified with 
theory. The accretion of theory is a continuing process: as old theory is dis-
carded or elaborated and modified into new theory, and yesterday’s estab-
lished theory becomes part of today’s technical aid to observation (the phi-
losophy of science’s auxiliary hypothesis), a system of interconnected theoreti-
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cal layers is built up, like new cities built over old, establishing their founda-
tions amongst those below it. There is an analogous process by which the 
brain has evolved, from primitive old brain concerned largely with the olfac-
tory sense, emotion and locomotion, to the neocortex of the higher animals, 
concerned with what can be more clearly identified as representation, which 
corresponds to the process by which the empirical laws of technique become 
overlaid by representational, theoretical constructs. This may be more than an 
analogy, for the development of science can profitably be viewed as an exten-
sion of the evolutionary development of the brain to the cultural/social do-
main; that is to say, the organizational structure that enables understanding of 
the world has been extended beyond the cerebral to the social; or expressed 
otherwise, it is a progression from sense experience to science via “everyday 
thinking”. 
 Einstein wrote of science as follows: 
 The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday 
thinking. It is for this reason that the critical thinking of the physicist cannot 
possibly be restricted to the examination of the concepts of his own specific 
field. He cannot proceed without considering critically a much more difficult 
problem, the problem of analyzing the nature of everyday thinking.78
The refinement in everyday thinking that Einstein had in mind for physics was 
a sort of reconstruction of everyday thinking from its basis in sense experi-
ence, for he continued: 
 
 On the stage of our subconscious mind appear in colourful succession 
sense experiences, memory pictures of them, representations and feelings. 
In contrast to psychology, physics treats directly only of sense experiences 
and of the ‘understanding’ of their connections. But even the concept of the 
‘real external world’ of everyday thinking rests exclusively on sense impres-
sions. 
 Now we must first remark that the differentiation between sense impres-
sions and representations is not possible; or, at least it is not possible with 
absolute certainty. With the discussion of this problem, which affects also 
the notion of reality, we will not concern ourselves but we shall take the exis-
tence of sense experiences as given, that is to say as psychic experiences of 
special kind.79
 
That “physics treats directly only of sense experiences and of the ‘understand-
ing’ of their connections” looks like a tenet of Ernst Mach’s phenomenalism 
(though Einstein wrote in 1936).  Whether or not it is meant in that way de-
pends on what is to be understood by ‘sense experience’, and on whether the 
‘connections’ of sense experience are meant to include everyday observation. 
Einstein acknowledges this ambiguity of meaning when he writes that “differ-
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entiation [with absolute certainty] between sense impressions and representa-
tions is not possible”, implying that there may be a representational element 
in sense experience. Nevertheless, we see expressed here an idea of Einstein’s 
that probably derived from the influence of Mach, for some of the mental 
explorations leading to his two theories of relativity can be seen as reconstruc-
tions of everyday thinking. For example, Einstein wrote of “the happiest 
thought of my life”: 
 
When, in 1907, I was working on a comprehensive paper on the special the-
ory of relativity . . . I had also to attempt to modify the Newtonian theory of 
gravitation in such a way that its laws would fit in the [special relativity] the-
ory. Attempts in this direction did show that this could be done, but did not 
satisfy me because they were based on physically unfounded hypotheses. 
Then there occurred to me the ‘glücklichste Gedanke meines Lebens’, the 
happiest thought of my life, in the following form. The gravitational field has 
only a relative existence . . . Because for an observer falling freely from the 
roof of a house there exists—at least in his immediate surroundings—no 
gravitational field. Indeed, if the observer drops some bodies then these 
remain relative to him in a state of rest or of uniform motion . . . . The ob-
server therefore has the right to interpret his state as ‘at rest’ . . . and his en-
vironment as field-free relative to gravitation. 
 The experimentally known matter independence of the acceleration of fall 
is therefore a powerful argument for the fact that the relativity postulate has 
to be extended to coordinate systems which, relative to each other, are in 
non-uniform motion.80
 
Thus was Einstein led to the general theory of relativity by a refinement of the 
representation in everyday thinking of the sensory experience of force. 
 If we look at what scientists do, we find that they move easily between 
theoretical and observational language, which form part of a single language 
(‘language’ here stands for thought, as publicly expressed); in fact the distinc-
tion between the two is hardly noticed, except in talk about what scientists do. 
The same seamlessness occurs between perception and conception in every-
day thinking. We look at a human face, and we see its honesty, or its beauty. A 
physicist looks at a trace in a cloud chamber, and he sees the path of a sub-
atomic particle. A stone age man sees the wrath of the gods in the sky ablaze 
with lightning and resounding with thunder. As these experiences appear to 
result from processes akin to the accretions of theory upon theory described 
above for science, it seems reasonable to analyse them by reference to such 
processes. Thus in the case of the human face we might say that what we per-
ceive is a face, and to that we apply the concept of honesty. This way of putting 
it is not necessarily a faithful description of the neurological perceptual proc-
                                                   
80 Albert Einstein, “Grundgedanken und Methoden der Relativitätstheorie in ihrer Entwick-
lung dargestellt”, p. 178. Italics as in the original.  
  
 56
ess or the conscious observational process. For example, it is suggested by the 
neurologist, Susan Greenfield, in writing about the impairment of visual rec-
ognition called agnosia, that 
. . . understanding and seeing are not two separate processes but rather they 
are inextricably linked: if you see something you will automatically identify 
it. On the other hand, if you do not see an object in front of you, . . . [that] is 
because there has been a collapse of the higher integrative processes for 
complex form recognition in the visual cortex. Obviously you will not recog-
nize the object.81
That is, perception and conception form a single process. 
 What is the appropriate description of observation for the purpose of 
understanding its role in science? 
3. The Observational Base of Science 
Summary: Observation has conceptual content. Science emerges 
where concepts change from being sense and culture based to being 
scientifically informed. Scientific concepts are independent of human 
concerns but are provisional, while non-scientific concepts reflect 
human concerns but are taken as given. Paradoxically it is science, 
independent of the human, that reveals the human dimension of its 
own base. Philosophers have responded by seeking a secure observa-
tional base. 
In the previous section it was suggested that ‘observation’ and ‘theory’ are 
relative terms, that observation is where theory finds its immediate ground-
ing, but that observation may itself incorporate theory from another related 
field of scientific enquiry or from well established theory in the same field. The 
main reference point in this progression is where the theoretical content of 
observation changes from the sense and culture based concepts of “everyday 
thinking” to scientifically informed concepts; this is where ‘observation’ 
changes from its traditional sense used by philosophers (Francis Bacon for 
example) to the more general sense used by scientists (permitting the observa-
tion of subatomic particles, for example). The ‘reference point’ in this progres-
sion refers of course to a loosely defined region rather than to a mathematical 
point, because as science infiltrates culture, concepts can become both culture 
based and scientifically informed. What we have in mind is that sense and 
culture based concepts are those by which the world is comprehended without 
those concepts normally being questioned (except by philosophers and scien-
tists), whereas scientifically informed concepts are those constructed by the 
scientific enterprise for comprehension of a world extended beyond that of 
everyday experience by scientific means, both experimental and theoretical—
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by the telescope, the microscope, atomic theory, etc. In contrast to everyday 
concepts, scientific concepts and theories, because of their more deliberate 
construction, are recognized as provisional or approximate. This is not to say 
that everyday concepts are not subject to change; but the change is evolution-
ary rather than systematically pursued, as with science. 
 Another difference between everyday and scientific concepts is that every-
day concepts derive from not only human concerns, transient as they may be, 
but from the human condition, with its own particular focus on survival and 
the sensory mechanisms for ensuring it, whereas scientific concepts are con-
cerned with what is universal and independent of human concerns (except in 
so far as science studies them). The conceptual element in observation would 
not be significant if observation were unmediated. But observation is medi-
ated by conception; or, more precisely, by physiological processes giving rise 
to representations whose conscious aspect is conceptual. Thus science, the 
study of the universal, supposedly finds its foundation in observation that is 
mediated by concepts with a very human dimension. How, we may ask, is 
science able to transcend this conceptual dependence? In an attempt to re-
solve this question, and as part of the philosophical quest for absolute founda-
tions for knowledge, philosophers have sought an unmediated observational 
base for science, the observational act free of conceptualization. Paradoxically, 
any such quest is undermined by the fact that it is science itself that reveals 
the mediated nature of observation and hence the mediating influence of con-
cepts on its own observational base. Consider Bertrand Russell’s rather stark 
description of this supposed paradox: 
 Scientific scripture, in its most canonical form, is embodied in physics 
(including physiology). Physics assures us that the occurrences which we call 
“perceiving objects” are at the end of a long causal chain which starts from 
the objects, and are not likely to resemble the objects except, at best, in cer-
tain very abstract ways. We all start from “naïve realism”, i.e., the doctrine 
that things are what they seem. We think that grass is green, that stones are 
hard, and that snow is cold. But physics assures us that the greenness of 
grass, the hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow, are not the green-
ness, hardness, and coldness that we know in our own experience, but some-
thing very different. The observer, when he seems to himself to be observing 
a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the effects of the 
stone upon himself. Thus science seems to be at war with itself: when it most 
means to be objective, it finds itself plunged into subjectivity against its will. 
Naïve realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows that naïve realism 
is false. Therefore naïve realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false.82
For ‘naïve realism’ read ‘observation not mediated by human conceptual 
makeup’ (“things are what they seem”): thus Russell argues that observation 
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cannot be concept free in this sense. 
 Einstein, in his characteristically generous and gracious way, says that 
“these lines say something which had never previously occurred to me”, and 
writes in response: 
. . . Russell’s just cited remark uncovers a connection: if Berkeley relies upon 
the fact that we do not directly grasp the “things” of the external world 
through our senses, but that only events causally connected with the pres-
ence of “things” reach our sense organs, then this is a consideration which 
gets its persuasive character from our confidence in the physical mode of 
thought. For, if one doubts the physical mode of thought in even its most 
general features, there is no necessity to interpolate between the object and 
the act of vision anything which separates the object from the subject and 
makes the “existence of the object” problematical.83
Einstein states, in effect, that physics is true (using Russell’s form of words) if 
and only if naïve realism is false; and as he takes physics to be true (c.f. “our 
confidence in the physical mode of thought”), naïve realism is false. 
 Philosophy and science respond to the problem as to how science tran-
scends its dependence on an observational base mediated by human concerns 
in two distinctive ways, which we shall now consider. 
4. The Philosophical Quest for Observational Certainty 
Summary: Both rationalists and empiricists have sought an indubi-
table base for knowledge, rationalists in individual thought and em-
piricists in individual observation. The empiricists’ idea was to iden-
tify an indubitable observational base from which all observed enti-
ties, or at least the observation thereof, could be constructed. Because 
of the inherent uncertainty in observation of mentally external phe-
nomena, indubitable bases proposed were mentally internal, sense-
data and seeming-to-observe being two considered here. It is shown 
that such mentally internal observational bases, if indubitable, can-
not act as indubitable observational bases for science. 
It has been distinctive of philosophy to seek certainty. For both rationalists 
and empiricists the problem has been the way in which we acquire knowledge. 
The rationalist approach derived originally from Plato, and was concerned 
with the uncertainty of knowledge obtained from the senses in contrast with 
the apparent certainty of knowledge obtained from individual thought proc-
esses. The ideal was Euclidean geometry, seemingly derived from our own 
thought and yet constituting absolute knowledge of the world. Descartes 
sought to apply this method to natural philosophy, his results being ex-
pounded in the Principles of Philosophy, referred to in Part I. He was con-
cerned to show that the principles upon which he based his philosophy were 
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beyond doubt, were indubitable. As all knowledge appears to begin with the 
individual, the starting point for showing indubitability was his own existence: 
how can the argument from illusion, and the scepticism of our very existence 
which this suggests, be answered? Descartes was convinced that his own exis-
tence follows from the fact that he was engaged in thought; and because 
knowledge that we are thinking is indubitable, our existence is also indubita-
ble. Now ‘I think, therefore I exist’ is undeniable in the same way as an axiom 
of geometry is undeniable: it reflects the way in which the words ‘think’ and 
‘exist’ are used in rational discourse, just as ‘a straight line can be drawn be-
tween any two points’ reflects the way in which the terms ‘straight line’ and 
‘point’ are used in geometrical descriptions. But the existential inference is 
empirical, as Descartes could not have realized, just in the way that geometry 
has been found to be empirical, for rational discourse using the words ‘think’ 
and ‘exist’, or their scientific refinements, depends on the success of such 
discourse in the empirical world, in the public arena. 
 The idea that knowledge is obtained from indubitable individual experi-
ence was also subscribed to by the empiricists, but in a different way from the 
rationalists. The empiricists believed that all knowledge of the world comes 
from the individual experience of it, from observation. The question that con-
cerned the empiricists, and has concerned their later successors, was therefore 
how knowledge is obtained from experience of the world—what is the nature 
of observation? The experience upon which knowledge is based was what 
Locke called ‘ideas’, Hume called ‘impressions’, and Russell and other analytic 
philosophers called sense–data. There is an echo of this in Russell’s assertion, 
quoted above, that the observer, in seeming to himself to be observing an 
object, is really observing, not the object itself, of whose existence he can 
never be absolutely certain, but the causal effect of the object, or whatever it 
might be, on himself. From individual observational experience knowledge of 
the world is built up in some way, as a logical reconstruction in terms of sense-
data, for example, of ordinary discourse about observed objects. With Locke’s 
theory of ideas what was being attempted was a description, formal rather 
than physical, of the processes of observation occurring within the individual 
observer. A consolidation of the empiricism of Locke, Berkeley and Hume 
appeared in the phenomenalism of Mach, who regarded the world as consist-
ing only of sensations, or ‘elements’, as he called them, in terms of which it is 
the business of science to construct concise descriptions of phenomena, that 
is, of appearances of the world.84 With the advent of linguistic phenomenal-
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ism, stimulated largely by the logical advances of Frege and Russell, the prob-
lems of observation were translated into linguistic and logical terms. This 
proved a difficult challenge, as the philosophical progress of its most industri-
ous advocate, Carnap, illustrates. Influenced by Mach and Russell, Carnap 
first proposed (in his Logical Construction of the World) a formal system for 
observation based on individual mental experiences to which all observation 
could, in principle, be reduced (in the sense of reduction by which thermody-
namics is reducible to statistical mechanics). Persuaded by Neurath, Carnap 
revised the proposed observational base from mental experiences to physical 
protocol statements, that is, statements of irreducible physical events to which 
all of physics could be reduced, and hence all of science by reduction to phys-
ics. Carnap’s third position was as outlined at the end of this section and an 
abandonment of reduction in favour of confirmation, as discussed in Section 
6. For the purpose of evaluating these philosophical approaches to under-
standing observation, we shall consider the example of Russell’s ‘seeming to 
observe’. 
 Suppose that an observer is in a state of seeming to himself to be observ-
ing a stone. Let us call this state an observing-state; in this case a stone-
observing-state. Russell states that the observer is “observing the effects of the 
stone upon himself”. He also says that occurrences of “perceiving objects”, for 
example the stone-observing-state, is at the end of a causal chain starting at 
the object, for example the stone. As what is at the end of a causal chain is an 
effect, presumably the effect of the stone is the stone-observing-state. It fol-
lows that for Russell the observer is observing the observing-state. 
 Russell says that the observing-state is likely to resemble the object caus-
ing it only in “very abstract ways”. The word ‘resembled’ suggests the idea of 
copying from the object to its observational effect, an idea that does not co-
here with the process under consideration, and will be considered in Section 6. 
Perhaps all we should take from this statement of Russell’s is that the stone-
observing-state may not be caused by a stone at all—the observing-state may 
be an illusion or a mistake. How, then, can we account for a stone-observing-
state without a stone to cause it? We could say this: an observing-state is 
caused by certain stimuli which the observer, in assuming that state, inter-
prets in a certain way; in assuming a stone-observing-state the observer is 
interpreting the stimuli as if they had originated in a stone. It follows from this 
that a stone-observing-state is the same state irrespective of whether or not 
there is a stone observed. It should also be noted that an observing-state car-
ries with it a psychological conviction as to the identity of an observed object. 
 The conclusion that the observer is observing the observing-state is not 
uniquely Russell’s, but is common amongst empirically minded philosophers, 
for it answers to their need to take account of illusions and mistakes in obser-
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vation, and at the same time to identify indubitable observational foundations 
for knowledge. Thus Ayer writes: 
 When, however, one turns to the writings of those philosophers who have 
recently concerned themselves with the subject of perception, . . . they are 
not, for the most part, prepared to admit that such objects as pens or ciga-
rettes are ever directly perceived. What, in their opinion, we directly per-
ceive is always an object of a different kind from these; one to which it is 
now customary to give the name of “sense-datum”. These sense-data are said 
to have the “presentative function”85 of making us conscious of material 
things.86
Here the indubitable observational elements are sense-data. The idea that 
there is observation of an observing-state, or of sense-data, looks very like 
Descartes’s dualist idea that there is a homuncule, a soul or mind, viewing the 
image that is produced by the observed object on the retina of the eye, or on 
the pineal gland (as Descartes thought), or wherever apparently insurmount-
able difficulties first appear in our comprehension of the functioning of the 
brain. Perhaps, though, we could at least allow that one can in some sense, if 
not in an observational sense, be aware of an observing-state. However, if the 
awareness and the observing are simultaneous, as presumably is envisaged, 
then it would seem that the unity of consciousness should dictate that they be 
parts of a single state of awareness, in which case awareness of an observing-
state cannot be distinguished subjectively as distinct from the observing-state, 
though there may be distinct physiological components making up the single 
state—awareness of an observing-state does at least appear to be logically 
distinguishable from the observing-state. 
  In that case let us consider whether the existence of the observing-state 
provides indubitable knowledge of scientific value. It can surely be said that a 
subject is, or can become, aware2 that (and when) he is in an observing-state, 
which is a state of awareness1 of the world and himself in it and of his own 
condition, whether the observing be veridical or not: he can be aware2 that he 
is aware1. For example, I can become aware1 of an injury to my foot (though it 
may or may not in fact be injured) by means of a pain in my foot, the pain 
being the mode of awareness1 and thus part of my observing-state. And I can 
be aware2 that I have a pain in my foot. Now surely my awareness2 of the pain 
constitutes indubitable knowledge, though the pain is not an indubitable indi-
cation of injury. That is, if I am aware2 of a pain, then is it not certain that I 
have a pain? And if I am aware2 of being in a stone-observing-state, then can I 
be otherwise than in a stone-observing-state? The answers to these questions 
depend on how the two states are related. Certainly awareness1 that there is a 
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stone before me does not imply that there is a stone before me. Why, then, 
might awareness2 that I am in a particular state imply that I am in that par-
ticular state? Perhaps because, as both states are states of my consciousness, 
they are, by the unity of consciousness, aspects of the very same state—they 
coexist in a single state of consciousness. If so, then can we speak of aware-
ness2 as constituting a distinct item of knowledge? Is it not the state of which 
it forms a part (and of which the observing-state is another part) the entity to 
which knowledge can be attributed? If it is, then that combined state of 
awareness2 and awareness1 cannot, because of its observational component, 
be indubitable. The terms in which this analysis is expressed appear to be 
insufficiently well defined and insufficiently clear in their reference to admit of 
a definitive conclusion on either logical or empirical grounds. Fortunately 
decision as to the existence of an indubitable base for science is not affected by 
this difficulty. For if awareness2 of an observation is not indubitable, then it 
cannot be a candidate for an indubitable base. On the other hand, if it does 
constitute indubitable knowledge, it can easily be shown, as follows, that that 
knowledge cannot form an indubitable base for science. 
 Consider my observing-state concerning a stone, which may or may not be 
veridical. If I report on my observing-state, then others are in a position to 
form their own independent observing-states concerning the supposed stone 
and its properties and to issue their own reports on their observings. These 
reports and mine can then be correlated so as to ascertain the existence and 
properties of the stone. The object of these observing-states, the stone, then 
becomes an object of public knowledge. It is with such public knowledge as 
this that science is concerned —the most obvious evidence of this is in the 
reports submitted to the public arena of scientific journals and conferences, 
where the validity of their claims may be tested. Now suppose that I report 
my, supposed indubitable, awareness2 of my observing-state. For this to be of 
value to science as indubitable knowledge, my observing-state would need to 
become an object of public knowledge by means of the issue of reports of oth-
ers’ indubitable knowledge of my observing-state. But while others may be-
come aware of some aspects of my observing-state, by reading my report, 
observing my behaviour or examining my brain, that awareness would not be 
indubitable, for no one has the privileged access to my conscious experience 
that I have, and in any case would certainly not exist in the detail of my own 
awareness. It follows that awareness of observing-states, if indubitable (from 
the point of view of the observer), cannot form an indubitable base for science, 
or indeed for empirical knowledge in general (and, it should be added, for my 
own actions, for indubitable as awareness of my own thought processes might 
be, it is of limited use as a source for my knowledge of the world). 
 We may as a consequence of this discussion venture the general conclu-
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sion that the philosopher’s quest for an indubitable base for knowledge cannot 
be otherwise than fruitless. 
 In view of difficulties with sense-data and suchlike as objects of public 
knowledge, philosophers have put forward as basic observational entities, in 
Carnap’s words87, “properties [of objects] directly perceived by the senses”, 
such as “blue”, “hard” and “hot”; or in the case of the intensity of an electric 
current, for example, the pointer reading of an ammeter rather than the inten-
sity of the current itself. Perhaps one could substitute a colourimeter for 
measuring colour, a Rockwell machine for measuring hardness, a thermome-
ter for measuring hotness, and so on, so that in this way all observations could 
become the readings of pointers or digital displays of measuring instruments 
designed on scientific principles. What this does is to enable science to pene-
trate into observational practice, thus reducing the influence of ordinary hu-
man practices on the scientific structure. This turns out to be just part of the 
process by which science frees itself from its base in naïve realism, and moves 
toward, not absolute knowledge of a philosophical kind, but universal knowl-
edge of a scientific kind. 
5. The Scientific Refinement of Observation 
Summary: Science achieves independence of human concerns by re-
peated scientific refinement of its observation base in everyday ex-
perience. The repetition is an iterative process by which each refine-
ment is used to assist in achieving the next one. This process enables 
science to penetrate into its observational base and free it of its un-
wanted human orientation. At the same time it enables the laws of 
science to be subjected to improved testing, and refined or replaced 
accordingly. New laws in turn redefine the terms under which the 
observational base is established. The convergence of the base 
through iteration does not imply a like convergence of the laws. 
Given the conclusion of the previous section, how can science achieve inde-
pendence of human concerns while remaining dependent on observation with 
a human conceptual content? For an answer to this we return to Einstein, and 
in particular to his idea that “the whole of science is nothing more than a re-
finement of everyday thinking”. Einstein’s genius lay in his capacity to refor-
mulate the basic conceptual ingredients of physics—time, space, mass, energy, 
gravitation—by taking them back to their roots in our ordinary perception of 
the physical world, as with “the happiest thought of my life” (see above). It is 
probably with such reformulations as this that his idea about the refinement 
of everyday thinking was concerned. Rather than pursue Einstein’s idea 
amongst his writings, let us see how it can be developed in a general way to 
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account for the emergence out of our everyday concerns of a science con-
cerned with the universal. In brief, the idea is not that the human conceptual 
content of observation should be eliminated, but that it should be refined in 
accordance with scientific knowledge. 
 This refinement is achieved by the method of iteration. ‘Iteration’ means 
repetition, and is fundamental in mathematics. Let us look briefly at its use 
there. Very few quantities in mathematics can be expressed in terms of ratios 
of whole numbers, that is, as rational numbers. Because whole numbers and 
their ratios were the only form of number recognized by the Greeks, an irra-
tional number such as 2  was for them not a number. But it is a number for 
us, for we have created it88, and we can approximate it by rational numbers as 
closely as we please by the method of iteration. (It is also possible to define 
2  as the limiting value of an iterative procedure.) There is no single method 
of iteration for calculating 2 : in order to illustrate iteration, here is one such 
method. Start with a rough approximation, say 10 =x . Calculate 
, 001 12 x//xx += 112 12 x//xx += , 223 12 x//xx += , and so on. Each iteration 
uses the same calculation procedure, but applied to the result of the previous 
iteration (for , applied to the starting approximation). Note that the mem-
bers of the sequence are rational numbers. The first few numbers generated in 
this way are, to six decimal places: 
1x
    10 =x
    00050011 .x =
    66741612 .x =
    21641413 .x =
    21441414 .x =
Thereafter no change occurs in the first six decimal places; that is,  ap-
proximates 
4x
2  to six decimal places. This example illustrates the principal 
features of iteration: it is repetition of a procedure applied to results obtained 
by previous application of the procedure. It can be seen that choice of an ap-
propriate procedure may result in rapid convergence. For our purpose a suffi-
ciently general form for the method of iteration is, starting from x0, to obtain 
 by some process P applied to  for n=0, 1, 2, . . . , where  
are elements of some class of objects for which a metric exists by which con-
vergence of the sequence  can be defined. Note that the conver-
gence does not imply the existence of a limit lying in the class to which the 
elements belong; thus the limit of the above sequence of rational numbers, 
)(1 nn xPx =+ nx ...,x,x 10
)( 10 ...,x,x
2 , is not a rational number. However, the convergence of  may )( 10 ...,x,x
                                                   
88 Richard Dedekind created it: he defined 2 as the ordered pair of sets of rational numbers 
(Dedekind cut), ({x : x2<2}, {x : x2>2}). In effect, 2 is defined as the point where the ra-
tional numbers are cut into the two sets. See E.T. Bell, Men of Mathematics, p. 519. 
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enable an extension of the class to be so constructed that it contains such a 
limit; for example, the rational number field can be extended to the real num-
ber field, which contains 2 . Note that if  converges then the limit 
is independent of the starting approximation , provided that  is suffi-
ciently close to the limit: the limit is a solution of the equation . Note 
also that if there is another sequence  associated with  
for which , where Q is a procedure associated with P, it does not 
follow from the convergence of  that the sequence  also 
converges. For example, 
)( 10 ...,x,x
0x 0x
)(xPx =
)( 10 ...,y,y )( 10 ...,x,x
)(1 nn yQy =+
)( 10 ...,x,x )( 10 ...,y,y
if nny  0≥n , nnn xxyy,yx 211100 and  1 =−=== ++ for 
then )( 10 ...,x,x  )...,,,, 8141211( −−= converges but 
−−=  does not. )...1,1,1,(1,)( 10 ...,y,y
 Mathematical iteration is introduced as a point of reference for a termi-
nology that may be usefully applied in more loosely structured non-
mathematical investigations, in particular the one in which we are presently 
interested. Accordingly, we shall now consider the use of iteration in a particu-
lar case in the development of physics, that of the measurement of time. 
 Prior to modern science a variety of naturally occurring regularities were 
used to keep time: for example, the flow of water, oscillating rods, and astro-
nomical movements. These were found to suit man’s need of a regular mo-
tion—abstracted to the uniform passing of time—by which to organize the 
routines of his life, in so far as they conformed roughly to each other and to 
the rhythm of life. Water clocks were used up to the time of Galileo (1564–
1642), who in his experiments on objects falling under the force of gravity 
used the flow of water through a tube attached to the bottom of a large con-
tainer to measure time.89 Let us denote these primitive types of clock by C , 
and the everyday thinking with which they were associated by L  (L for law or 
theory). What Galileo did was to use C  in the discovery of new laws L , in 
particular those concerning falling bodies, from which he obtained the period 
of a pendulum. In 1657 Christaan Huygens produced the pendulum clock, the 
first of a more accurate class of clocks, C . Here is identified a process, P, by 
which  is obtained from C  by way of the development of the new law, L , 
which was enabled by C : thus C
0
0
0 1
1
1C 0 1
0 )( 01 CP= .  in turn assisted Newton’s con-
solidation of mechanics to be established, and from further advancements in 
knowledge associated with this there was developed law L , and thence a 
more accurate class of clocks, C : thus we write C
1C
2
2 )(C12 P= . The sequence can 
be represented: 
 
 
                                                   
89 See Rom H é, Great Scient  Experiments, p. 72. arr ific
L0
C0
L1
C1
L2
C2
FIGURE 2 
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In each case the clock based on the new law enabled the terms in which the 
law is framed, in particular time, to be fixed more precisely, the law to be 
subjected to test, and thence a further law developed. 
 It is important to recognize that the replacement of  by  via , of  
by  via  and so on were not just technological developments enabled by 
scientific progress: they were part of the process by which the terms of that 
progress were defined. Consider the construction of more accurate pendulum 
clocks  in place of Huygens’s pendulum clock . By what criterion should 
 be considered more accurate in measuring time than ? Criteria are not 
God-given, but are created in response to empirical investigation. In this case 
the answer lies in the Newtonian mechanical system of laws, . In his Prin-
cipia Newton writes of time: 
0C 1C 1L 1C
2C 2L
2C 1C
2C 1C
2L
 Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself and from its own nature, 
flows equably without relation to anything external, and by another name is 
called ‘duration’; relative, apparent, and common time is some sensible and 
external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the means 
of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time, such as an hour, a 
day, a month, a year.90
‘Absolute, true, and mathematical time’ is the abstraction of time with which 
Newton’s theory of mechanics is concerned. ‘Relative, apparent, and common 
time’ is a measure of absolute time ‘by the means of motion’, where motion 
must, of course, conform to Newton’s mechanical principles. Suppose that the 
motions of identical mechanical systems differed between two different loca-
tions when measured by a clock of type  but not by a clock of type .1C 2C   Then 
we could say that the former clock does not measure absolute time but, at least 
by this test, the latter clock does. For example, a  type clock gives different 
measurements of elapsed time for the supposedly constant sidereal day at 
different latitudes (due, according to Newtonian mechanics, to variation with 
latitude of the gravitational force exerted by the earth); a  type clock gives 
the same measurement of elapsed time (because it is corrected for the gravita-
tional effect). The criterion for considering  more accurate than  is thus 
that time as measured by  gives a confirmation of Newtonian mechanics, in 
the correction applied by means of it to produce C
1C
2C
2C 1C
2C
2 from C1. That is, the con-
ceptual content of the observation of time has been changed in conformity 
with scientific theory. A further change occurred when, with the aid of C2, 
discrepancies were discovered between the observed orbit of the planet Mer-
                                                   
90 Isaac Newton, The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Scholium 1 
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cury and predictions made on the basis of Newtonian mechanics. These dis-
crepancies, together with difficulties with the Newtonian concepts of absolute 
time and space, as well as relativistic considerations applied to gravitation 
(mentioned earlier), led to Einstein’s theories of relativity, L3, which contrib-
uted to the development of clocks C3 conforming to those theories. Ernest 
Nagel writes about this iterative process: 
A definite advantage has thus been obtained from the adoption of a new 
timekeeper. For in consequence of this change, dependencies are discovered 
between the periods of various processes which might either have escaped 
our attention entirely had we retained the old clock or have required formu-
lations so complex as to make them practically worthless. But it is obvious 
that there is no necessary limit to this process of abandoning one standard 
measure of time in favour of another, and that further gains may be won if 
the pendulum is replaced by, say, the rotating earth as the standard clock. 
The procedure here outlined illustrates what has been called the process of 
“successive definition”, a process repeatedly encountered in the history of 
modern science.91
 This is the way in which a succession of developments in scientific theory 
and concomitant developments in observational practice occur in unison, 
which we have for purposes of exposition represented by the sequence C1 = 
P(C0), C2 = P(C1), . . . , where P stands for the process of theoretical develop-
ment referred to. It is of course to a large extent arbitrary how the divisions of 
the sequence are defined. However it is done, it is clear that the sequence of 
laws associated with the sequence of clocks can be represented in a similar 
way: L1 = Q(L0), L2 = Q(L1), . . . , where Q is the process of scientific infiltration 
of observations enabling development of scientific theory. With the mathe-
matical example of iteration in mind, it might be expected that the sequence 
(C0, C1, . . . ) generated by the relation Cn+1 = P(Cn) would show evidence of 
convergence. A metric for convergence might be the accuracy of Cn  in measur-
ing time. Time as measured by Cn, however, is a concept that takes its meaning 
from theory Ln . However, the accuracy of any of C0, C1, . . . , Cn can be judged 
according to Ln  (or perhaps equivalently, any Lm  for m ≥ n), so notionally we 
may write ji CC −  as a (numerical) measure of the closeness in accuracy of 
 and  for i, j ≤ n. (Formally, we might define the sequence (CiC jC 0, C1, . . . ) to 
converge if and only if, given any number ε > 0, there is a number N such that, 
for all n > m > N , mn CC −  < ε according to Ln .) If, for example, Ln is taken to 
be relativity theory, then the sequence of clocks from the water clock to the 
atomic clock shows evidence of convergence in accuracy of time measurement 
judged by Ln. That there is a notional convergence of the sequence (C0, C1, . . . ) 
does not mean either (a) that there is an actual clock to which the sequence 
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converges, or (b) that there is also a convergence in the sequence (L0, L1, . . . ). 
(a) is just a confirmation that convergence does not imply reality of limit, or 
reality in the limit, as scientific realists maintain. (b) does not say that there is 
no convergence for (L0, L1, . . . ), only that none is implied. And convergence is 
not indicated by the historical evidence, which shows periods of convergent 
normal science (in Kuhn’s terminology) punctuated by revolutionary jumps—
relativistic mechanics is far from Newtonian mechanics in formal structure 
despite its many observational convergences. 
 Iteration, or “successive definition”, has a general application to science. It 
is the method whereby science becomes more and more abstract, where con-
cepts once formulated on the basis of everyday experiences gradually lose 
their everyday associations, new concepts are developed which owe their 
meaning primarily to their theoretical role, including theory employed in 
experimental observation, and thus a scientific language comes into existence. 
This is how science seeks a base from which to achieve universality of applica-
tion; not in some philosophically absolute construction, but in a procedure by 
which the base is progressively refined in the light of developing theory. The 
formalism used for the development of clocks can be adapted to express this 
last point, with C for clock replaced by O for observation: 
 
L0 L1
O1
L2
O2
FIGURE 3 
O0
 
 
 
 
The direction of the arrow shows the dominant, though not exclusive, influ-
ence. How does Russell’s argument for the falsity of naïve realism, quoted in 
Section 3, fit into this scheme? The argument is: naïve realism → physics → 
~naïve realism. Corresponding to the pair (On, Ln) let us separate out from Ln 
the derived mind–world relationship Rn , with R0 being naïve realism. 
 
L0
O0
L1
O1
L2
R2R1R0
O2
 
 
 FIGURE 4 
 
 
 
 
Does Rn have any influence on Ln? On the evidence of Part I it would appear 
not; hence the representation of Rn in the diagram. It follows that Russell’s 
statement that naïve realism, R0, leads to physics, (O1, L1), is wrong. Russell is 
confusing the statement of naïve realism, that “things are what they seem”, 
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with statements of fact, made by a naïve realist, upon which physics is based. 
But the pair (O0, L0), which might be dubbed ‘common sense and folk science’ 
and from which R0 derives, leads to (O1, L1) → R1 → ~R0 . Thus naïve realism 
is shown to be false not on philosophical grounds, but as an implication of 
science. 
 In Section 4 it was shown that there is no indubitable observational base 
for science. Thus in view of the conclusions of Section 5 it cannot be expected 
that there would be a point beyond which scientific refinement of the concep-
tual content of observation does not penetrate. The question as to how science 
relates to the world devolves, then, on how the mind relates to the world. It 
was observed in Section 3 that ‘observation’ and ‘theory’ are relative terms 
that obtain their meaning from the context of their use in scientific practice. 
The question that arises here is how observation and theory are related; in 
particular, how theory and theoretical terms are established on the basis of 
observation. These issues are now examined. 
6. Mind and the World 
Summary: The relation of mind and world is investigated. It is 
epitomized in the question of how we see, for which the physiology of 
vision does not provide an adequate answer. To answer the question 
requires an understanding of how the mental constructs of the visual 
process relate to the world. They cannot be said (except obliquely) to 
resemble the world, as there is no independent way of knowing the 
world. It is put forward as a proposition of fact that the world as we 
know it is ‘given’ by its mental representations. The nature of repre-
sentation, its relation to sensory input, and the actions that may en-
sue from it are intimately connected. At the neurological level, a pos-
sible mechanism for generating representations is by selection from 
possible neurological connections. 
There are issues concerning mind and the world, and analogously science and 
observation, that have been of central importance to philosophy since its be-
ginning. They have been touched on in the preceding discussion and will now 
be addressed directly. 
 First let the assumption be stated again under which this investigation is 
being conducted: given the reach of modern scientific knowledge, philosophi-
cal problems concerning mind and the world derive essentially from difficul-
ties in finding a mode of description of known facts suitable for critical analy-
sis of the problems, due in large measure to the ancient roots of both philoso-
phical and ordinary language, and its dissociation from the kind of language in 
which these facts can be adequately comprehended and new facts accommo-
dated, the kind of language used by science. 
 The central problem for the philosophy of mind, the relation of the mind 
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to the world, and the philosophy of science, how scientific theory relates to 
scientific observation, are epitomized in the seemingly simple question: What 
is it to see? Until we have thought about it, this seems to be a superfluous 
question, for is it not only the blind who do not know what it is to see? On 
being acquainted with the main facts about the visual system, we are quite 
likely to be satisfied with the answers they give, in so far as they reflect current 
knowledge. This response, however, is not justified, as Francis Crick writes in 
The Astonishing Hypothesis: 
 
 There are two rather surprising aspects of our present knowledge of the 
visual system. The first is how much we already know—by any standards the 
amount is enormous. . . . This knowledge has been acquired by the painstak-
ing efforts of many experimenters and theorists, over many years, studying 
both humans and animals. 
 The other surprising thing is that, in spite of all this work, we really have 
no clear idea how we see anything. . . . we do not yet know, even in outline, 
how our brains produce the vivid visual awareness that we take so much for 
granted. We can glimpse fragments of the processes involved, but we lack 
both the detailed information and the ideas to answer the most simple ques-
tions: How do I see colour? What is happening when I recall the image of a 
familiar face? and so on. 
 But there is a third surprising thing. You probably already have a rough-
and-ready idea of how you yourself see things. . . . “you” put together the pic-
tures coming to your brain from your two eyes, and so you see. Without 
thinking about it, you probably have some idea how this might happen. 
What may surprise you is that, even if scientists still do not know how we see 
things, it is easy to show that how you think you see things is largely simplis-
tic or, in many cases, plain wrong.92
 
Crick apparently believes that, apart from simplistic notions of vision, the 
deficiency in our understanding of vision lies in our lack of knowledge of the 
neurological processes involved. This is consistent with the “Astonishing Hy-
pothesis” of the title of his book, that 
“You”, your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your 
sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behav-
iour of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules.93
Crick’s hypothesis is the well known identity theory of the mind, that mental 
events are identical (in some sense) to neurological processes. This theory 
seems to leave something unaccounted for, as it seemed to Leibniz nearly 
three hundred years ago: 
 17. We are moreover obliged to confess that perception and that which 
depends on it cannot be explained mechanically, that is to say by figures 
and motions. Suppose that there were a machine so constructed as to pro-
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duce thought, feeling, and perception, we could imagine it increased in size 
while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter as one might a 
mill. On going inside we should only see the parts impinging upon one an-
other; we should not see anything which would explain a perception. The 
explanation of perception must therefore be sought in a simple substance, 
and not in a compound or in a machine.94
Leibniz fills in the missing element in perception with monads. Crick supposes 
that we have a natural inclination to fill it in with an unexplained “you”, a 
Cartesian homuncule, which he summarily dismisses as “plain wrong”. But 
surely both Crick and Leibniz are right in this, that vision is nothing but neu-
rons, but neurons alone do not seem to explain vision. If Crick means to say 
that there are neurological correlates for vision, as no doubt he does, then 
would not finding those correlates and describing them in a suitable way af-
ford an explanation that should satisfy us? 
 The neurophysiologist, Rudolfo Llinás, acknowledges the need for such an 
explanation, and proposes one: 
 
 As a neuroscientist, the single most important issue one can address con-
cerns the manner in which brains and minds relate to one another. It is thus 
quite surprising that this issue attracts so little interest in our field. . . . 
 I for one, as a monist, consider ‘mindness’ (by ‘mindness’ I mean high-
level awareness, including self-awareness) to be but one of several global 
physiological computational states that the brain can generate. . . . the 
‘mindness state’ allows complex goal-directed interactions between a living 
organism and its environment. The more complex the interaction the more 
involved the ‘mindness’ state—and yet, it seems to me, never so complex as 
to transcend the boundaries of the purely material. . . . 
 In order to put this issue into context, we may ask, for instance, ‘How do 
we see?’ Indeed, among the many upsetting experiences encountered as a 
professor of physiology at a medical school, one in particular is relevant 
here. It relates to a student who, having been particularly interested in our 
teaching of the nervous system, said, ‘But, now that I have learned neurosci-
ence, I find that I still do not understand, for instance, how I see’. The stu-
dent may be able to recite the functional and anatomical properties of the 
visual system from retina to motor neurons and yet may say to me in all 
candour, ‘I can follow the whole system and its properties but I still have no 
conception at all of what it is to see’. This problem arises because we forget 
to tell our students that seeing is reconstructing the external world, based 
not on the reflecting properties of light on external objects but, rather, on 
the transformation of such visual sensory input (a vector) into perception 
vectors in other sets of coordinate systems. Indeed, we should have re-
minded our students that in order to see one requires first to have moved 
within the world and to have established, via the use of natural coordinates, 
the properties of objects with respect to our own physical attributes (the 
weight of each object, its size with respect to that of our body, etc.). It would 
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be clear then that it is only through the ability that our brain has to trans-
form measurements in one set of coordinates (the visual system) into com-
parable sets of measurements (visually guided motor execution) provided by 
other sensory inputs (for example, touch from fingertips) that one can truly 
develop the necessary semantics to be able to understand what one sees. The 
point is that understanding the functional connectivity of the visual system 
is not sufficient for understanding vision.95
 
Two important propositions can be drawn from this quotation. 
(1) Vision is a reconstruction of the external world. Elsewhere Llinás ex-
presses this in striking terms: 
The sensory input feeds and modulates an internal state of intrinsic origin, 
that is, perception is a dream modulated by sensory input.96
(2) Vision is only one part of the process by which that reconstruction takes 
place, for it must be complemented by other sensory modes and it must be 
exploratory, it must be integrated with movement. 
The first proposition is obvious when one thinks about it for a moment: seeing 
involves having a vision of things; where else could the vision be but in our-
selves? The whole of the visual field that appears to be before our eyes is 
formed within ourselves! Which, of course, is not to say that the things visual-
ized are in ourselves. Llinás goes further by proposing a mathematical model 
for the reconstruction, which produces a homomorphism (a many-to-one 
form preserving mapping) from the space of external reality as represented by 
sensory input onto the space of internal functional states. Thus 
. . . one may say that mind is a computational state of the brain generated by 
the interaction between the external world and an internal set of reference 
frames. These latter frames are generated, initially, as an internal embed-
ding of the body’s natural coordinate systems.97
This proposal offers a neurological correlate of the mind, including vision, 
which gives a structural meaning to the ‘is’ of the identity theory of the mind. 
 With this kind of analysis before us, we ask again: Does such an analysis 
as this offer a sufficient explanation to satisfy us? Does it answer Leibniz’s 
requirement? The generally accepted answer, at least amongst philosophers, is 
that some such explanation provides objective understanding of the mind–
world interaction, but that it can never explain the subjective aspect of indi-
vidual experience, of consciousness. We shall put aside the second issue for 
the present and concentrate on objective description. 
 Let us return to the observing-state of the mind (or the brain) of Section 4, 
which Bertrand Russell said is “at the end of a long causal chain which starts 
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from the objects” observed, but which is “not likely to resemble the objects, 
except, at best, in certain very abstract ways”. But does it make any sense to 
speak of a perception of an object as resembling the object? By ‘resemble’ 
Russell is perhaps thinking of verisimilitude (“likeness or resemblance to 
truth”, OED). Suppose I look at a tree. My vision of the tree, which is part of 
my observing-state, resembles the appearance of the tree, does it not? How 
could it be otherwise? In this way: suppose I look at an electricity pole (in dim 
light, and partly obscured) and see a tree. My vision of the pole, which is part 
of my observing-state, resembles the appearance of a tree. Now suppose I wish 
to check the object of my vision. I take a closer look, touch the pole, refer to 
my knowledge of poles and trees, perhaps ask someone else to have a look at it 
too, and so on. Thus that my vision of an object, my observing-state, resem-
bles the object itself can only be taken to mean that my observing-state co-
heres with other comparable observing-states, those whose objects supposedly 
correspond to mine; and if the coherence is poor, so is the resemblance. In 
short, I check agreement of my observing-state with other observing-states, 
existing and newly generated, and information derived therefrom. It is what I 
can do as a result of my observing-state that gives ‘resemblance’ its meaning in 
this context. It is meaningless to speak of direct resemblance between a vision 
and its object, for the two, being of different categories, are not directly com-
parable for resemblance; they can be compared only indirectly in the manner 
described. 
 Notice that in the procedure described for deciding on resemblance be-
tween observing-state and object, we do not step outside the realm of observ-
ing-states—we cannot bypass observing-states to take a direct look at the ob-
ject as a thing in itself, so to speak, for there is nothing that answers to the 
description, ‘a direct look at a thing in itself’. This does not mean that we do 
not look at the outside world; for observing-states result from our response to 
sensory stimulation, coming both from within our bodies and from the exter-
nal world, the world external to our bodies. 
 Let us ask, then, what is the relation between the observing-state and its 
object? And in general between any mental state and what it is about? This is 
the fundamental question concerning the relation between the mind and the 
world. The short answer is that the object inheres in the observing-state, as 
Franz Brentano wrote: 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a con-
tent, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as 
meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon in-
cludes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the 
same way. . . . We can therefore define mental phenomena by saying that 
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they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within 
themselves.98
Brentano’s one-time student, Kasimir Twardowski, reaffirmed this: 
It is one of the best known positions of [descriptive] psychology, hardly con-
tested by anyone, that every mental phenomenon intends an immanent ob-
ject.99
The observing-state is a construct of the nervous system of the observer pro-
duced in response to sensory stimulation and utilizing existing information 
from his cerebral capacity. The construct utilizes a coordinate system within 
which the object and the observer are located, thus enabling the observer to 
project the object either beyond his own body and nervous system, or else 
within it, according to the nature of the sensory stimulus. This much is rea-
sonably clear from our knowledge of the functioning of the nervous system, in 
particular vision. The details are not well understood however, mainly, it 
seems, due to lack of understanding of the organization of the existing vast 
store of information (memory) which is utilized in the construction of mental 
states. It would appear that mental constructs are organizing systems, some 
stable in time, others subject to continual change. There have been many 
models offered of the nervous system, becoming more detailed as knowledge 
accumulates, one of which is that of Llinás. Others are the holographic hy-
pothesis of Karl Pribram100 and the neural Darwinism promoted by Gerald 
Edelman101 (see below). 
 To speak of the object of an observing-state inhering in the observing-
state itself provides us with an understanding of vision as a constructive proc-
ess. We appear to be left, however, with the unanswered question as to how 
the observing-state relates to the state of affairs in the world that it represents. 
The relation cannot be one of resemblance (in any direct sense), for the rea-
sons given above. It should be clear from our discussion that what we should 
be asking is not how faithful a correspondence there is between a mental con-
struct and the part of the world-as-it-is that it represents, but what it is that 
the mental construct can do, what function it fulfils for its possessor. The 
answer is obvious: the construct enables its possessor to adapt to and survive 
in its environment. There are two parts to this, evolutionary adaptation and 
learning, including perception. In evolution, natural selection is made from 
biological variations by the survival of the gene line determining the selected 
variation. There is no question here of the evolutionary adaptation resembling 
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its environment. 
 Now consider learning, that is, the making of mental constructs or repre-
sentations of the environment, and perceiving the environment accordingly. 
Again there is no question of a representation resembling the environment in 
order to enable its possessor to survive. What the possessor of the representa-
tion is doing is constructing a model by which to adapt to and anticipate envi-
ronmental change. This view agrees with that of the neuroscientist, J.Z. 
Young: 
When an animal learns, it gradually comes to take actions that are appropri-
ate to certain aspects of the situations it has experienced. Only in this sense 
can it be said to ‘represent’ these situations.102
That representations do not ‘represent’ the environment in the sense of re-
sembling it is also argued by Kathleen Akins103, who concludes that philoso-
phical concerns about “aboutness” are misconceived, as “aboutness” is not 
about anything in the ordinary sense of the word ‘about’. The vision of the 
world before your eyes, or at least the neurological basis of it, is just a con-
struct enabling you to successfully navigate your way about it. That the world 
may appear different to different eyes, or from different perspectives of 
knowledge and intent, confirms this. An organism is constrained by its envi-
ronment in respect of its basic functions, namely supply of nutrients, growth 
and procreation. Adaptation amounts to the internalization of response pat-
terns so as to exploit the environment in the carrying out of the basic func-
tions and minimize the unwanted impact of environmental constraint on 
those functions. Such internalization of response patterns may reflect quite 
complex forms of adaptation, the level of complexity depending on the com-
plexity of the environment within which an organism lives. An organism that 
possesses locomotive ability requires a significantly higher order of complexity 
of adaptation (with a corresponding complexity of structure) than one that 
remains in a fixed location, particularly for the location of its own body in 
relation to its environment, and also for the greater complexity of environ-
ment that locomotion opens up. It is apparently the organism possessing 
locomotion that can be characterized by the possession of a central nervous 
system. An instructive example of this is the tunicate (sea squirt), first studied 
by the Emperor Hirohito. As a larva capable of locomotion, the sea squirt 
possesses 
a brain-like ganglion which can be informed about the environment by pe-
ripheral sensory input from a statocyst (organ for balance), a primitive eye, 
and a notocord (primitive spinal chord). These central nervous structures 
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have the connections necessary to deal with the continuously changing envi-
ronment, as this primitive tadpole-like larva swims through the water.104
When mature the tunicate attaches itself permanently to a rock, and no longer 
needing most of its brain, consumes it (“a process paralleled by some human 
academics upon obtaining university tenure”). 
The lesson of this evolutionary stage is, of course, very clear. It is that brains 
are needed only in those multicellular beings that move actively.105
In order to complete the picture, we should consider how a mental construct 
or representation may be brought into existence to fulfil its function of ena-
bling its possessor to survive: how does an organism respond constructively to 
sensory impingements from its environment? We are asking here what the 
neurophysiological process might be. 
 It is of course possible, and is psychologically plausible (though we have 
ruled it out above), that somehow, over time, sensory impingements create or 
mould within the observer an image or impression of the environment, or of 
the parts of it that are relevant to his well-being. This was, in fact, the kind of 
process that was initially proposed to explain the operation of the immune 
system, and is an instructive example to consider. The immune system is de-
scribed by Edelman as follows: 
 
 If I inject a protein into an individual’s body that does not resemble its 
own proteins, specialized cells called lymphocytes respond by producing 
molecules called antibodies. These molecules bind by fitting to specific and 
characteristic portions of the foreign molecule, or antigen, as it is called. A 
second and later encounter allows these antibodies to bind even more effec-
tively to just those antigens. Perhaps more astonishing is the fact that a spe-
cific recognition event occurs even for new molecules synthesized by organic 
chemists, molecules that [had] never existed before either in the responding 
species or in the history of the earth for that matter. 
 How can an individual’s body positively distinguish novel molecules in 
such a specific fashion?106
 
The initial theory proposed to account for this was called the theory of instruc-
tion: the immune system was instructed by the antigen as to how it might 
defeat it—very obliging of the antigen indeed. The theory went like this: 
. . . in the immune system, a foreign molecule transferred information about 
its shape and structure to the combining site of the antibody molecule. It 
then removed itself (the way a cookie cutter would be removed from dough) 
leaving a crevice of complementary shape that could then bind to all foreign 
molecules with regions having the shape with which the impression was 
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originally made.107
This theory is at least more credible than one whereby a faithful image of a 
whole environment may be constructed within an organism in all its complex-
ity. Its credibility is weakened, however, by the assumed cooperation of the 
antigen in its own destruction—surely antigens would have evolved that do not 
cooperate in the way supposed. One can speculate; but one can also test, and 
under test the theory of instruction has been shown to be false. It will be re-
membered that a similar false theory of direct environmental influence was 
once proposed to account for evolution, Lamarck’s theory of acquired charac-
teristics. The accepted theory for the immune system is the theory of clonal 
selection, due to Frank MacFarlane Burnet, and is, like Darwin’s theory of 
evolution, based on the idea of selection. Edelman describes it thus: 
 
 Burnet maintained that, prior to a confrontation with any foreign mole-
cule, an individual’s body has the ability to make a huge repertoire of anti-
body molecules, each with a different shape at its binding site. When a for-
eign molecule (say on a virus or bacterium) is introduced into the body, it 
encounters a population of cells, each with a different antibody on its sur-
face. It binds to those cells in the repertoire having antibodies whose com-
bining sites happen to be more or less complementary to it. When a portion 
of an antigen binds to an antibody with a sufficiently close fit, it stimulates 
the cell (called a lymphocyte) bearing that antibody to divide repeatedly. 
This results in many more “progeny” cells having antibodies of the same 
shape and binding specificity. 
 A group of daughter cells is called a clone (the asexual progeny of a single 
cell) and the whole process is one of differential reproduction by clonal se-
lection.108
 
 Now let us return to consideration of the process by which a representa-
tion is created. In each of the cases of evolution and the immune system it was 
seen that the cooperation of nature cannot be assumed in establishing the 
integrity of the individual organism—nature knows nothing of the rights of the 
individual. Likewise it cannot be assumed that nature will cooperate in the 
construction of mental representations: these must at base level be physically 
determined by the individual’s confrontation with nature. What we can more 
reasonably assume is that the individual has evolved with a sufficient wealth 
of potential models, namely cerebral connections, from which selection may 
be made to achieve adaptation to his environment, in a similar way to selec-
tion in evolution and immunity. This does not rule out construction except at 
the basic level, for a representation would normally be constituted by many 
selected connections from which it could be said to be constructed. Such a 
selective mechanism for learning was put forward by J.Z. Young: 
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The thesis I wish to propound is that learning in the nervous system is simi-
larly a selection among a previously available set of possible alternatives.109
This is likewise the mechanism proposed by Edelman (without reference to 
J.Z. Young) in his theory of neural Darwinism (theory of neuronal group selec-
tion), referred to earlier. While decisive confirmation still awaits such theories 
of selection, it is likely that a selective mechanism will play a significant role in 
the construction of mental representations. 
 An analogy with the development of science can be drawn. Science devel-
ops by selection from a repertoire of possible theories formulated in the ‘cere-
bral connectionist’ language of logic and mathematics. The repertoire is ex-
tended by developments in mathematics, as it is in evolution by mutation. 
7. Idealism versus Realism 
Summary: The duality of idealism and realism is dissolved by the re-
lation of mind to world described in Section 6. The dissolution is 
achieved by the external/internal distinctions described there, and as 
also put forward by Carnap and Putnam. Similarity of observation 
between individuals, producing public observation, depends on bio-
logical and cultural similarity, the criterion for similarity of observa-
tion being behavioural, that is, intersubjective agreement. Some ad-
ditional remarks on realism follow. 
The description given above of observing-state and object may prompt the 
philosophically minded to respond that as the description makes the object a 
construct (or part thereof) of the mind, an idealistic view of the world is being 
proposed. The best way to answer this is to make quite clear what the proposal 
is and let the philosopher decide whether it falls within some kind of idealism. 
 First, the description is intended to be factual. It is a fact that our contact 
with the world is solely by sensory stimulation, and that this is converted into 
a rich and detailed representation, which is the world as we know it. A phi-
losophical realist would say that the representation corresponds to the world 
as it is, more or less, while an idealist would say that the representation is an 
invention of the mind. (The word ‘representation’ is not intended to convey 
either view; the less familiar term ‘construct’ would carry the same meaning.) 
Given the facts of the matter, there can be no evidence either way, because 
there is no way of contacting the world as it is except by sensory stimulation 
and the ensuing representational constructions.110 It is not surprising, then, 
that the realism–idealism polarity has been a perennial feature of philosophi-
                                                   
109 J.Z. Young, op. cit., p. 30 
110 To clarify this point, consider the following allegory. A shows B a picture of an object O. B 
asks A to show him O. A responds by showing B another, more detailed, picture of O. B 
says, “No, that is not what I asked to see; I asked to see O itself.” A says, “All I can show 
you are more detailed pictures of O, for O is something that can be seen only in pictures.” 
  
 79
cal debate, for there is no way of deciding it—in truth there is nothing to de-
cide. 
 Second, it would be misrepresenting the description to say that it makes 
the world a construct of the mind. The world is not constructed by the mind, 
but given to the mind via sensory stimulation. The mind’s role is to produce a 
structure that will enable the individual to comprehend and survive in the 
world. 
 Third, it is the mental construct by which the world is known that pro-
duces its sense of reality for the individual observer. We are all realists when 
in our observing-states. And to check on the reality of something observed we 
adopt the method described in the previous section. 
 We conclude that the philosophical polarity of realism–idealism is mis-
conceived. Reality has sense only in the context of a construct by which the 
world is represented. Carnap has given clear expression to this point of view in 
a linguistic framework, which we may take as standing for publicly shared 
mental constructs (of which more below): 
 
Let us consider as an example the simplest kind of entities dealt with in the 
everyday language: the spatio-temporally ordered system of observable 
things and events. Once we have accepted the thing language with its 
framework for things, we can raise and answer internal questions; e.g., “Is 
there a white piece of paper on my desk? . . . These questions are to be an-
swered by empirical investigations. . . . The concept of reality occurring in 
these internal questions is an empirical, scientific, non-metaphysical con-
cept. To recognize something as a real thing or event means to succeed in in-
corporating it into the system of things at a particular space-time position so 
that it fits together with the other things recognized as real, according to the 
rules of the framework. 
 From these questions we must distinguish the external question of the re-
ality of the thing world itself. In contrast to the former questions, this ques-
tion is raised neither by the man in the street nor by scientists, but only by 
philosophers. Realists give an affirmative answer, subjective idealists a nega-
tive one, and the controversy goes on for centuries without ever being 
solved. And it cannot be solved because it is framed in a wrong way. To be 
real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the system; hence this 
concept cannot be meaningfully applied to the  system itself.111
 
A similar expression of this thesis, in more naturalistic terms, is given by Put-
nam, in which he contrasts two philosophical perspectives: 
 
 One of these perspectives is the perspective of metaphysical realism. On 
this perspective, the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-
independent objects. There is exactly one true and complete description of 
‘the way the world is’. Truth involves some sort of correspondence relation 
between words or thought-signs and external things and sets of things. I 
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shall call this perspective the externalist perspective, because its favourite 
point of view is a God’s Eye point of view. 
 The perspective I shall defend has no unambiguous name. It is a late arri-
val in the history of philosophy, and even today it keeps being confused with 
other points of view of a quite different sort. I shall refer to it as the internal-
ist perspective, because it is characteristic of this view to hold that what ob-
jects does the world consist of? is a question that it only makes sense to ask 
within a theory or description. Many ‘internalist’ philosophers, though not 
all, hold further that there is more than one ‘true’ theory or description of 
the world. ‘Truth’, in an internalist view, is some sort of (idealized) rational 
acceptability—some sort of ideal coherence of our beliefs with each other 
and with our experiences as those experiences are themselves represented 
in our belief system—and not correspondence with mind-independent or 
discourse-independent ‘states of affairs’. There is no God’s Eye point of view 
that we can know or usefully imagine; there are only the various points of 
view of actual persons reflecting various interests and purposes that their 
descriptions and theories subserve. (‘Coherence theory of truth’; ‘Non-
realism’; ‘Verificationism’; ‘Pluralism’; ‘Pragmatism’; are all terms that have 
been applied to the internalist perspective; but every one of these terms has 
connotations that are unacceptable because of their other historic applica-
tions.)112
 
Both of these quotations are philosophical rather than scientific in their refer-
ence. 
 A realist may be inclined to identify the positions taken by Carnap and 
Putnam with some kinds of idealism. It is true that they are not realist in the 
following sense defined by Keith Campbell: 
Realists in the philosophy of science are those philosophers who will not 
conclude, from the fact that scientific theories are undoubtedly constructs of 
human mentality and culture, that therefore the content of these theories is 
inevitably some function of the human mentality and culture that have pro-
duced them.113
They are not realists in this sense because (a) the content of a theory (or the 
object of a construct) can be referred to only be means of a theory (or con-
struct), though generally, for well established (real) content, by more than one 
theory, and (b) the content of a theory generally includes other theory, which, 
if well established, may be taken as fact. In this respect Putnam contrasts 
himself with Rorty (and I contrast myself similarly). Discussing “Rorty’s Short 
Way with the Question” of realism, Putnam writes that Rorty’s 
 
argument is supposed to show that the whole idea that our words and 
thoughts sometimes do and sometimes do not “agree with” or “correspond 
to” or “represent” a reality outside themselves ought to be rejected as en-
tirely empty. The reason given is that it is impossible to “stand outside” and 
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compare our thought and language with the world. The only access we have 
to the world is to the world as it is represented in thought and language. 
Rorty concludes that speaking of some of our words and thoughts as “true” 
or as “in agreement with the facts” is only “a compliment” that we pay to our 
own intellectual creations (the ones that help us “cope”). 
 If the question of realism could be disposed of so simply, then many other 
philosophical issues which are entangled with it could be disposed of as well. 
I agree with Rorty that we have no access to “unconceptualized reality”. As 
John McDowell likes to put it, you can’t view your language “from sideways 
on” in the way that the idea of looking at one’s language and the world and 
comparing the two suggests. But it doesn’t follow that language and thought 
do not describe something outside themselves, even if that something can 
only be described by describing it (that is by employing language and 
thought); and, as Rorty ought to have seen, the belief that they do plays an 
essential role within language and thought themselves and, more impor-
tantly, within our lives.114
 
Hence Putnam’s term, “internal realism”. 
 The reason it is difficult to conceive of objects as constructs is that we 
cannot observe the world except by means of constructs, and therefore find it 
difficult to stand outside a system of constructs in order to describe them. 
Suppose we observe a person, O, in an observing-state of observing a tree. If 
we ourselves also are observing the tree, how can we say that the tree is a 
construct of O? A tree, after all, is a tree, it is not a construct of someone’s 
mind (in derogatory terms, a figment of the imagination), it is not even the 
object of a construct. On analyzing our perception of the tree, we could allow 
that the perception occurs by means of a representation of it in our mind; 
likewise a representation of it in O’s mind. (Berkeley would have it that we 
perceive the representation itself, but that is clearly wrong—we perceive the 
tree, the object of the representation, by means of the representation.) But is 
there not a real tree that is the object of both representations? Of course there 
is a real tree. But that does not oppose the fact that the real tree is an object of 
our mental construct, or the common object (in a sense explained below) of 
mental constructs of ourselves and O. The reason that there appears to be an 
opposition between real and construct is that there are here two different 
modes of description being used: the tree is real when described using the 
mental construct by which it is represented, that is, from the point of view of 
the observing-state; the tree is a mental construct of O when we are conceiving 
of the processes of O’s observing of the tree, that is, when we are describing an 
observing-state. The first mode of description is the one we naturally use in 
everyday life, for informal scientific description, and for most philosophical 
discussion. When Llinás writes that “we forget to tell our students that seeing 
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is reconstructing the external world”, he is, by implication, using both modes 
of description: he is describing seeing the world as a constructive process 
(“perception is a dream modulated by sensory input”), but in calling a con-
struct a ‘reconstruction’ he is taking the world as given. Errol Harris noted this 
practice: 
. . . I have argued that physiological theories, treating sense processes as the 
transmission of coded information, lead to self-refuting epistemological 
theories of perception, which are not themselves entailed by the physiologi-
cal evidence, but to which physiologists are sometimes led by the tacit adop-
tion of epistemological presuppositions. Philosophers, on the other hand, 
tend to be misled, by a superficial acquaintance with certain physiological 
facts, into too ready an acceptance of theories of the sense-data variety.115
When there is not a common object of perception, however, when O observes 
a tree where we observe a pole, it is necessary to distinguish more carefully 
between the two modes of description. If our object of observation is con-
firmed by further observation, then the need to describe O’s object as a mental 
construct is obvious. One is reminded here of Wittgenstein’s duck–rabbit116 
(and numerous other ambiguous pictures), a drawing which can be seen to 
portray alternately a duck’s head and a rabbit’s head (but never both at once), 
thus demonstrating the pivotal role of mental construct in perception. Another 
example of mental construction is given by a figure due to Kanizsa117: 
 
 
 
 FIGURE 5 
 
 
 
Here one sees a white triangle overlaying disks and lines which exists solely by 
virtue of those objects, for which, it has been confirmed, there exists a distinct 
neural correlate. 
 While observation depends on the individual mind, it is not made in isola-
tion: of other observation; of affective, cognitive and conative aspects of our 
minds; or of the observations of others and hence of commonly accepted and 
socially sanctioned identifications. Elementary observation of natural phe-
nomena is largely independent of the existence of culture, and is present, of 
course, in animals without culture. The influence of culture is important in 
establishing common mental constructs. Commonality of mental construct 
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depends on similarity, though certainly not identity, in biological, and in par-
ticular neurological, makeup, in social organization and in culture. Common-
ality of elementary observation of natural phenomena requires only similarity 
in biological makeup. The criterion of commonality of mental construct is 
behavioural effect, including linguistic behaviour, and is thus intersubjective 
in nature. The only criterion upon which, for example, similarity in perception 
of a tree or a colour can at present be judged is behaviour ensuing on the per-
ception, as this is the only objective criterion that exists in the present state of 
knowledge. With sufficient knowledge of the neurological correlates of subjec-
tive experience, it might be possible to use neurological criteria to decide on 
commonality of mental construct, but for this to be independent of behav-
ioural criteria, significant theoretical development in the neurologi-
cal/behavioural area would be required, which at present would seem to lie far 
in the future. 
 The above theory of the concurrence of the mind and the world has been 
put forward as an interpretation that takes account of known facts, including 
the physiology and psychology of perception. It will be seen below that it also 
provides a natural elucidation of the seemingly intractable problem of con-
scious experience, and yields a parallel interpretation in the description of the 
relation of theory to observation in science. The theory is proposed as scien-
tific, in the sense that it takes account of observed facts and can be developed 
into predictive scientific theory. Perhaps it should therefore be described as a 
guiding or organizing principle rather than a theory. As such it cannot be 
claimed to be without precedent, for it resonates the ideas of Kant and the 
subjective idealists that followed him, and also those of the phenomenalists. 
Mach, for instance, said that “the world consists only of our sensations”, ob-
jects are made up of elements which can be detected by the senses. Despite 
similarities, that is not the view put forward here, which is that the world, 
whatever it might be (and physics is the basic source for that), is communi-
cated to us only through our senses, but what it is is what we make of it by our 
own constructions in response to sensory stimulations according to our own 
natural endowment and existing knowledge. These constructions, the knowl-
edge we obtain by our learning from birth, are obtained by the same kind of 
iterative process that was described for the development of science in Section 
5. Mach’s statement about the world is metaphysical—it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to know what difference it would make, whether true or false, to 
anything we might observe or how we might observe it. The proposals made 
here do make a difference to what we observe, and they do not depend on 
what we cannot observe. 
 Some remarks follow on everyday realism, scientific realism and meta-
physical realism. 
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Everyday realism. It is usually assumed when conceiving of a situation that 
entities (objects or events) continue to exist when they are not directly per-
ceived or sensed. This is seldom an explicit assumption, of course, but is im-
plicit in our mental processes, particularly visual. The assumption concerns 
perception rather than observation in its general sense, as the latter includes 
the inferring of existence where there is no direct perception. A more general 
statement of existence would therefore be that entities are taken to exist when 
they are the objects of a conception, a theory for example. This is much the 
view of W.V. Quine, who puts it in the linguistic form, “To ask what the as-
suming of an object consists in is to ask what referring to the object consists 
in”.118 If the conception of which the entity is an object is well corroborated, 
then the entity is taken to possess everyday reality, to exist as conceived. This 
existence may be at a time far removed from the time when the conception is 
formed: thus dinosaurs exist in space–time, that is, they did exist, as they are 
objects of the science of palæontology. 
 
Scientific realism. The structure of scientific realism is well displayed by the 
case of quantum theory. Quantum theory, understood as a formal system, 
concerns various entities that are conceived in mathematical terms. In terms 
of these entities and their relations, the theory, it is usually said, predicts cer-
tain observations. These observations are not of entities of the theory of 
course, but as with any scientific theory, correspond to the entities in a sys-
tematic way (by correspondence rules) which is not specified by the formal 
theory itself, but is given by a model for the theory. In one model for quantum 
theory it is said that particles, or at least their macroscopic effects, are ob-
served, these particles being associated with mathematical entities of the the-
ory. 
 Now if, as often happens (and certainly happens with less abstruse scien-
tific theory), the model is carried beyond its immediate function and is identi-
fied with the theory itself, then it is concluded that the particles exist only 
when observed (in accordance with the correspondence rules)—they do not 
possess the reality of everyday objects. It must be recognized, however, that 
the quantum model that mentions particles is just a tool for connecting theory 
to observation, and the particles are fictitious objects of a statistical kind, 
somewhat as the average man with 2.6 children is a statistical fiction. It need 
not be a problem, therefore, that these fictitious objects exhibit behaviour that 
does not accord with what we would expect of a real object. Models for most 
scientific theories fall so naturally into our normal modes of thought that we 
are hardly aware of their existence as tools for application of theories. The 
                                                   
118 W.V. Quine, “Things and Their Place in Theories”, p. 2 
  
 85
case of quantum theory is different. Because quantum theory is probabilistic, 
there is no one model that will connect it to our everyday non-probabilistic 
observational experience, and the two principal models concerning particles 
and waves are not consistent with each other. This inconsistency, and the fact 
that scientists have no difficulty in applying the theory, demonstrates the 
fictitious nature of the models, and the unreality of the objects they speak of. 
In quantum theory scientific reality rests with the entities of the formal theory 
and everyday reality with observations they are associated with, the associa-
tion being of a statistical nature. 
 
Metaphysical realism. This is a philosophical extension of everyday realism. It 
assumes the existence of the world, by which may be meant everything in 
space–time (or in all places at all times), independently of the existence of any 
conception of it. Metaphysical reality thus accords with everyday reality in 
insisting that an unobserved entity can be real, but goes beyond it in not re-
quiring reality to depend on the object’s falling within any conception. Note 
that metaphysical realism does not mean just that the universe existed at a 
time when there was no conception of it, when there were no human beings 
for example. This meaning is included in everyday realism, as such an exis-
tence falls under our present conception (as explained under everyday real-
ism). 
 Now if metaphysical realism is not just an alternative way of describing 
everyday realism, there must be something that is metaphysically real but not 
everyday real. In that case let the term ‘meta-real’ mean metaphysically real 
but not everyday real, so that meta-realism conforms to the statement, (∃U)(U 
does not fall under any concept), and any U that satisfies meta-realism is 
meta-real. We cannot say, of course, that U is the universe, because the uni-
verse falls within scientific cosmological conceptions. Now observe that meta-
real, and hence metaphysically real, cannot be a concept, on pain of self con-
tradiction: a U falling under the concept meta-real would not fall under any 
concept. Perhaps meta-real could be called a meta-concept. What is that? 
Perhaps it is a concept that only philosophers understand, and likewise meta-
physical reality, just as God is a concept that only those of faith understand. As 
Wittgenstein wrote, “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in si-
lence”.119 Unlike Wittgenstein himself, let us heed his advice.120
 At the opposite pole to metaphysically real is metaphysically ideal, sup-
ported by the sceptical argument: for example, that we are no more than 
brains in a vat of nutrient which are wired up for the supply of all the sensory 
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stimuli that provide the full range of our experiences; or, in Descartes’s ver-
sion, that these stimuli are supplied by an evil demon. Each of these meta-
physical notions introduces an entity, so specified as to be beyond the range of 
our possible knowledge, that functions either to give support to the world as 
we conceive it by extending it or to undermine the world as we conceive it by 
diminishing it. In neither case would the full range of our experience differ by 
one iota whether the notion were true or false. These metaphysical notions are 
apparently introduced only as a substitute for knowledge of the full complexity 
of the conceptual world which we inhabit, roles once filled by God and the 
Devil. 
8. Formal Analysis of Organism and Environment 
Summary: A symbolic description of the relation between an organ-
ism and its environment is given showing the form of the representa-
tion of the environment in the organism and how intersubjective 
representation may come about. 
In order to fix our ideas it is instructive to express them in formal terms. Let 
the state of the central nervous system at some initial time, which we may take 
to be 0, be denoted by C0. Between time 0 and time t (> 0) a pattern of envi-
ronmental sensory stimuli impinges on the central nervous system. Denote 
this pattern by Et, which belongs to a set of possible environmental impinge-
ments E. Denote the state of the central nervous system at time t by Ct. If we 
assume the system consisting of the central nervous system and its environ-
mental impingements to be physically deterministic (as far as neural processes 
are concerned) and to be isolated from outside perturbation, then we can take 
Ct to be dependent on C0 and Et alone, and write 
  Ct  =  T(C0, Et), 
where T summarizes the physical transformation processes that take a state 
C0 to a state Ct  in the presence of environmental impingements Et. Let 
  E(Ct|C0)  =df  {E : E ∈ E & Ct  =  T(C0, E)}. 
This is the set of all environmental impingements that give rise to Ct, given C0. 
Note that Et ∈ E(Ct|C0), and that E(Ct|C0) = E(Ct'|C0) if and only if Ct = Ct'. 
Any two E’s lying in E(Ct|C0) are called equivalent under Ct|C0. This equiva-
lence induces a partitioning of the class of all environmental impingements E 
into the equivalence classes E(Ct|C0), which are in one-to-one correspondence 
with constructs Ct|C0. Such a construct may be thought of as that part of Ct 
which reflects the influence of Et. 
 Now in a stable environment over a sufficiently long period of time (suffi-
ciently large t) one might regard E(Ct|C0) as a fair sampling, particularly in 
the case of an organism actively exploring its environment, of environmental 
impingements that could arise from a common source S, which we may call a 
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state of affairs. Considerations such as this are no doubt what give plausibility 
to belief in the existence of such a state of affairs. This is an ergodic argument 
of the kind first used by Maxwell and Boltzmann to establish a correspon-
dence between the micro-physical theory of the statistical mechanics of gases 
and the macro-physical theory of thermodynamics, that is to say, a reduction 
of the macro-physical by the micro-physical. In the situation we are consider-
ing, environmental impingements (Et) play the part of the micro-physical, and 
neural constructions (Ct|C0, not the individual neurons) play the part of mi-
cro-physical constructions corresponding to macro-physical phenomena, 
E(Ct|C0) being a subspace of the phase space of the micro-physical, as in sta-
tistical mechanics. (An excellent account of the ergodic argument is given by 
Lawrence Sklar121.) 
 The correspondence between statistical mechanics and thermodynamics 
first investigated by Maxwell and Boltzmann is called a reduction of thermo-
dynamics by statistical mechanics. What the reduction comes to is the con-
struction in statistical mechanical terms of a theory which can be shown to be 
isomorphic to thermodynamics; loosely speaking, the construction of thermo-
dynamics within statistical mechanics. (The classical account of theory reduc-
tion was introduced by Ernest Nagel122, and has been given an extensive revi-
sion by C.A. Hooker123; see also P.M. Churchland124 and P.S. Churchland125.) 
 In the analogous case of the central nervous system, neural construction is 
here being characterized as a reduction: Ct|C0 is a construction from envi-
ronmental stimuli isomorphic to a state of affairs S. Thus the role of S given 
by the ergodic argument is as the state of affairs given in terms of its reduction 
by an organism’s central nervous system. In this case correspondence is not 
between theories conceived in formal terms, but between modes of descrip-
tion, on the one hand description in neurological terms, on the other hand 
description in terms employed for the conscious life of an organism. This may 
be thought of as akin to the reduction of psychology by neurology. 
 Let us turn to the question of the existence of the state of affairs, S. The 
sense in which a state of affairs can be said to have an existence as a real entity 
requires careful formulation. Notice that S was postulated in the context of the 
above ergodic/reductive argument, which was conducted from the perspective 
of an observer of an organism, not from the perspective of an organism itself. 
The latter perspective, that of an actor on the stage rather than a member of 
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the audience, does not lead to a state of affairs S independent of the structure 
Ct|C0, for no such state of affairs can be derived from of the processes associ-
ated with an organism. The formal analysis given above leads to the construc-
tion Ct|C0 and the corresponding class of environmental stimuli  E(Ct|C0), 
and it is from within the construction Ct|C0 alone that the organism compre-
hends and acts within its environment. As the terms in which it comprehends 
its environment are those given by the content of Ct|C0 , the content may be 
identified with the state of affairs S. Thus the content of Ct|C0 is isomorphic to 
Ct|C0 ; the construct and its content have the same form, but are compre-
hended from different points of view. How can these two points of view be 
distinguished? They are respectively like the points of view of one who uses a 
tool and one who describes it. In using a tool, the tool becomes part of one’s 
conscious being; but this is not so with describing it. If consciousness is what 
it is to be an organism, then it is what it is to be an organism using the tools 
which constitute it. (Refer to Part II, Section 12 for consciousness.) 
 It might be replied that if an assumption about the existence of a state of 
affairs S independent of the organism needs to be made in describing the 
organism, then S must necessarily have an independent existence. But as such 
an assumption must belong to the observer of the organism by virtue of a 
construct of the observer’s own central nervous system, this reply does no 
more to establish the independent existence of S than the organism’s con-
struct does. There is no point of reference beyond the neural constructs of 
organisms which can be used to establish the independent existence of states 
of affairs independent of any organism, for we are all organisms—we cannot 
escape our human condition. 
 Now consider briefly the establishment of intersubjective, and thus public, 
constructs by means of communication between organisms of similar concep-
tual endowment. In an idealized situation, O and O' are two identical organ-
isms living in the same environment. Let their identical neural constructs be 
denoted by C0. Living in the same environment, their environmental im-
pingements are partitioned identically. Suppose that O and O' both experience 
a perception, and let the associated environmental impingements be Et and Et' 
respectively. Now suppose that Et and Et' lie in the same equivalence class of 
environmental impingements, which we may denote by E(Ct|C0), with Ct = 
T(C0, Et) = T(C0, Et'), a neural construct common to both O and O'. 
 The possibility of equivalence of Et and Et', and common neural construct 
Ct, opens the way to communication between O and O', if they are equipped 
for it. This can be done by the association of convenient, standardized equiva-
lence classes of impingements with other equivalence classes of impinge-
ments: in terms of content, it is the associating of symbols with entities sym-
bolized. By this means, organism O may refer organism O' to part of the con-
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tent of Ct by means of such a symbol. 
 This is a bare sketch of idealized communication. Relaxing the ideal condi-
tions would not be expected to invalidate the process, but yield a realization 
departing from the ideal. 
9. Comparison with Other Work  
 
Summary: The present thesis is compared with four other theses. 
(i) Velmans’s reflexive model of experience. Here a neural represen-
tation “reflexively projects” events and objects to locations as repre-
sented, so that they are experienced as being at those locations. Such 
experience is phenomenal consciousness, which cannot be said to 
have an unambiguous location. 
(ii) Recapitulation of the present thesis. A summary is given for com-
parison with the other theses considered. 
(iii) Popper’s three worlds. The worlds are the physical, the mental, 
and the objective world of ideas, and their unity encompasses all 
things. In this unity the mental world is the causal mediator between 
the other two worlds, the causal processes being sense perception 
and biological interaction. There is a want of clarity in this thesis. 
(iv) Bolzano’s semantic structure. Bolzano applied to the mind–
world relationship the methods he used to give mathematics a 
proper logical structure. The resulting structure is consistent but not 
clearly related to natural processes. 
(v) Brentano’s thesis. Brentano introduced intentionality in the mod-
ern sense, whereby every mental state contains its reference to the 
world within it. The relation between a real object and an intentional 
object is a difficulty for which a solution is proposed. 
(vi) Comparison with previous accounts of the mind–world relation-
ship. A table of comparative accounts is presented. 
 
(i) Velmans’s reflexive model of experience 
A psychologist who has put forward a proposal that has some similarity to the 
proposal put forward here is Max Velmans. The aim of his proposal, which he 
calls a reflexive model of consciousness, is to explain conscious experience. It 
is of value to consider Velmans’s proposal because it was presented at a sym-
posium where comments were made and recorded, displaying some confusion 
surrounding this matter. Velmans describes his proposal as follows: 
 Thus, the reflexive model makes the conventional assumptions that rep-
resentations of external events are formed within the subject’s brain and 
that under appropriate conditions these are accompanied by experiences of 
the represented events. Unconventionally, it also suggests that the brain 
models the world by reflexively projecting experiences to the judged loca-
tion of the events they represent. On this view, the world as experienced (the 
phenomenal world) is a representation, formed by sense organs and percep-
tual processes that have developed in the course of human evolution. Being 
part of consciousness, the phenomenal world cannot be thought of as sepa-
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rate from consciousness.126
Velmans notes, however, that “if the phenomenal world is just a representa-
tion, it cannot be the ‘thing-itself’”, an entity that he apparently takes from 
Kant. 
 Velmans produces Figure 6 in illustration of reflexive projection. The 
figure shows the object, a cat, as-perceived by both the subject, who holds a 
representation of it, and an observer, who also observes the subject. Thus 
subjective experience of the object becomes also inter-subjective—the object is 
publicly perceived—so that the subjective experience becomes amenable to 
scientific study, in particular psychological. Velmans contrasts his proposal 
with both a dualist model and a reductionist model, in both of which the ex-
perience of the object is held to take place in the subject’s mind, a view that he 
believes hinders our understanding of representation, consciousness and so 
on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 reflexive 
projection 
light rays 
a cat as-perceived 
      by subject 
a cat as-perceived 
   by an observer subject 
optic nerve 
   neural 
representation 
         of a cat 
FIGURE 6: REFLEXIVE MODEL OF VISUAL PERCEPTION (FROM VELMANS) 
   neural causes 
and correlates of 
   consciousness 
The figure is drawn from an inter-subjective, or public, point of view, which 
means that it depicts what anyone observing or analysing the situation would 
see or conjecture. The cat that is shown is therefore what would be seen by 
anyone, including the subject and the observer. It should not be interpreted, 
however, as showing the subject’s representation as deriving from his own 
reflexive projection. 
 Velmans’s proposal may be summarized as follows: 
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1. There are neural representations of the external world. 
2. Corresponding to neural representations there may be experiences of the 
external world. 
3. The external world as experienced is called the phenomenal world. 
4. Events of the phenomenal world are ‘reflexively projected’ to their as-
sumed locations. That is, their locations are not just recorded in their rep-
resentations, but are experienced as being at their locations. 
5. The phenomenal world is part of consciousness. 
 
 Velmans offers in illustration of this model the phenomenon of virtual 
reality,  
where a person is brought to observe as real a situation which is entirely con-
trived by simulation of the sensory input that the real situation would pro-
duce: 
I own a fine hologram of the head of Sulis Minerva, a goddess of the waters 
in the old Roman city of Bath. If the hologram is mounted in a box and one 
is not told that it is a hologram, it looks (from the front) just like the statue 
of a head in a box. But what one sees is just a three-dimensional image of a 
head in a box. In the reflexive model, this is again easily explained. The pat-
tern of light reflected from the two-dimensional surface of the hologram re-
sembles the pattern of light that would be reflected from a three-
dimensional head located in the box. Accordingly, perceptual processes con-
strue the reflecting surface to be a three-dimensional head and reflexively 
project an image of a head to its judged location, in the box. The image of a 
head out in space is the only image one experiences (there is no additional 
image of a head experienced to be in one’s mind or brain). If the hologram 
were replaced by an actual head, perceptual processing would be the same.127
This shows that the object of a representation inheres in the representation 
itself and is given its sense of reality by it. Unfortunately, this inclines Vel-
mans to think of the experiential object as being located with the experience, 
and therefore mental experience itself as being reflexively projected, though 
he equivocates about this, as is seen in the exchange below. It is certainly not 
necessary to think of it this way, for experience of the external world and the 
external world as experienced are formally different categories, the former 
being a representation of the latter. 
 Benjamin Libet, well-known for neurological experiments demonstrating 
that willed actions may be initiated prior to consciousness of the willing, was 
present at the symposium and summarized Velmans’s idea of reflexive projec-
tion in the following succinct terms: 
 Libet: It seems to me that the reflexive model is simply a special case of 
what’s going on all the time—subjective referral. If you stimulate the soma-
tosensory cortex electrically, you don’t feel anything in the brain or head at 
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all, you feel it out in your hand or wherever the representation is of that cor-
tical site. That applies to all sensibilities. There is a referral away from the 
brain to the body parts; there is referral out into space, if the stimulus ap-
pears to be coming from there. The representations of the neuronal patterns 
of the brain are not isomorphic [mapped one-to-one while preserving form] 
with what’s coming in128, so there is referral not only at a distance, but also 
in terms of the shape or configuration of the image, which is not identical 
with the neuronal representation at all.129
It is, of course, of paramount importance to a living being for its survival and 
integrity that it locate the source of any phenomenal experience, and then 
associate the experience with that source. Where the source cannot be readily 
identified, the subject will continually try various plausible possibilities until it 
is satisfied. A single causal agent may produce more than one phenomenal 
experience. For example, a blinding light can produce an identification with 
the source of the light, and simultaneously a sensation identified with the eyes 
which alerts the subject to possible damage. I am subject to the experience of 
ringing in the ears, and can remember that when the experience first occurred 
I tried to identify it with various external events, such as work on nearby rail-
way lines, a hypothesis that failed because the ringing persisted when I moved 
away from them. Eventually I learned that the ringing arose from a source 
within the ears themselves, caused by damage due to an influenza virus. Im-
mediately the ringing became located within the ears, and soon receded into 
the unconscious, whence it reappears only occasionally when attention is 
drawn to it. 
 Thomas Nagel raised the question as to where a visual experience is lo-
cated. 
 
 Nagel: Max, it seems to me that you are introducing an unnecessary puz-
zle in asking where is the head when you look at a hologram of a head. The 
head is the intentional object of my perceptual experience—what it is a per-
ception of. Of course, the object of my experience is located in the box, but 
my visual experience of seeing a head in the box is in my head. Are you deny-
ing that? 
 Velmans: Yes. I would say that you are giving a characterization of your 
visual experience that misrepresents what you actually experience! You 
make a distinction between the intentional object of perceptual experience 
(the head as experienced), which you agree is out in the world, and your ex-
perience of a head, which you claim is in your head. But when you look at 
the hologram, you don’t have an experience of the holographic head in your 
own head. The only visual experience you have is of a head in a box, out in 
the world. 
 Nagel: I don’t say that I experience the visual experience of the head as 
                                                   
128 Llinás says there is a homomorphism from “what’s coming in” to the representations; see 
above. 
129 Velmans, op. cit., p. 94 
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being in my head. I just say it is in fact an event taking place in my brain. If 
we want to locate the mental event in space, its location is in my head. There 
is absolutely no incompatibility between that and locating the intentional 
object of that perceptual experience outside my head. These are really two 
completely different levels of description of the thing.130
 
Three entities are being spoken about here: (a) a visual experience, more gen-
erally a mental experience; (b) what the visual experience is about or of, its 
object; (c) the neural state corresponding the visual experience, which may be 
called the neural representation. It is agreed that the object of a visual experi-
ence, the head of Sulis Minerva, is situated where it is subjectively referred in 
the box; and it is agreed that the neural representation is in the brain. What is 
not agreed is where, if anywhere, the visual experience is located, and how it 
relates to its object. That problem is brought into the open by John Searle. 
 
 Searle: . . . sometimes when we experience that world, it impacts on our 
nervous system in such a way that the external independently existing world 
causes us to have in our heads conscious experiences of that world. 
 Velmans: I would say that such experiences are not phenomenally ‘in our 
heads’; they are phenomenally distributed out in the space surrounding our 
bodies. But, I agree with the basic point you are making that there really is a 
world (a thing-itself) that such experiences represent. 
 Searle: There really is a world, it causes us to have experiences, those ex-
periences are all in our heads, though of course they make reference to the 
world that is not in our heads. 
 Velmans: But the world is not normally experienced to be inside our 
heads!131
 
 Surely Velmans is right in denying that conscious experiences are located 
in our heads. But is he right in saying that they are distributed in the vicinity 
of our bodies? Does conscious experience have a location? Aristotle thought 
sensation to be situated in the heart; which is reasonable, as raised emotion 
often produces a sensation there. Sensations certainly are located, in some 
sense, in the body. As conscious experiences are ours and generally include 
references to ourselves, they are usually felt to be located somewhere within 
ourselves. To say this is not to give a strictly physical location, however, but is 
more like saying that the having of a conscious experience is a state of the 
person, that is, saying that the person is in a conscious state. The simple an-
swer is to say that conscious experience is in the mind. Saying this does not 
give a location, of course, as the mind itself does not have a location: the mind 
is a reification of the mental, concerning cognitive, conative and affective 
behaviour, or states, which are described in the mentalistic–psychological 
language used for our social thinking and intercourse. Provided one can keep 
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hold of the facts and convey them to others, it matters little how we express 
ourselves. But with mental matters the facts are complex, and thus it is impor-
tant to understand the implications of our modes of expression. 
 
(ii) Recapitulation of the present thesis 
The thesis that has been put forward here is that as a result of sensory stimu-
lation of an observer/actor O deriving from his environment, a mental con-
struct is formed within the central nervous system of O which constitutes a 
representation of the environment in terms appropriate to his adaptation and 
survival. These terms include, amongst others, spatial terms, by which the 
locations and movement of objects and of O himself are determined. The real-
ity of the content of the representation, and of its objects, is given by the fact 
that in O’s consciousness he is not a mere observer of the representation, 
observing, as it were, a picture of his environment in the Cartesian dualist 
manner, but he lives and acts within that representation, and is known to 
himself only in such a way: the representation is part of O himself and of the 
processes by which he lives, but his consciousness lies within the representa-
tion, so to speak, and therefore cannot encompass it as such. It is for this rea-
son that introspection does not reveal the actual processes of observation and 
that these processes are difficult to conceive of. This subjective connection is 
the basis of the relation between mind and world. It is expanded through 
social intercourse, as indicated earlier (Section 8), into the intersubjective. 
Through the medium of language (in the case of humans) the intersubjective 
develops toward the objective, which may be equated to the cultural/scientific 
realm, by modifying the subjective in the iterative manner outlined in Section 
3. 
 There are three ontological transitions that can be distinguished in the 
mind–world relation: 
 
 T1 From neurological to psychological—subjective representation ex-
plained in terms of physical processes; 
 T2 From psychological to sociological—intersubjective representation 
explained in terms of subjective representation; 
 T3 From sociological to cultural/scientific—objective representation 
explained in terms of intersubjective representation. 
 
‘A explained in terms of B’ means a theory of A reduced to a theory B in the 
sense given in Section 8. A full exposition of the mind–world connection re-
quires a multidisciplinary study of man and his culture, including neurosci-
ence, psychology, sociology, anthropology,  . . . , in fact, every discipline that 
studies an aspect of man in relation to the world. It is a vast study, but it is a 
study that is taking place now in a piecemeal, but increasingly unified, fashion, 
and is also becoming increasingly subjected to the scientific disciplines. What 
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is required in order to abstract an understanding of the mind–world relation 
from these multidisciplinary studies is their coordination by a consistent the-
ory, of the kind that is outlined here. 
 Examination of the complete mind–world relationship has generally been 
recognized as an area specially suited to philosophical study. The relation T1 
has been the most difficult to comprehend. It has formed the nucleus of phi-
losophical controversy since the time of Socrates, and has only recently be-
come amenable to scientific investigation. There is an aspect of T1 that is 
widely held to be, and to be such as to remain, beyond the methods of science 
to explain: this is the aspect variously called ‘consciousness’, ‘subjective point 
of view’, ‘qualia’, ‘conscious experience’, ‘sensation’. This will be discussed in 
Section 12. 
 
 
(iii) Popper’s three worlds 
Karl Popper has written about a subdivision of the world into three worlds: 
 In this pluralistic philosophy the world consists of at least three ontologi-
cally distinct sub-worlds; or, as I shall say, there are three worlds: the first is 
the physical world or the world of physical states; the second is the mental 
world or the world of mental states; and the third is the world of intelligi-
bles, or of ideas in the objective sense; it is the world of possible objects of 
thought: the world of theories in themselves, and their logical relations; of 
arguments in themselves; and of problem situations in themselves.132
There is not an exact parallel between Popper’s three worlds and the catego-
ries considered here. A rough correspondence might be this: 
 
        World 1, physical      ↔    physical processes    
          World 2, mental      ↔    subjective representation 
  World 3, objects of thought      ↔    intersubjective & objective repre-
sentation 
 
Popper writes that “one of the fundamental problems of this pluralistic phi-
losophy concerns the relationship between these three ‘worlds’”133 and pro-
poses world 2 as the causal mediator between world 1 and world 3. Under the 
heading “The Causal Relations Between the Three Worlds” he writes that 
. . . the human mind can see a physical body in the literal sense of ‘see’ in 
which the eyes participate in the process. It can also ‘see’ or ‘grasp’ an arith-
metical or geometrical object; a number, or a geometrical figure. But al-
though this sense ‘see’ or ‘grasp’ is used in a metaphorical way, it neverthe-
less denotes a real relationship between the mind and its intelligible object, 
the arithmetical or geometrical object; and the relationship is closely analo-
gous to ‘seeing’ in the literal sense. Thus the mind may be linked with ob-
                                                   
132 Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge, p. 154 
133 Popper, op. cit., p. 155 
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jects of both the first world and the third world.134
If the words ‘see’ and ‘grasp’ are taken to imply something like ‘form a repre-
sentation of ’, then the causal connections of world 1 and world 3 are ex-
pressed through their representations in world 2. Popper offers no suggestion 
as to how representations may be thought of, that is, as to what sort of rela-
tionship ‘seeing’ is, or as to how representation in world 2 of world 1 and 
world 3 might transmit a causal connection. It is more to the point that world 
1 and world 3 are represented as causally connected in world 2, and hence in 
world 3. Here, for example, is a representation in world 3 of the causal con-
nection between climate and culture (world 1 and world 3) in Mesopotamia 
and Egypt (the reader uninterested in Mesopotamia and Egypt may omit this 
quotation). 
Although there was always the possibility of drought or flooding, the Nile 
seldom brought disaster to Egypt. Mesopotamian civilization developed in a 
very different environment. The Tigris and Euphrates are far less uniform in 
their behaviour than the Nile. The inhabitants of ancient Mesopotamia had 
to contend with variations of climate, scorching winds, torrential rains, and 
devastating floods over which they had little control. The mood of Mesopo-
tamian civilization reflected this element of force and violence in nature 
which gave no grounds for believing that the ravages of time could be sur-
mounted by a ritual cult like that of Osiris in Egypt. Although there was evi-
dence of cosmic order in the motions of sun, moon, and stars and in the cy-
cle of the seasons, this order was not regarded as securely established but 
had continually to be achieved by the integration of conflicting divine wills 
or powers. The basic framework of society in Mesopotamia remained the 
same for 2,000 years or more, but at different times Sumerians, Babyloni-
ans, and Assyrians were dominant and the order of society was far less static 
than in Egypt. Whereas in Egypt the pharaoh symbolized the triumph of an 
invincible divine order over the forces of chaos, in Mesopotamia kingship 
represented the struggle of a human order with all its anxieties and hazards 
to integrate itself with the universe.135
As apparently Popper is not thinking of the causal relations between his 
worlds in terms of representation, how are they established? Popper attributes 
his world 3 idea to Bolzano: 
. . . I had developed certain views of Bolzano’s (and, as I later found, also of 
Frege’s) into a theory of what I called the “third world” or “world 3”. It was 
only then that it dawned on me that the body–mind problem could be com-
pletely transformed if we call the theory of world 3 to our aid. For it can help 
us to develop at least the rudiments of an objective theory—a biological the-
ory—not only of subjective states of consciousness but also of selves.136
                                                   
134 Popper, op. cit., p. 155 
135 G.J. Whitrow, Time in History, p. 29 
136 Karl Popper, Unended Quest, p. 222 
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This “biological theory” Popper uses to fashion the connecting links between 
his three worlds: 
 
So I propose, to start with, that we regard the human mind quite naively as if 
it were a highly developed bodily organ, and that we ask ourselves, as we 
might with respect to a sense organ, what it contributes to the household of 
the organism. 
 To this question there is at hand a typical answer which I propose to dis-
miss. It is that our consciousness enables us to see, or perceive, things. I 
dismiss this answer because for such purposes we have eyes and other sense 
organs. . . . 
 I propose instead that we regard the human mind first of all as an organ 
that produces objects of the human world 3 (in the more general sense) and 
interacts with them.137
In order to call the connections biological, Popper calls the mind a bodily 
organ (is this organ additional to the brain?), and claims that perception is 
achieved with the sense organs (does this exclude the mind from the percep-
tual process?). He also claims that world 3 objects can interact with a biologi-
cal organ, the mind, for which interaction the ‘inmates’ of world 3 are ‘real’: 
 
. . . I have become a realist with respect to the world 3 of problems, theories, 
and critical arguments. 
. . . I arrived at the conclusion that its inmates were real; indeed, more or 
less as real as physical tables and chairs.138
 
The causal relations between Popper’s worlds are thus explained in terms of 
sense perception and biological interaction. As the former is hardly irreducible 
and the latter hardly convincing, we shall proceed to the inspirational source 
of world 3. 
 
 
(iv) Bolzano’s semantic structure 
Bolzano is described by Alberto Coffa as “the founder of the semantic tradi-
tion”139, by which analysis of the factual content of the world was transformed, 
in reaction to the idealism stimulated by Kant, into analysis of statements 
about the world. According to Coffa, 
. . . the semantic tradition [was] a philosophical movement that, unlike posi-
tivism, took the a priori seriously and, unlike idealism, chose to look even 
more closely than Kant at his paradigm examples of the a priori.140
Prior to the establishment of a firm logical basis for the mathematics of conti-
nuity and limit by Bolzano, Cauchy, Weierstrass and others, these concepts 
had been thought of by mathematicians since the time of Newton in terms of 
                                                   
137 Popper, op. cit., p. 220-221 
138 Popper, op. cit., p. 214 
139 J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap, p. 23 
140 Coffa, op. cit., p. 23 
  
 98
the movement in space and time of idealized physical entities such as points 
(hence Kant’s association of arithmetic with time); that is, mathematics was 
regarded as a physical idealization (‘ideal’ as in Plato), and so depended on 
physical intuition. It was this view of mathematics that was responsible for 
misleading Kant. What Bolzano did was to initiate the removal of physical 
intuition as a basis for mathematics (which is not to say that intuition did not 
continue to be of heuristic value). This turned out to be of enormous value in 
the subsequent development of mathematics. 
 Bolzano proceeded to extend the same logical/semantic methods to the 
problem of the mind–world relationship, another area of confusion bestowed 
on the philosophical world by Kant. While semantic methods are appropriate 
for an area of formal study, such as mathematics and logic, where facts do not 
have to be accommodated, they are sterile, and thus of only philosophical 
interest, when applied to empirical matters. (One hundred years after Bol-
zano, Russell proceeded similarly by extending his logicist methods in the 
foundations of mathematics to the empirical realm with his logical atomism—
which is not to say that Russell regarded his ideas as empirical—and what new 
knowledge has that yielded? Here we need to distinguish between these phi-
losophical methods and scientific model building by analogy, in say theoretical 
physics, which is certainly not sterile.) Bolzano treated the mind–world rela-
tionship formally in terms of mental representation. While this bestowed no 
benefit of a factual nature, it clarified logical distinctions. First, he distin-
guished between subjective and objective representations: subjective repre-
sentations correspond to mental states, which are real; objective representa-
tions correspond to linguistic meanings, which are not real, and are the con-
tent of subjective representations. Second, he distinguished between an objec-
tive representation and its objects, which are real. This formal structure thus 
gives the connection between two so-called real entities, subjective represen-
tations and objects, the connection being that the content of a subjective rep-
resentation refers to objects. It will be observed that the structure of Bolzano 
is built upon subjective representation: given subjective representation, ob-
jects follow. Bolzano’s structure is expressed in semantic terms: ‘meaning’, 
‘content’, ‘representation’ understood semantically, ‘object of representation’. 
This enables one to talk about the mind–body relationship consistently, but 
provides no information as to what sort of processes are taking place. Fur-
thermore, if those processes do not in fact fit into Bolzano’s structure, then it 
can only be misleading for any scientific investigator who adopts it as a guide 
to his thinking. 
 
(v) Brentano’s thesis 
While Bolzano looked ahead beyond Kant’s idealism to linguistic philosophy, 
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Brentano looked back from the prevailing subjective idealism to Aristotle for 
the source of his characterization of the mental in terms of intentionality. He 
wrote as quoted in Section 6: 
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the 
Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and 
what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a con-
tent, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as 
meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon in-
cludes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the 
same way. . . . We can therefore define mental phenomena by saying that 
they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within 
themselves.141
This proposal has been the source of much confusion, which no doubt derives 
to some extent from confusion in the mind of Brentano himself. What it ap-
pears to be expressing is the following: 
 
(a)  Every mental state S is associated with some object O; 
 
(b)  The nature of the association is that 
 (i)  O dwells within S in some sense, 
 (ii)  S incorporates direction towards O, and 
 (iii)  There is an act of presentation (representation) of O within S. 
 
(c)  Every mental state is at the same time directed reflexively towards it-
self. 
 There is a problem with Brentano’s thesis which caused both himself and 
his followers a great deal of concern. The problem is, how does a mental state 
relate to the real world? Brentano was a realist, yet his idea of intentional 
inexistence can be interpreted only too easily in idealistic terms. Let us exam-
ine this with the aid of the summary given above. As to every S there is an O, O 
would appear to be dependent on, in fact to be part of, S, as the term ‘inten-
tional (in)existence’ implies. As (a) necessitates that O exist as part of S, O 
cannot be an independent object which may or may not exist; and the status of 
O, as part of S, and hence of S itself, cannot vary according to whether or not O 
happens to correspond to an object external to S. Now consider the perception 
by means of S of an object O′ which gives rise to O. How are O and O′ related? 
By the above observations, they cannot be identical. The answer to this ques-
tion must allow for, or explain, the existence of O when O′ does not exist. 
 The following is offered as a solution consistent with Brentano’s thesis. S 
incorporates within itself direction towards O: call this an S–direction towards 
O. It is assumed that as O′ is perceived by means of a presentation of O, there 
is also in some sense a derived S–direction towards O′. (For example, if I see a 
real tree, then, besides being directed towards the percept of the tree, my 
                                                   
141 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 88 
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mind, or at least its embodiment, is also directed in some sense towards the 
real tree.) As O and O′ cannot be identical, O′ being in the world external to S, 
the S–direction towards O′ must be different from the S–direction towards O. 
Let S′ be the physical correlate or embodiment of S. Then corresponding to, 
and by virtue of, the S–direction towards O, there is an S′–direction towards 
O′. (Consider by analogy the commander of a submarine tracking a ship by 
means of his submarine’s periscope. The periscope (S) is directed towards the 
image (O) of the ship, while the submarine (S′) is directed towards the ship 
(O′), that is to say, directed in the sense of tracking it.) This proposal allows 
for the non-existence of O′, as S′ would in that case be directed towards the O′ 
assumed by virtue of the S–direction towards O. 
 Note that this is not part of the proposal of the present thesis, in which the 
principle of Occam’s razor is honoured, for O′ plays no part in the mind–world 
relationship apart from preserving an unexplained (naïve) realism: O′ is un-
known to S except through O, and is not necessary in order to account for O—
postulation of O′ is, in fact, ad hoc, for how can O be accounted for by some-
thing that is known only through it? But accounting for S and how O arises 
within S is another problem with Brentano’s thesis. If there is an O′, then O 
must reflect O′ in some fashion. How does O reflect O′? (We examined this 
problem earlier.) Perhaps, in evolutionary terms, just in this way, that the S–
direction towards O produces the S′–direction towards O′, which is to the 
adaptive and survival advantage of S′. Again, postulation of O′ is unnecessary 
for this purpose, as the presentation (construction) of O within S in response 
to sensory stimulation, whatever its source, is sufficient to fulfil this function. 
 
(vi) Comparison with previous accounts of the mind–world rela-
tionship 
Figure 7 gives a summary of the foregoing accounts of the mind–world rela-
tionship. In Brentano’s account content and object are presented together in 
accordance with his view that direction towards an object is integral with the 
content. This is also a feature of Velmans’s account and of the present thesis. 
Brentano (and also Velmans (see Section 9(i)) has been criticized for this on 
semantic grounds, as object and representation of object belong to different 
logical categories. However, unlike Bolzano’s structure, these are not semantic 
constructions, so it should be permissible to have object and direction towards 
object incorporated in a single representation. 
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 Note that in the proposal of the present thesis there are two alternative 
descriptions of subjective representations, physical and mental, according to 
the purpose of the description. Note also that subjective representation is 
shown as the pivotal process of the system, pivotal for a positive feedback loop 
(iteration), which is shown in two parts: stimulatory (the physical environ-
ment) and non-subjective representational (the social environment). This 
does not reduce the physical world to a subsidiary role, however, for the 
physical world, or perhaps more appropriately the universe of discourse, en-
compasses the entire system. 
10. The Classification of Mental States 
Summary: There are three mental domains, cognitive, conative and 
affective, all of which are present to some degree in any mental state 
or act. Affect is usually most effectively described using cognitive and 
conative terms, and perhaps for this reason is often ignored in phi-
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losophical analysis. Pain includes a great variety of experience, 
dominated by the non-cognitive, though including the cognitive, all 
of which interact closely to produce the pain experience. Each of the 
kinds of mental state, sensation, perception and thought, can be de-
scribed in terms of its cognitive, conative and affective content. 
The description of mental states in cognitive and non-cognitive terms has a 
long history: 
One of the very earliest models of the human personality, dating back to the 
ancient Greeks, involved the idea that the human psyche consisted of three 
basic domains: the cognitive domain, which is the thinking, reasoning 
part of the individual; the conative domain, which concerns the individ-
ual’s will and intentions; and the affective domain, which is to do with 
feelings and emotions. One metaphor used to describe this was that of a 
charioteer driving two horses: the forces which provided the power to move 
the human spirit were the conative and affective domains, and the charioteer 
guiding them along was the cognitive domain.142
When discussing mental representation it is vision that we are often thinking 
of—it is taken as the exemplar. This is because vision is the dominant sense in 
man and because it permits of comparatively straightforward and unambigu-
ous description and analysis, in cognitive terms at least, as against pain for 
example. But because vision can readily be idealized as the means by which we 
form an objective understanding of the world, with the senses as aids, the 
emphasis on vision tends to restrict our analysis to cognitive aspects of repre-
sentation. And yet the non-cognitive aspects of representation, the affective 
and conative, constitute an important part of the consciousness that is created 
by representation. Without affect and conation, visual experience can become 
seemingly devoid of meaning, and lifeless. This becomes evident to us when, 
on occasion, our emotional contact with the world and consequently our will 
to live are diminished, as when a loved one, or love, is lost to us— 
 
A grief without a pang, void, dark, and drear, 
 A stifled, drowsy, unimpassioned grief, 
 Which finds no natural outlet, no relief, 
  In word, or sigh, or tear – 
O Lady! in this wan and heartless mood, 
To other thoughts by yonder throstle woo’d, 
 All this long eve, so balmy and serene, 
Have I been gazing on the western sky, 
 And its peculiar tint of yellow green: 
And still I gaze – and with how blank an eye! 
And those thin clouds above, in flakes and bars, 
That give away their motion to the stars; 
Those stars, that glide behind them or between, 
Now sparkling, now bedimmed, but always seen: 
                                                   
142 Nicky Hayes, Foundations of Psychology, p. 606 
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Yon crescent Moon, as fixed as if it grew 
In its own cloudless, starless lake of blue; 
I see them all so excellently fair, 
I see, not feel, how beautiful they are! 143
 
Here we witness cognition with reduced affect. This is mild in comparison 
with cognition that can occur with apparently complete removal of a normally 
associated affect, as with the Capgras Syndrome. 
When you see your father, your visual intelligence goes to work constructing 
the 3D shape of his face, the colour and texture of his skin, his expression, 
and ultimately his identity. Then, in the normal case, the constructions of 
your visual intelligence engage the resources of your emotional intelligence, 
and you have feelings appropriate to your father . . . In Capgras patients, 
however, the connection between visual intelligence and emotional intelli-
gence is cut, so that the Capgras patient doesn’t have appropriate feelings 
when he sees his father. Since the man in front of him looks like his father 
but doesn’t feel like his father, the Capgras patient concludes, perhaps natu-
rally enough, that the man must be an impostor. He certainly feels like an 
impostor. . . . It is not a problem of face recognition, or of vision more gener-
ally. Many Capgras patients . . . have normal vision and normal ability to 
discriminate and recognize faces.144
It can be surmised that affect must be present to some degree in any mental 
state that would usually be thought of as cognitive—pure cognition is merely 
an ideal. 
 When we turn to bodily sensations we find that they cannot be understood 
without taking account of both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects. As New-
ton demonstrated by means of a prism that white light can be separated into 
its component colours, so it can be shown that pain is composed of separate 
cognitive (“discriminative”) and non-cognitive components.  
We can, either through purposeful intervention or accidents of Nature, dis-
sociate our discriminative pain processing from our affective-motivational 
pain processing. Ingestion of morphine (or other opiates), lesions to the me-
dial thalamus, and prefrontal lobotomies all result in sensations of pain 
without a sense of suffering and without producing characteristic pain be-
haviours (wincing, moaning, complaining, etc.). In these cases, patients can 
localize their pains but are not upset by the fact that they are in pain. We can 
also get reverse effects, to a degree. Fentanyl causes one to react in pain, yet 
inhibits our discriminatory abilities for the pain. Lesion studies and studies 
using hemispherectomies show that even with cortex completely missing, we 
can still have a pain sensation; we simply lack fine localization and intensity 
discrimination. Patients with Parkinson’s disease and Huntington’s disease 
often have pain sensations but are unable to indicate where they feel 
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pains.145
It is not only through drugs and surgery that the non-cognitive side of pain 
can be eliminated, but also through conditioning. Ronald Melzack 
 
. . . brought up a number of Scotch terriers from birth in sensory isolation, 
protecting them to such an extent that none of them ever felt a single 
scratch, knock, or blow. Pain simply did not exist for them. 
 Later, when the dogs were grown up, they were abruptly exposed to bru-
tal realities. When they bit each other in play, they seemed to feel as little 
pain as the boxer in the ring. They did not even flinch away or try to defend 
themselves, although wounds gradually formed and drew blood. To a burn-
ing candle they responded with curiosity and sniffed the flame. Of course 
they burned their muzzles badly. Even so, they did not learn their lesson, but 
kept on calmly sniffing any other open fire they saw. . . . 
 The nervous systems of the Scotch terriers, however, was perfectly intact. 
They seemed to feel something, but could not make anything of it. . . . 
Strange as it sounds, even pain is a thing which to some extent has to be 
learnt.146
 
 Compared to the cognitive, non-cognitive aspects of mental states are not 
so amenable to unambiguous description. This is because the cognitive, al-
though of subjective origin, is amenable to the intersubjective processes, on 
which language depends, with subjects placed on an equal footing, while in the 
case of the non-cognitive intersubjective processes are decidedly one sided, 
with the balance weighed in favour of the subject. In the case of a pain with a 
clear cognitive component, a cut finger for example, the cognitive aspect is 
observable by all, while the affective aspect is experienced as a sensation by 
the subject, but can only be presumed from the behaviour of the subject and 
experienced empathetically by others. Because of this, descriptive terms for 
the non-cognitive tend often to be adapted from those employed for the cogni-
tive. For example, one might speak of a stinging pain, one that would be ex-
perienced if one had been stung. 
 The spectrum of non-cognitive qualities of pain has been described and 
displayed on a scale of intensity by Melzack and Torgerson147. Their classifica-
tion was obtained from the clinical literature under headings (dimensions) 
falling into sensory, affective and evaluative groupings. The classification 
reflects the views of those who experience pain and those who treat it. In the 
following list the qualities of pain are listed in order of intensity: 
 
 
SENSORY 
temporal flickering, quivering, pulsing, throbbing, beating, pounding 
                                                   
145 Valerie Hardcastle, “The Nature of Pain”, pp. 300-301 
146 Vitus B. Droscher, The Magic of the Senses, pp. 99-100, summarizing results reported in 
“Early Environment” by William R. Thompson and Ronald Melzack 
147 Ronald Melzack, The Puzzle of Pain, pp. 42-43, Figure 3 
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spatial jumping, flashing, shooting 
punctate pressure pricking, boring, drilling, stabbing, lancinating 
incisive pressure sharp, cutting, lacerating 
constrictive pressure pinching, pressing, gnawing, cramping, crushing 
traction pressure tugging, pulling, wrenching 
thermal hot, burning, scalding, searing 
brightness tingling, itchy, smarting, stinging 
dullness dull, sore, hurting, aching, heavy 
miscellaneous tender, taut, rasping, splitting 
 
 
AFFECTIVE 
tension tiring, exhausting 
autonomic sickening, suffocating 
fear fearful, frightful, terrifying 
punishment punishing, gruelling, cruel, viscous, killing 
 
 
EVALUATIVE annoying, troublesome, discomforting, miserable, distressing,
 intense, horrible, unbearable, excruciating 
 
This list shows what range of experience pain covers. Although the descrip-
tions given are quite suggestive, they can nevertheless fall short of conveying 
to a non-sufferer the quality of a pain as experienced. This difficulty is con-
veyed by Kathleen Akins. 
We have all faced the difficulty of trying to communicate the nature of a par-
ticular phenomenal experience, good or bad. ‘It was awful, absolutely horri-
ble!!’ you might recount, speaking of a bad migraine headache—but, apart 
from a fellow migraine sufferer, no one seems the wiser for your description. 
Frustratingly, despite the listener’s own extensive catalogue of aches and 
pains, any elaboration on the ‘horribleness’ of a migraine seems to do little 
good. ‘Yes, it’s a bit like that but . . . .’ one will hedge, when asked how a mi-
graine compares to an ordinary headache, one caused by tension or sinus in-
flammation. Or is it like having a nasty hangover, a bad case of the flu, or 
like the stabbing pain one feels when the lights are suddenly switched on in a 
darkened room? ‘It’s sort of like that, except, only, um . . . well . . . much, 
much worse!’ This is what a sufferer will typically reply, unsure, even in his 
own mind, what to make of such comparisons. (Does a migraine differ from 
a bad hangover only in intensity or is there in fact a difference in kind? Or 
does the difference in intensity constitute a difference in kind?) Ironically, 
the best description one can give, the descriptions that elicit the most empa-
thetic sounds and nods, are usually not descriptions of the pain at all, but of 
the beliefs and desires that go along with the migraine. ‘If I knew the mi-
graine wasn’t going to end, I’d seriously wonder whether life was worth liv-
ing’ or ‘the pain is so intense, you don’t even want to roll over, to find a more 
comfortable position in which to lie’—it is such thoughts that make clear the 
severity of the experience.148
Here we see how analogy alone can fail to communicate an experience of se-
vere pain; similarly for any other debilitating emotional stress. Recourse has 
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then to be to describing the conative effect of the stress, what actions one 
might be prepared to take to end it. In fine narrative, emotion may barely be 
mentioned, being understood from the narrative description alone. The 
American writer Raymond Carver said that it is possible 
to write about commonplace things and objects using commonplace but pre-
cise language and endow these things—a chair, a window curtain, a fork, a 
stone, a woman’s earring—with immense, even startling, power.149
Here is one of Carver’s characters telling his own story: 
 
 Everything was fine for the first year. I was holding down another job 
nights, and we were getting ahead. We had plans. Then one morning, I don’t 
know. I’d just laid some bathroom tile in one of the units when this little 
Mexican maid comes in to clean. It was Holly had hired her. I can’t really say 
I’d noticed the little thing before, though we spoke when we saw each other. 
She called me, I remember, Mister. 
 Anyway, one thing and the other.150
 
We know what this man is feeling without being told, it is conveyed by the way 
of telling it—“Then one morning, I don’t know.”—it is older than mankind. 
Taking emotion as understood is all right in everyday life and in narrative 
prose, but following the same practice in philosophical analysis can lead to its 
unwarranted neglect. 
 Having exhibited the influences of affect and conation on mental proc-
esses, let us see how this can help us in understanding the various forms of 
mental representation. These influences are seldom taken account of by phi-
losophers, despite their established presence in psychology, a situation due to 
some extent perhaps to the semantic influence, due to the amenability of cog-
nition to semantic analysis in contrast to the non-cognitive dimensions of 
experience, though philosophers do include these under the guise of proposi-
tional attitudes such as fear and desire. A.C. Ewing is a philosopher who 
makes mention of the non-cognitive. Ewing writes, recounting the ancient 
Greek model: 
 Turning to the more specifically mental side of ourselves, we find that it 
has been subjected to a threefold classification, represented by the distinc-
tion between affective, cognitive, and conative. . . . We must not, however, 
think of it as if the three sides operate quite separately. On the contrary 
practically all mental processes involve all three at once.151
It is important to remember Ewing’s last point. Cognition, conation and affect 
do not contribute to mental states separately but in coordination (although 
they draw to some degree on different areas of the brain). It is clear that men-
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tal states differ in the proportional contributions of these three components, 
and it is also clear that despite the dominance of one or another in many men-
tal states, all are present to some degree.  
 The example of pain is instructive in this respect. Pain is often described 
as if it possessed no cognitive component. For example, Colin McGinn writes 
that “. . . visual experiences represent the world as being a certain way, but 
pains have no such representational content”152. Part of the problem here may 
be due to a confusion of terminology. The word ‘pain’ is used for both a con-
scious experience and a local condition of the body to which it refers, the latter 
use being due perhaps to the dominance of the affective component of the 
experience of pain. Both of these uses of ‘pain’, however, concern aspects of 
the same mental state, a state of pain. McGinn, being a proponent of con-
sciousness as an unresolvable philosophical mystery, uses ‘pain’ in the first 
sense, in which it acts as the epitome of pure conscious experience, that is, a 
mental state in which external reference is absent. (Later McGinn qualifies his 
position by saying that in respect of sensations “we cannot wholly eliminate 
the contribution of the less dominant [the third person] perspective”, suggest-
ing that his earlier statement about pain may have been an idealized view of 
it.) That the pain experience does contain a cognitive component referring to a 
localized pain is shown by the results quoted earlier of dissociation of its cog-
nitive and non-cognitive components. 
 It is worth looking a little further into the scientific side of this for the 
insight it can give into the way in which the components of pain appear to be 
interacting. There is clear evidence from positron emission tomography (PET) 
that the neural construct associated with pain, besides involving perceptual 
and sensory areas of the brain, involves also areas concerned with the control 
of movement, viz. the motor cortex, the basal ganglia and the cerebellum. Wall 
comments: 
 
The results are so surprising that we may need a fundamental shift in the 
target that we are seeking to locate the mechanism for pain. We naturally 
think in steps. First we have sensation, followed by perception with its iden-
tification, classification and emotion, and lastly perhaps, motor action and 
behaviour. To match these three steps, classical thinking assigned separate 
functions to three parts of the brain: the sensory brain, the perception brain, 
and the motor-planning and action brain. 
 Now we have to face these completely paradoxical PET scans. Some pa-
tients show every sign of perception of their pain but are not moving or even 
planning to move, yet parts of their brain previously assigned to the motor 
step are intensely active. Could it be that we have made a fundamental error 
in expecting a sensory box separate from the motor-planning box? Could it 
be that we in fact sense objects in terms of what we might do about them? 
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Could it be that we have erected an artificial frontier between a sensory brain 
and a motor-planning brain which does not in fact exist? . . . we have seen 
here that the feeling of pain coincides with changes in every part of the body 
and in a distributed pattern in parts of the brain.153
 
Wall proposes 
 
that the sensation of pain itself is the consequence of our brain analyzing the 
situation in terms of what action would be appropriate. . . . 
Our understanding brains steadily combine all the available information 
from the outside world and within our own bodies with our personal and ge-
netic histories. The outcomes are decisions of the tactics and strategies 
which could be appropriate to respond to the situation. We use the word 
‘pain’ as shorthand for one of these groupings of relevant response tactics 
and strategies. Pain is not just a sensation but, like hunger and thirst, is an 
awareness of an action plan to be rid of it.154
 
Pain thus includes perception of a particular kind of threatening situation, an 
expectation of its development and a plan of action to control it. 
 Concerning the practice of philosophy, McGinn writes: 
So the philosopher wishes to know, without being roused from his armchair, 
what is essential to the various mental phenomena; the psychologist’s aim is 
at once more ambitious and more modest—he wants to discover by empiri-
cal means the actual workings of this or that creature’s mind.155
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1                         DIMENSIONS OF MENTAL STATES 
(Representative weights are shown respectively for vision and pain.) 
(0,  0) 
(1,  0) 
(0,  5) 
(0,  0) 
(3,  0) 
(0,  4) 
(0,  0) 
(6,  0) 
(0,  1) 
belief 
desire 
fear 
vision 
hearing 
smelling 
touch 
pain 
hunger 
sensation 
percep-
tion 
thought mental 
external 
to body 
internal 
to body 
affect conation cogni-
ti  
GENERAL 
DESCRIPTION 
EXAMPLES SOURCE 
DOMAIN STIMULUS 
That is to say, in the words of Wall, philosophers seek to construct “idealized 
‘rational’ sensory systems in happy ignorance of the working of living organ-
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isms”156. 
 In view of the foregoing, a mental state may be conveniently analyzed 
using two independent dimensions, according to the scheme shown in Table 1, 
in which weights can be introduced into the boxes on the right hand side. (The 
weights that are entered sum to 10 and are for vision and pain respectively in 
the order entered.) Note that a vision, while being primarily stimulated from 
external sources (that is, the perceived object is located outside the body by 
the mental state), will also include auxiliary elements of mental stimulus, and 
may be combined with tactile sensation; and similarly for pain, mutatis mu-
tandis. (For the weights entered in the table auxiliary elements are not taken 
into account.) 
11. Propositional Attitudes and Intentionality of Mental States 
 
Summary: Both Colin McGinn and John Searle use propositional at-
titudes to define intentional subclasses of mental states. It is main-
tained that all mental states are intentional, and can therefore be 
formulated as propositional attitudes. 
(i) Emotional tone. Searle maintains that states of emotional tone do 
not belong to his subclass of mental states, which he calls Intentional, 
because they are not about anything. He also discusses the possibility 
that all Intentional states can be expressed in terms of belief and de-
sire. It is shown that this is not possible, as the necessary component 
of affect is left out. This can often be supplied by emotional tone, 
which can consequently be a component of an intentional state, and 
in this sense is about the world. 
(ii) The nature and the object of pain.  In response to McGinn’s asser-
tion that pain is not intentional, Tim Crane considers what may be 
the object of a state of pain. As a realist he rejects a mental object in 
the sense of Brentano’s intentional object. To obtain an objective pain 
object, Crane has to deny the subjective basis of the objective. 
 
Colin McGinn introduces the class of “mental phenomena which have proposi-
tional content, that is, the ascription of which involves the use of a ‘that’–
clause, as in ‘Jones believes that the sky is blue’”157. This is the class of pro-
positional attitudes, which he equates with the state called thought in Table 1, 
and says “it seems more natural to accord central importance to how the atti-
tude figures in shaping a person’s propensities to act; the dispositional proper-
ties of propositional attitudes seem integral to their nature”158. But propensity 
to act is a criterion for the possession of a mental representation (see Section 
6), and thus can be taken as integral to the nature of any mental state, and any 
propensity to act can be formulated as a proposition. It follows that any men-
                                                   
156 Wall, op. cit., p. 1 
157 McGinn, op. cit., p. 8 
158 McGinn, op. cit., p. 8 
  
 110
tal state where there is representation can be called a propositional attitude. 
Pain in particular includes, in the words of Wall quoted above, “an action plan 
to be rid of it” (“it” being the pain referred to by the state of pain), and is 
therefore a propositional attitude. As all mental states are propositional atti-
tudes, the holding of a propositional attitude cannot be used to define a sub-
class of mental states. The source of the idea that there is such a subclass may 
be linguistic, as some states, such as that of belief, are more readily expressible 
in propositional form than others, such as pain. But surely the ready expressi-
bility of a mental state in propositional form is of no relevance to its classifica-
tion, unless it is perhaps connected to the idea that language is essential to 
thought. But then is language essential to the formulation of a desire, another 
propositional attitude, or to the cat’s belief that there is a rat under the couch? 
Thus a mental state of pain, arising for example from a pain in the finger, 
which is a condition of the finger, refers to that pain in the finger, to that con-
dition (there are here two references for the word ‘pain’). The pain state can be 
expressed by the proposition, “I have a pain in my finger”, just as a state of 
desire can be expressed by the proposition, “I have a desire . . .”. Therefore a 
pain state can be classed as a propositional attitude. This does not apply to 
some exceptional pain states, such as those with little or no cognitive compo-
nent, or some pain states of children who are still learning to identify the 
source of a pain, just as it may not apply to all states of desire—we do not 
always understand what we feel. 
 It was assumed in the foregoing discussion, in agreement with Brentano, 
that all mental states are representational, or intentional; that is, that a mental 
state refers to the world, or has “direction towards an object”, or concerns the 
world in a more general way. This should not really be called an assumption, 
as it is integral to the conception here propounded of the relationship of mind 
and world that the world as we know it is constructed by the mind, it is the 
object of such a construct. Once this thesis is understood and assimilated, 
there should be no need to further establish that all mental states are inten-
tional. But it behoves us to defend our thesis by showing how it answers to 
those who, like McGinn, maintain the contrary by pointing to supposedly non-
intentional mental states. The areas of controversy that will be discussed in 
this section are, (i) emotional tone, as distinct from emotional reaction, (ii) the 
nature of the object of pain; and in the next section, qualia and consciousness. 
 
(i) Emotional tone 
John Searle writes as follows: 
First, on my account only some, not all, mental states and events have Inten-
tionality. Beliefs, fears, hopes and desires are Intentional; but there are 
forms of nervousness, elation and undirected anxiety that are not Inten-
tional. A clue to this distinction is provided by the constraints on how these 
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states are reported. If I tell you I have a belief or a desire, it always makes 
sense for you to ask, “What is it exactly that you believe?” or “What is it that 
you desire?”; and it won’t do for me to say, “Oh I just have a belief and a de-
sire without believing anything or desiring anything”. My beliefs and desires 
must always be about something. But my nervousness and undirected anxi-
ety need not in that way be about anything. Such states are characteristically 
accompanied by beliefs and desires, but undirected states are not identical 
with beliefs or desires.159
Searle is putting forward an account of intentionality in which certain emo-
tional states are not intentional. (He capitalizes ‘Intentionality’ for his particu-
lar usage of the term.) His criterion for Intentionality is the same as McGinn’s 
criterion for propositional attitudes, the possible description using a ‘that’–
clause, or equivalent. But while McGinn excludes perception from proposi-
tional attitudes, Searle includes it under his criterion of Intentionality, be-
cause, as he writes, 
From the point of view of Intentionality, all seeing is seeing that: whenever it 
is true to say that x sees y it must be true that x sees that such and such is the 
case.160
Searle terms the ‘that’–clause a ‘condition of satisfaction’, which is analogous 
to the truth condition of a statement, the fulfilment condition of a promise, 
and the obedience condition of an order, ideas which he draws from his study 
of speech acts. He assures us, however, that 
In my effort to explain Intentionality in terms of language I am using our 
prior knowledge of language as a heuristic device for explanatory purposes. 
Once I have tried to make clear the nature of Intentionality I will argue that 
the relation of logical dependence is precisely the reverse.161
 Having divided mental states into the Intentional and non-Intentional, 
Searle observes that 
Many philosophers think that belief and desire are somehow the basic Inten-
tional states, . . . 162
The reason for this is the idea that belief and desire together can produce, at 
both the conscious and unconscious levels, actions that are rational, given the 
belief and the desire; and knowledge of a person’s beliefs and desires can give 
a rational explanation for his actions. For example, if a person desires an ap-
ple and believes that there is an apple in the cupboard, then it is rational for 
him to act in accordance with his belief by going to the cupboard and taking 
the apple to satisfy his desire. Of belief and desire Searle says that 
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I shall construe them very broadly to encompass: in the case of belief, feeling 
certain, having a hunch, supposing, and many other degrees of conviction; 
and in the case of desire, wanting, wishing, lusting and hankering after, and 
many other degrees of desire.163
Based on these mental states, Searle proposes paradigm Intentional states, 
which we shall denote by BeliefI and DesireI, “corresponding roughly to parts 
of the great traditional categories of Cognition and Volition”164, that is, cogni-
tion and conation. He then asks whether all Intentional states can be reduced 
to BeliefI and DesireI. Take, for example, the Intentional state, fear that p, 
where p is any proposition. Presumably we could write 
 
  fear that p ⇒ BeliefI that (p is possible) & DesireI that (not–p), 
 
where ⇒ stands for implication. As the states of the right hand side of this 
statement include, by assumption, only cognition and conation, and fear that 
p has an affective component, the implication cannot be replaced by a state-
ment of equivalence. If, however, we let FearI be the residue of fear when its 
affective aspects are removed, then we could perhaps define it thus: 
 
  FearI that p =def  BeliefI that (p is possible) & DesireI that (not–p). 
 
As another example, 
 
  amused that p ⇒ BeliefI that p, 
but 
  AmusedI that p ⇔ BeliefI that p. 
 
Devoid of its affective component, amusement is nothing more than belief. 
 It was observed that belief and desire are often sufficient for explaining 
action. Is this also true of BeliefI and DesireI? We could ask, for example, is 
FearI that p sufficient to produce the same action as is produced by fear that p, 
namely action resulting in not–p? Or we could ask, is 
 
 
  BeliefI (there is an apple there) & DesireI (I have the apple here) 
 
sufficient to produce 
 
  action (I move the apple that is there to here)? 
 
The answer in each case depends on how the desire is motivated. Now it does 
not require much psychological knowledge to show that affect is usually inte-
gral to and is often a significant component of desire in so far as desire is re-
garded as productive of action. It is usual, for example, that desire to have an 
apple is based not only on a hunger drive, which could perhaps be regarded as 
purely conative, but also on anticipation of pleasure in eating it, which is affec-
tive. Likewise, in answer to our first question concerning FearI, there is no 
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doubt that there is in many cases an affective component of fear necessary for 
the production of action: after all, disposition to produce a certain kind of 
action is the function of an affect, as it is of all mental states. Consider the 
report in Section 10 on Scotch Terriers brought up to feel little pain: the only 
reason they lacked the desire to withdraw their muzzles from a burning candle 
was the lack of the affective aspect of pain. 
 Having shown that the affective component of a mental state cannot be 
neglected in considering the disposition to action that is the criterion for the 
existence of the state, we may now turn to Searle’s stipulation that an affect 
that is not expressible as a propositional attitude is not to be taken as Inten-
tional. One can argue against a stipulation such as this that does not lead to a 
logical contradiction only on grounds of its usefulness in view of existing facts 
and accepted theory. As it is not clear that there is any mental state that is 
purely affective, we must be concerned with affect as a contribution to, or 
component of, a mental state. In that capacity affect in many cases derives its 
direction, or reference, from its associated cognitive and conative components, 
and therefore cannot in such cases be regarded as possessing a reference on its 
own account, and is therefore non-Intentional. It follows that there are non-
Intentional contributors to mental states that are essential in considering a 
state’s disposition to action. Emotional tones fall into this category, such as 
those of nervousness, elation and undirected anxiety mentioned by Searle. 
Here is an example of an emotional tone that makes a contribution to an In-
tentional mental state. 
 Consider ‘fear of Fido’, Fido being a dog. In the above manner, let ‘FearI of 
Fido’ be defined by 
 
 FearI of Fido =def  BeliefI that (Fido is present) & DesireI that (Fido be 
absent). 
 
Full propensity to action when confronted by Fido requires the introduction of 
the affective side of fear into ‘FearI of Fido’ to produce ‘fear of Fido’. The affect 
that is introduced may be specific to Fido (due to some past encounter, for 
example), or specific to dogs (also due to past encounters perhaps), or it may 
be related to animals in general, or it may be a general nervousness. Which of 
these emotions can be regarded as non-Intentional? The first is certainly In-
tentional, as it refers to Fido. The next two are about the world in that they 
mention general features of the world, dogs and animals, so if an affect related 
to Fido is to be counted as Intentional, so presumably would an affect related 
to dogs or animals be counted as Intentional. The last is the one Searle would 
exclude from Intentionality, as it cannot be converted into the form ‘nervous 
of p’. However it is usually possible to relate general nervousness, and other 
such generalized emotions, to some category of things in the world, even such 
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a loosely defined category as ‘things unknown to the subject’, in which case it 
would be directed to things within that category but not to things outside it. In 
particular, a general nervousness may be directed towards Fido. More explic-
itly, let Np stand for Nervous Nelly is nervous of p, and let U be the class of 
things unknown to Nelly (or whatever class of things one may identify Nelly as 
being nervous of). Then Nelly’s general nervousness can be expressed by 
(p)(p∈U ⇒ Np). On being confronted with Fido, whose behaviour is unknown 
to Nelly, as Fido ∈ U, NFido, that is, Nelly is nervous of Fido. Thus, if we now 
define  ‘FearI of Fido’ by 
 
FearI of Fido 
 =def BeliefI that (Fido is present) & Fido ∈ U & DesireI that (Fido be ab-
sent), 
 
then (for expositional purposes using conjunction to represent a more com-
plex association of affect with an Intentional state) 
 
  fear of Fido ⇔ FearI of Fido & (p)(p∈U ⇒ Np) 
           ⇒ FearI of Fido & NFido, 
 
and this may lead to action resulting in the absence of Fido from the vicinity of 
Nervous Nelly. Thus general nervousness is an emotion that has application to 
produce, from insufficiently motivated Intentional states, mental states that 
lead to action. It is in this particular dispositional sense that general nervous-
ness and other emotional tones are about the world. 
 Because there are non-Intentional contributors to mental states that are 
essential for their disposition to action, Searle’s definition of Intentionality is 
inappropriate as a general property of mental states. It must be acknowledged, 
however, that a condition such as general nervousness comes close to condi-
tions that would be called personality traits, which cannot be regarded as 
being about the world, although they are instrumental in determining mental 
states. 
 
(ii) The nature of the object of pain 
McGinn’s view that pain is non-intentional was discussed earlier. Here we 
consider Tim Crane’s response. It was argued earlier in response to McGinn 
that the word ‘pain’ is used to refer to both the conscious experience and a 
local condition of the body, both of which are aspects of the state of pain, an 
intentional state directed towards the local condition. Crane writes in re-
sponse to McGinn: 
 
Pains, on this [McGinn’s] view, are not about anything, they are not of any-
thing, they represent nothing: they have no intentionality. Rather, pains are 
purely subjective qualities: their existence consists in the existence of a sub-
jective state that tells us nothing about the external world. 
 To hold this view is to distinguish pain from other cases of bodily sensa-
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tion where we are able to distinguish between the sensation and what it is of: 
sensations of warmth, of cold, of pressure, of tiredness, of hunger can all be 
described in terms of what they are sensations of, and what they are sensa-
tions of are properties of the external world (temperature, pressure etc.).165
 
In regard to the last statement, it should be pointed out that McGinn does not 
make the distinction Crane makes, for he writes that “bodily sensations do not 
have an intentional object in the way perceptual experiences do”166; that is, 
McGinn does not distinguish pain from other bodily sensations. Crane men-
tions hunger, as against pain, in which “we are able to distinguish between the 
sensation and what it is of”, but his list of what sensations are of does not 
reach hunger: what is hunger of? Crane considers whether the solution can be 
that there is an object presented in a state of pain, but it is an internal or 
mental object. Now even if we reject mental objects in the case of the percep-
tion of the external world, can a case be made for their existence in the case 
of bodily sensation?167
‘Internal object’ refers to the intentional object of Brentano’s thesis, which, as 
a good realist, Crane is anxious to deny the existence of, not realizing that a 
realist outlook can be accommodated by intentional objects, as explained in 
Section 9. As Brentano’s thesis does not distinguish between external and 
internal intentional objects (as in perception and sensation respectively), or 
between primary and secondary qualities, the issue is really as to the objectiv-
ity of objects of sensation, the test case being pain. 
 Crane writes that a pain may be regarded as having objective existence 
because it can wake us up before we are aware of it; that is, it is independent 
of the conscious pain experience. On the other hand, it may be that “I was 
awoken by some non-conscious event in my brain, which then gave rise to 
pain when I became conscious”168. Whatever pain is, it need not be accepted as 
a mental object, but (following D.M. Armstrong169) can be taken as the object 
of “a form of perceptual awareness of one’s body”170, and similarly for other 
bodily sensations. This is given credence by the fact that pain is identified as 
being located in a part of the body: 
But what tells in favour of the perceptual theory is the fact that to concen-
trate on the ache, I must necessarily concentrate on the part of my body 
which aches; the mental object theory cannot explain this necessity.171
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 On the contrary, it is a consequence of Brentano’s thesis that with the 
intentional object is given its location, not in the mind, but in the space con-
ceived by the mind, and this does not dictate a perceptual theory of sensation. 
In his efforts to find an objective object of sensation, Crane is denying the 
subjective, or mental, basis of sensation by trying to assimilate it to percep-
tion. No doubt there are similarities between sensation and perception, one 
being, ironically, that both are based in the subjective; but there is an impor-
tant difference, that the object of a sensation, being concerned with processes 
that are not equally accessible to both the first and the third person, cannot be 
developed intersubjectively, and hence objectively, to the same extent as the 
object of a perception. The root of Crane’s problem is his adherence to a real-
ism that cannot realistically accommodate the subjective. This also lies at the 
root of the problem of qualia, which we now consider. 
12. Qualia and Consciousness 
Summary: According to Sydney Shoemaker we need an account of 
intentionality that accepts qualia while preserving materialism and 
functionalism. First, it is maintained that qualia are intentional, for 
it cannot be denied that they have a direction to the world. Neverthe-
less, as spectrum inversion shows, qualia of different individuals di-
rected to the same object may differ within certain limits. Next is 
analyzed Frank Jackson’s story of Mary, who knew all there is to 
know about the colour red but only discovered its quale on seeing it. 
Jackson’s argument is found, after considering criticisms by Daniel 
Dennett and Paul Churchland, to have established that qualia, 
though physical in the sense of possessing neural correlates, cannot 
become completely known from their physical specifications. How, 
then, do qualia, and consciousness, arise? Do they constitute an un-
bridgeable explanatory gap? Read on. 
Qualia and consciousness are two areas of philosophical discussion of the 
mind–world relationship which are generally acknowledged, or at least often 
claimed, to be beyond full rational comprehension. The view put forward here 
is that there is no problem with qualia and consciousness lying beyond ra-
tional, including scientific, comprehension. If there is a problem, it is not with 
the facts, but with finding a description that will accommodate them consis-
tently. 
 Sydney Shoemaker writes that 
. . . we need qualia to make sense of secondary qualities 
and that to defend the existence of qualia we need to oppose 
. . . the “intentionalist view” . . . which says that experiences have no intro-
spectable properties other than intentional ones. 
He acknowledges, however, that 
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 A possible view . . . is the “projectivist” view that in our perceptual experi-
ence we in some sense project what are in fact nonintentional features of our 
experiences, i.e., qualia, onto the states of affairs they represent. . . . This 
view reconciles the phenomenology of these cases—the fact that the nonin-
tentional properties we are aware of in them are experienced as spatially lo-
cated—with the claim that sensory experience involves qualia and awareness 
of qualia.172
A statement of the position that Shoemaker is drawing on would appear to be 
this: Secondary qualities, say the green of a leaf or the pain in a finger, are not 
objective properties, but are subjective qualities of our experience, called 
qualia, resulting from interaction between the perceiver and the perceived. 
Secondary qualities cannot therefore be intentional, not being actual proper-
ties of any object, but we nevertheless subjectively refer them to objects and 
thereby seemingly experience them as being in or of objects themselves. Sec-
ondary qualities can therefore be comprehended only through our subjective 
experience, and are intersubjectively communicable only by way of their sub-
jective referral. The subjective experience of each individual can be known in 
its own particularity only by the individual himself. In particular, subjective 
experiences which have apparently identical subjective referral (in so far as 
differences may be evaluated by intersubjective communication) may differ 
between individuals, as in spectrum inversion. This contrasts with the primary 
qualities, which can be comprehended independently of direct subjective 
experience and can be objectively described. 
 Shoemaker writes that 
we need an account of these matters that accepts the existence of qualia and 
shows how commitment to their existence is compatible with materialism 
and functionalism.173
In order to preserve his idea of materialism and functionalism, Shoemaker 
endeavours to paint qualia as non-intentional, and to that end, as he says, he 
needs to oppose the thesis that all introspectable properties of experience—say 
all conscious experience—are intentional. That thesis follows from Brentano’s 
Thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental, but it does not follow from 
the thesis presented in Section 6, that the world is an object of constructions 
of human minds. Let us examine the thesis that all introspectable properties 
of experience are intentional. 
 In the first place, it is reasonable to assume, on functional grounds, that 
everything that goes on in the central nervous system is directed to, or has 
developed both by evolution and maturation for the function of, preserving 
the organism in the face of a hostile environment, of maintaining its homeo-
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stasis. Does this preclude the existence of mental experience that has no inten-
tional function? A cursory glance at evolution suggests that it does, for we find 
vestiges in our bodies of biological features that were at one time in our evolu-
tionary past important for survival, such as a tail, and mental faculties, such as 
that of smell, that have diminished significantly as a result of reduced survival 
value in the presence of other developments, such as the neocortex. The long 
evolution of human kind and its progenitors has pared it of superfluous facul-
ties. Likewise, in the maturation process, particularly that of the brain, we find 
that faculties not developed in early life are lost to development, and unused 
faculties atrophy. Turning to the intentional characterization of the mind, the 
tremendously varied mental apparatus that is innately available or can be 
developed for mental construction we can liken to the construction of scien-
tific theory, where those parts that do not connect with the rest of a theory are 
removed and the model for the theory trimmed of its initially heuristically 
useful but now superfluous and misleading appendages. The list of such theo-
retical culling is a long one: refer, for example, to Maxwell’s development of 
electromagnetic theory with the initial aid of an easily pictured system of “tiny 
idle wheels rotating in the medium between each pair of vortex cells”, which 
he regarded “as a temporary and provisory hypothesis”174. As with science, so 
with the mind: it functions solely for direction to the environment and its own 
well-being, and for this it makes use of all the tools available to it. An idea that 
did not relate to the world in any way at all could not relate to any idea that 
does, and the mind would show a fundamental division for which there is no 
evidence. 
 It may occur to some readers that invoking evolution in support of a 
proposition concerning the human mind, from which the idea of evolution 
itself derives, involves a circularity, which might be put as follows: “Thought 
brings evolution into being, rather than the other way around, as in scientific 
realism. This implies that evolution cannot explain how we come to think as 
we do”175. This supposed circularity arises from an imprecision in use of the 
term ‘evolution’, and disappears when expressed thus: Thought brings the 
theory of evolution into being, and the theory of evolution implies that evolu-
tion brings thought into being. The theory of evolution is one means by which 
we are able to reach an understanding of ourselves—for it is inherent in the 
human situation that we can lift ourselves up only by our own bootstraps. 
Failure to distinguish evolution from its theory is a failure to distinguish word 
from object, and is the source of a possible misunderstanding of the present 
thesis. It is not maintained in this thesis that the world as we apprehend it is a 
                                                   
174 Mary Jo Nye, Before Big Science, pp. 73-74 
175 Quoting from an anonymous referee (possibly Keith Campbell). 
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construct of the human mind; it is maintained that the world as we apprehend 
it is the object of a construct of the human mind. Thus the statement, S, that 
thought brings evolutionary theory (a human construct) into being does not 
imply the statement that thought brings evolution (an object of evolutionary 
theory) into being. Nor does it imply that evolution does not exist except as an 
object of evolutionary theory; that is, it does not deny the scientific realist’s 
claim. In fact the statement S does not imply anything about evolution, as it is 
only through evolutionary theory that anything can be stated about evolution, 
and S is not a statement of evolutionary theory. The claims of scientific realists 
are therefore without content. To attempt to speak of evolution other than by 
means of its theory, to ascribe to it some extra-scientific property of reality, is 
to subscribe to what Putnam calls ‘metaphysical realism’ (Part II, Section 7), 
an idea that has been more deleterious to the advance of human thought than 
almost anything else; and it is pure philosophy, not science. 
 As we are particularly concerned with qualia, and the idea that they are 
non-intentional, let us now consider this. Shoemaker would say, presumably, 
that the colour green is not intentional because physics has shown that there is 
nothing objective that the property green refers to. There is a loose associa-
tion, of course, between the colour green and light of wavelength in the vicin-
ity of 0.54 of a micron, but this is not sufficient to call that band of light an 
intentional object of green qualia. In any case, there are many other stimuli for 
the experience of green, or any other colour, many being dependent on obser-
vational conditions. (Refer to C.L. Hardin, Color for Philosophers, for infor-
mation on this.) Thus the property green does not point to a materialistically 
objective classification (a natural kind). However, restriction of the idea of 
intentionality in this way is clearly designed to preserve materialism. The 
sense in which ‘intentional’ is used in this thesis is not restricted in such a 
way, but corresponds to the “projectivist view” described by Shoemaker above, 
that features of our experience, including qualia, are projected onto states of 
affairs they represent. It is clear that this use accords with our mental func-
tioning, for we do not only project the green of our experience onto perceived 
objects, to colour them in so to speak, but see these objects as green objects. 
Turn aside from this, and we are entering a world of physical description 
alone. Taking a broad view of intentionality does not force us to turn away 
from physicalism, however. 
 A test for a view of intentionality that encompasses qualia is provided by 
the thought experiment of inverted qualia. It was mentioned earlier that “the 
subjective experience of each individual can be known in its own particularity 
only by the individual himself”. Does it follow that it is not, say, the actual 
experience of green that is intentionality directed towards an object, but only 
the distinction in colour that the experience of green enables us to make that 
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is so directed, and similarly with other such cases? From the functional point 
of view the answer would appear to be yes, in which case whatever colour 
experience is directed towards the same object by different individuals would 
be called an experience of green: the quale is named after its intentional ob-
ject, not for some intrinsic property it may have. Thus it is possible that there 
could be a complete spectrum inversion between individuals, with yellow and 
blue, green and red and so on changing their intentional roles. Although some 
variation in qualia clearly occurs, as it does with all bodily features176, com-
plete spectrum inversion is empirically unlikely except as an aberration, for 
there could well be a limit to the variation in the neural correlates of colour 
experiences due to functional considerations: if my red of the sunset is your 
green of the grass, one of us may be at a distinct perceptual disadvantage; 
even more bizarre, if my pain experience is your pleasure experience and vice 
versa, one of us will soon be eliminated. However it turns out empirically, 
however our individual experiences may differ and whatever the sphere of 
mental activity, qualia remain intentional and are given the names of their 
intentional objects as established intersubjectively, the only constraint being 
the empirical possibility of intersubjective processes. 
 It has been maintained by many philosophers that complete knowledge of 
primary qualities does not yield knowledge of secondary qualities, and hence 
of qualia. Thus qualia are in a sense not physical. This view has been rein-
forced by various philosophical thought experiments. One of the best known is 
Frank Jackson’s story of Mary, a brilliant scientist who, having been confined 
to a black and white room since birth, has had no experience of colour, but 
 
knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 
‘physical’ which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and 
neurophysiology, . . . 
 It seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. For 
when she is let out of the black-and-white room or given a colour television, 
she will learn what it is like to see something red, say. . . . Hence, physical-
ism is false.177
 
What does Jackson mean by “physicalism is false”? He writes: 
 Physicalism is not the noncontroversial thesis that the actual world is 
largely physical, but the challenging thesis that it is entirely physical. This is 
why physicalists must hold that complete physical knowledge is complete 
knowledge simpliciter. For suppose it is not complete: then our world must 
differ from a world, W(P), for which it is complete, and the difference must 
                                                   
176 For example, polymorphism of the gene for red pigment molecules of the retina produces 
differences in possible colour constructions, and thus colour qualia. See Donald Hoff-
man, Visual Intelligence, pp. 132-133. 
177 Frank Jackson, “What Mary Didn’t Know”, p. 291. See also Jackson’s “Epiphenomenal 
Qualia”. 
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be in nonphysical facts; for our world and W(P) agree in all matters physi-
cal.178
Thus in the world W(P) there can be complete knowledge of all facts, whereas 
in our world, which differs from W(P) if physicalism is false, there can be 
complete knowledge only of all physical facts. “Physicalism is false” therefore 
means that there is at least one fact, about which knowledge is possible, which 
is not a physical fact. Such a fact is “what Mary didn’t know”, namely “what it 
is like to see something red”. Can this be called a fact? For convenience of 
exposition it may be allowed as a fact, but it certainly is not a fact that can be 
described objectively, and to allow it as a fact that can be experienced may be 
misleading. We shall return to this question, which is fundamental to under-
standing qualia and consciousness. But for the moment let us record what 
Jackson’s argument, if it is valid, can fairly be described as having established. 
 
Physicalism is Incomplete A full physical description of a phenomenon does 
not produce experience of it. 
 
A philosopher with a linguistic orientation may like to insist that this conclu-
sion should read, “A full physical description of a phenomenon does not in-
clude a description of the experience involved”179. Whether there are aspects 
of the experience of seeing red that a physical description, in Jackson’s “wide 
sense of ‘physical’”, does not include is a moot point—at least we can say that 
all physical correlates of experience are subject to full physical description. 
But whether or not the above formulation of Physicalism is Incomplete is what 
Jackson intended, it must be clear that the knowledge that his thought ex-
periment shows to be lacking in world W(P), but to be present in our world, is 
knowledge of what it is like to see red, it is the actual experience of seeing red 
that Mary had not previously had; and this is not knowledge by description. 
 The conclusion that physicalism is incomplete is one that most, apart from 
confirmed materialists, would be prepared to subscribe to. It should be noted, 
however, what the conclusion that physicalism is false cannot be taken to 
imply: it cannot be taken to imply the anti-physicalist thesis that we are not 
physical structures, in particular that there do not exist neural correlates of 
mental states, including neural correlates of qualia, although it is nevertheless 
consistent with this thesis. 
 Daniel Dennett is intent on showing that, given Mary’s physical knowl-
edge, she could not have had anything to discover when released from her 
black and white bondage. He writes about Mary: 
And it may also occur to us that if the first coloured things she is shown are, 
say, unlabelled wooden blocks, and she is told only that one of them is red 
                                                   
178 Jackson, op. cit., p. 291 
179 As the previously mentioned anonymous referee insists. 
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and the other blue, she won’t have the faintest idea which is which until she 
somehow learns which colour words go with her newfound experiences.180
But this occurs to Dennett only to reject it, for he puts the following words into 
Mary’s mouth (with the text changed to relate it to the wooden blocks): 
“You have to remember that I know everything—absolutely everything—that 
could ever be known about the physical causes and effects of colour vision. 
So of course before you brought the [blocks] in, I had already written down, 
in exquisite detail, exactly what physical impression a [red] object or a blue 
object (or a green object, etc.) would make on my nervous system. So I al-
ready knew exactly what thoughts I would have (because, after all, the ‘mere 
disposition’ to think about this or that is not one of your famous qualia, is 
it?).”181
Let us examine Dennett’s argument. First, it may, for the sake of the argu-
ment, be assumed that Mary, on seeing the red and blue blocks, did have ex-
periences of red and blue qualia. (It is most unlikely, though, that she could 
have had such experiences, as she would not have had the requisite visual 
experience in the developmental stage of her life for the formation of the nec-
essary neural connections.) What Dennett needs to show is that these qualia 
do not constitute a new experience for Mary. Dennett makes the reasonable 
assumption that the red and blue qualia would have neural correlates. Based 
on her neurological knowledge, Mary says that she was able to predict the 
effect of the various neural correlates of colour qualia on her neural structure, 
and thus to predict what thoughts these neural effects would correspond to. 
By comparing her actual thoughts with her predictions, Mary was able to iden-
tify the colours of the blocks. 
 There are two flaws in this argument. First, as Mary had had no prior 
colour experience, she would not have had any thoughts that would enable her 
to identify colours, only thoughts that colours differ. Second, even if she did 
have thoughts enabling her to identify colours, it does not follow that experi-
encing the red and blue qualia was not a new experience, only that she be-
haved as if it were not a new experience. Dennett appears to have been en-
snared by his behaviourist tendencies. 
 An idea as to what underlies the discussion about qualia is given in a criti-
cism of Jackson’s argument by Paul Churchland. He puts Jackson’s argument 
in the following form: 
 
(1) Mary knows everything there is to know about brain states and their 
properties. 
 
(2) It is not the case that Mary knows everything there is to know about 
sensations and their properties. 
 
                                                   
180 Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, p. 399 
181 Dennett, op. cit., pp. 399-400 
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Therefore, by Leibniz’s Law, 
 
(3) Sensations and their properties ≠ brain states and their properties.182
 
It is worthwhile to set this argument out symbolically. Let B be the set of facts 
about brain states, S the set of facts about sensations and experiences of sen-
sations (qualia), MKx = Mary knows x. Churchland’s rendering of Jackson’s 
argument is then: 
 
(1) (x)(x∈B ⇒ MKx)   
(2) ~(x)(x∈S ⇒ MKx)   ∴ (3) S ≠ B 
 
This is a valid argument (and does not depend on Leibniz’s Law for its valid-
ity). Churchland points out that the use of the word ‘know’ is equivocal be-
tween (1) and (2): in (1) ‘know’ has the sense of ‘know that’, while in (2) ‘know’ 
has the sense of ‘is acquainted with’. If we let MAx = Mary is acquainted with 
x, then premise (2) should be replaced by 
 
 (2′) ~(x)(x∈S ⇒ MAx) 
 
Churchland notes that this corrected rendering of Jackson’s argument is inva-
lid. Observe, however, that this argument can be made valid by the introduc-
tion of the additional premise 
 
 (4) (x)(MKx ⇒ MAx) 
 
In fact, it is easily seen that the addition of premise (4) is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for the validity of the argument. The new valid argument 
is thus: 
 
(1) (x)(x∈B ⇒ MKx)   
(2′) ~(x)(x∈S ⇒ MAx)   
(4) (x)(MKx ⇒ MAx)   ∴ (3) S ≠ B 
 
 What is stated by (4)? Take the element r ∈ S, where r = the sensation of 
the colour red. That Mary has full physical knowledge of r can be expressed, 
MKr; that Mary has experience of r can be expressed, MAr. Thus ~(MKr ⇒ 
MAr) expresses the fact about Mary, prior to her release from the black and 
white room, that her physical knowledge of r did not produce experience of r. 
Similarly for other sensations, taking Mary to be a representative individual 
(thus for simplicity we shall not quantify over individuals). For any factual x ∈ 
S or any x ∉ S we could take MAx to be equivalent to MKx. From these re-
marks, ~(x)(MKx ⇒ MAx) can be taken to be a statement of the thesis that 
Physicalism is Incomplete. Thus statement (4) expresses 
 
                                                   
182 Paul Churchland, “Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States”, pp. 61-
62 
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Physicalism is Complete A full physical description of a phenomenon pro-
duces experience of it. 
 
Churchland’s rendering of Jackson’s argument is therefore valid if and only if 
Physicalism is Complete. 
 The conclusion of that argument is (3) S ≠ B. What does this say? Nothing, 
apparently, as it follows from the definitions of the sets S and B that S ≠ B. On 
the other hand, if we allow identity between S and B in the sense that theories 
of S are reducible to theories of B (see Section 8 for reference to reduction), 
then S ≠ B says that S is not completely reducible to B, or roughly speaking, 
qualia do not possess neural correlates. (Alternatively one might take S ≠ B to 
say that S is not supervenient on B.) It is understandable that Churchland, 
who argues in favour of eliminativism via theoretical reduction, would want to 
undermine an argument for S ≠ B; but ironically it is the introduction of the 
Physicalism is Complete premise that yields a valid argument for S ≠ B. How 
can this be? Quite simply: the lack of neural correlates for qualia ensures that 
Physicalism is Complete is an empty statement—there is no physical descrip-
tion of a quale from which experience of it could be produced. 
 We shall now leave Churchland and return to Jackson to see whether his 
argument can be saved. We shall take his conclusion to be that Physicalism is 
Incomplete, as set forth earlier. This can be obtained from two premises 
summarizing the story of Mary as follows: 
 
 (1′) (x)(x∈S ⇒ MKx)  [Mary knows everything about sensa-
tions.]  
 (2′) ~(x)(x∈S ⇒ MAx)  [Mary has not experienced all 
sensations.]    ∴ (5) ~(x)(MKx ⇒ MAx) [The thesis Physicalism is Incomplete.] 
   
Proof: From (2′), ∃ r ∈ S (the sensation of the colour red) such that ~MAr. 
From (1′), MKr. Thus ~(MKr ⇒ MAr), from which (5) follows. 
Note that this does not use the set B, but allows that S = B in the sense men-
tioned above. 
 We conclude that both Dennett’s and Churchland’s arguments, based as 
they are on philosophical preconception rather than disinterested analysis, fail 
to show that Jackson’s argument is unsound; and that Jackson’s argument, 
while needing care in its presentation and interpretation, is fundamentally 
sound. 
 The problem that is crystalized out, so to speak, by the concept of qualia is 
how to take account of the subjective, which is known also by its variants, the 
soul, consciousness, the first person point of view, etc. Descartes started this 
off in its modern unfolding by proposing a duality of mind and body. Since 
then philosophers who have been unwilling to accept an understanding based 
on a duality have sought to find a basis in a unity centred on one or the other 
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of mind and matter, subjective and objective. The principal shortcoming of a 
duality is that it necessarily leaves the connecting link between the two parts 
incompletely accounted for; for once that linkage has been satisfactorily ex-
plained, there is no longer a final duality, but a unity of the two parts united by 
their linkage. 
 There is only one way to resolve this issue, and that is to look to the facts, 
and for them we shall refer back to the preceding pages of this thesis. At the 
opening of this section we see Shoemaker claiming that “. . . we need qualia to 
make sense of secondary qualities”. He could just as well have said that we 
need qualia to make sense of primary qualities. The fact is that each of pri-
mary and secondary qualities is needed for the other in some sense. Secondary 
qualities can be understood in terms of interactions between ourselves and the 
world only once we have some notion of primary qualities—the idea of secon-
dary qualities in their modern expression was established in the seventeenth 
century only once basic primary qualities had been developed in modern sci-
ence. But once we have recognized the existence of secondary qualities as 
arising by subjective referral from our own experience of the world, we realize 
that primary qualities themselves develop from those secondary qualities: the 
notion of force (and weight) from feelings of stress in our limbs, time from the 
regularity of passing events, energy from toil over time, temperature from 
feelings of warmth and cold, and so on. And the science of these primary 
qualities has its basis in experiment evaluated with the help of secondary 
qualities. (The way in which interaction occurs between primary and secon-
dary qualities was explained earlier in Section 3.) 
 As science has developed, two inescapable facts have become apparent. 
 
(1)  The world as we perceive it, sense it and know it is a structure that is 
based ultimately, in terms of the idea of intentionality, on constructs of 
individual minds (refer to Section 6). 
(2)  We are ourselves physical structures. 
 
Here apparently the physical rests on the subjective, and the subjective rests 
on the physical, so resulting in groundless explanation. But, if these two facts 
are combined into a single idea, the following is obtained: 
 
(3) As an object of their subjective experience, individuals collectively create 
the world as an explanatory and predictive structure, encompassing phys-
ics and allied sciences, by means of which an understanding is obtained 
both of their sensory environment and of themselves, and their integrity 
as homeostatic systems is protected.  
That explanatory structure provides understanding of the physical basis of the 
subjective experience from which it derives, in the form of a physical descrip-
tion of the processes that give rise to it, but it cannot physically explain or 
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describe what is termed the quale, the quality of that experience itself, for as 
Frank Jackson’s story of Mary illustrates, physicalism is incomplete. For phi-
losophers this one supposed explanatory gap183 in the circle of our under-
standing has, since physicalism has come to pre-eminence in our thinking, 
become perhaps the quintessential philosophical problem, the final distilla-
tion of the age-old question of the source of our animus (refer to Figure 8). 
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It is part of the challenge of the more general problem of consciousness, the 
fundamental part according to many, related to the problem of phenomenal 
consciousness. The challenge of the problem of qualia, and of the more gen-
eral problem of consciousness, has been met in several ways, both by philoso-
phers and non-philosophers: 
 
1. Traditionally by relegating these entities to the spiritual sphere. 
2. By attempts to account for qualia in philosophical terms, such as self-
awareness or what it is like to be the subject experiencing qualia. Thomas 
Nagel is a well known exponent of the latter view. 
3. By attempts to account for qualia in physical terms, perhaps by as yet 
unexamined neurological processes, based for example on quantum me-
chanics. This is the view of the physicist Roger Penrose184. 
4. By classifying the problem as being within the realm of natural processes, 
but beyond the capacity of humans to solve, whether due to the inherent 
nature of the problem or accidentally. This view is put forward by Colin 
McGinn185. 
5. By attempts to show that there is no gap between the physical nature of 
the brain and mental experience, either because qualia do not exist or be-
                                                   
183 Referred to as “the gap between subjective and objective” by Thomas Nagel, “What Is It 
Like To Be a Bat?”, p. 178 
184 Roger Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind 
185 Colin McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness 
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cause they are epiphenomenal and the neural correlates of qualia are suf-
ficient for an understanding. Daniel Dennett and Paul Churchland are ex-
ponents of this class of solutions. 
6. By maintaining that there is no problem of qualia or consciousness, either 
because these concepts are not or cannot be properly specified, or because 
the whole issue arises from a verbal confusion. Kathleen Wilkes falls 
somewhere under this description.186
 
 Of one thing we can be certain, that each quale, by definition, can be 
known by acquaintance only by its possessor, and is therefore beyond com-
plete description. Qualia, therefore, but not the mental experiences of which 
they are the qualities, must lie outside any detailed description of things. 
Wilkes provides a nice analogy for this: 
Just as a subway map often helpfully has an ancillary arrow stating ‘YOU 
ARE HERE’, so the notional, complete psychophysiological-physical picture 
of the world could be supplemented for its users: ‘THIS IS YOU’, from which 
the way things are experienced from that position may be inferred. The addi-
tion YOU ARE HERE to a map is, evidently, not the cartographer’s business, 
and such maps could not be sold at bookstores; similarly, the addendum 
THIS IS YOU to a completed psycho-physical account is not a proper part of 
the scientist’s concern.187
Nagel acknowledges that to understand “physical events in objective terms” it 
is not necessary to “understand the phenomenal forms in which those events 
appear to the senses”. Speaking of different species, he writes: 
Thus it is a condition of their referring to a common reality that their more 
particular viewpoints are not part of the common reality that they both ap-
prehend. The reduction can succeed only if the species-specific viewpoint is 
omitted from what is to be reduced.188  
But, intent on avoiding “neobehaviourism”, Nagel maintains that the subjec-
tive point of view cannot be ignored in an understanding of our internal men-
tal life: 
If we acknowledge that a physical theory of mind must account for the sub-
jective character of experience, we must admit that no presently available 
conception gives us a clue how this could be done. The problem is unique. If 
mental processes are indeed physical processes, then there is something it is 
like, intrinsically, to undergo certain physical processes. What it is for such a 
thing to be the case remains a mystery.189
 It is surprising that there should be such a diverse range of views on qualia 
and consciousness, for this area of controversy has become an arena in which 
                                                   
186 Kathleen V. Wilkes, “Is Consciousness Important?”, pp. 223-243 
187 Wilkes, op. cit., p. 241 
188 Thomas Nagel, “What Is It Like To Be a Bat?”, p. 175 
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all shades of philosophical ideology are exercised. This may be partly due to 
the fact that aspects of consciousness that appear to be proper subjects for 
scientific study, such as attention and awareness, are included with those that 
are of philosophical concern, thus misleading philosophers into the belief that 
areas of study such as phenomenal consciousness are suitable for philosophi-
cal, if not scientific, investigation. However that may be, the problem of qualia 
should perhaps be described not so much as a quintessential philosophical 
problem as a quintessential example of philosophical confusion about a mat-
ter that is inherently simple. 
 Nagel is very near to resolving the matter when he writes that 
. . . the fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basi-
cally, that there is something it is like to be that organism. . .  But fundamen-
tally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is some-
thing that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organ-
ism.190
Something it is like to be invites comparison, and hence description; and if 
none is forthcoming, it “remains a mystery”, as Nagel says. But there is noth-
ing it is like to be me, in all my individuality (unless it is something like being 
you), there is only being me, and me being me. Likewise, Nagel writes (as 
quoted above) that “if mental processes are indeed physical processes, then 
there is something it is like, intrinsically, to undergo certain physical proc-
esses”. But we do not undergo physical processes, we are the physical proc-
esses. Of course in ordinary speech we do speak as if we undergo physical 
processes: this reflects modes of expression deriving from our natural dualist 
conception of body and mind, which does good service in everyday life. But 
philosophy should not be concerned with reflecting everyday life, but with 
finding consistent ways of expressing the truth, of which dualism is not a part. 
Therefore we must not say that we undergo physical processes, but that we 
are the physical processes. The difference is the difference between describing 
a thing in the third person (my body for instance) and being the thing, and 
this is a difference that applies to anything: to a stone, to the weather, to our-
selves. For a stone or the weather it is the difference between having a repre-
sentation of the thing and being the object of the representation. The object, 
as an existing thing, has power to change things, whereas its representation 
does not. As the rhyme goes: sticks and stones can break your bones, but 
names will never hurt you. And as Searle said: “No one supposes that com-
puter simulations of a five-alarm fire will burn the neighbourhood down or 
that a computer simulation of a rainstorm will leave us all drenched. Why on 
earth would anyone suppose that a computer simulation of understanding 
                                                   
190 Nagel, op. cit., p. 166 
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actually understood anything?”191 Thus no description of a particular human 
being will produce that particular human being’s experience. (‘Description’ is 
used here in a broad sense to include working models.) 
 A human being is not quite like a stone or the weather, of course, as nei-
ther a stone nor the weather experiences anything; but it is like them in this 
respect, that a human, a stone and the weather all have an existence, and this 
is a different thing from a computer simulation or a description of any of 
them. What differs between a stone and a human being is the nature of their 
existence. It is in the intentionality of a human being’s existence that we find 
the key to qualia and consciousness, and through this the awareness of the co-
existence of intentional objects with that of the intentional subject. The only 
mystery, or challenge, lies in the extraordinary complexity of the human nerv-
ous system from which human intentionality derives, for there is no more 
complex thing known to us in the universe. 
 And what of the explanatory gap that so concerned Nagel? (See Figure 8.) 
There is no explanatory gap. There is only a virtuous explanatory spiral of the 
kind dealt with in Section 3. The gap shown in the picture, at the point where 
the qualia are, is, if you like, an existential gap, the point from which all exis-
tence originates, ourselves—as Descartes said. 
 The understanding of consciousness is little more than a corollary to the 
foregoing account of intentionality, for a conscious state is just an ‘active’ 
intentional state, one that is, so to speak, before the mind and is concerned 
with what one is attending to, and this is a psychological/neurophysiological 
rather than a philosophical problem192. Intentionality does for consciousness 
what it does in accounting for visual experience: being conscious of a tree is 
having a tree as the object of an active intentional state. Likewise, being self-
conscious is having oneself as intentional object, and the conscious process of 
thinking is active participation in an intentional state (the construction of 
intentional states may be consciously guided, but is mainly unconscious). 
 A final observation: The ease with which a resolution of the so-called 
problem of consciousness can be obtained from an account of the human 
situation that is faithful to the facts while adhering to no philosophical ideol-
ogy must surely give support to the conclusion of Part I of this essay, that 
philosophy is usually more of an obstacle than an aid to the attainment of 
                                                   
191 John Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs”, p. 423 
192 “Consciousness is involved only in activities stemming from the associative regions of the 
cortex”, and is quite likely to be due to “the synchronization of the billions of cortical 
nerve cells with the trillions of synapses—which are all the while under the influence of 
the reticular formation, thalamus, hippocampus and limbic systems. The astronomically 
high occurrence of internal rewiring in the associative cortex adds weight to this idea”. 
See Gerhard Roth, “The Quest To Find Consciousness”, p. 39. 
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knowledge and understanding. In support of this observation, consider the 
following proposal by a physicist stating in outline, though in terms that may 
be “suspect in the eyes of the philosophical police”193, essentially the thesis 
that has been presented in Part II of this essay. 
 
 Like many people faced with the problem of consciousness, Blackmore 
starts by assuming the existence of an independent external material world 
and then asks: “How do you get from a real magazine composed of atoms 
and molecules to your experience of seeing it?” 
 Well, quite. How could you? What is commonly misunderstood is that the 
so-called external real world, along with the concept of constituent particles, 
is a model derived from conscious experience. In other words, it is con-
sciousness, not physical matter, that is the fundamental “stuff” of the Uni-
verse. This approach immediately dispenses with the “hard problem” by 
making mind (consciousness) the essential reality, and matter a construct of 
mind. 
         Keith Atkin194
 
But of course Keith Atkin may have got his ideas from some philosopher. 
13. Conclusion 
In the thesis presented here the aim has been to accommodate known facts 
about humans and their situation, both commonplace and scientific, while 
employing only a minimum of conceptual construction, in an attempt to dis-
solve the central philosophical problems that have remained unresolved since 
philosophy began in ancient Greece. The motivating idea has been the follow-
ing: As philosophy is principally concerned with commonplace facts and in-
trospection, selected, idealized and analyzed so as to conform with an ideol-
ogy195, the only hope for dissolving philosophical problems is by following 
scientific practice in seeking a philosophically neutral description that ac-
counts for the principal objectively established facts. The description offered 
                                                   
193 Albert Einstein, “Remarks on Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Knowledge” 
194 Letter to the editor, New Scientist 
195 of which there is a profusion. Here is a sampling: 
  absolutism actualism atomism behaviourism co-
herentism compatibilism determinism dualism 
 empiricism epiphenomenalism essentialism evolutionism ex-
istentialism externalism foundationalism functionalism ide-
alism incompatibilism instrumentalism interactionism in-
ternalism irrationalism logical atomism logical positivism
 logicism materialism minimalism monism 
 mysticism objectivism occasionalism operationalism
 panpsychism phenomenalism pluralism positivism
 pragmatism psychologism quasi-realism rationalism re-
alism reductionism representationalism scepticism 
 selectionism sensationalism solipsism subjectivism
 verificationism 
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by this thesis is claimed to have achieved the following: 
 
1. To provided continuity between everyday and scientific understanding, 
and between observation and theory in science. This has only been 
sketched in outline. 
2. To give an account of sense perception that clarifies the mind–world rela-
tionship, and establishes the idea of reality in descriptive rather than ideo-
logical terms, thus diffusing the notions of metaphysical realism and ide-
alism (scepticism). 
3. To explain the subjective–objective connection which underlies all human 
knowledge by means of the idea of intentionality. 
4. To clarify the philosophically supposed ‘mystery’ or ‘hard problem’ of the 
nature of subjective experience, or qualia. 
5. To reduce the philosophical ‘problem of consciousness’ to the intentional 
character of the mind–body relationship. 
 
 Philosophical problems may be epitomized by the simple problem of mir-
ror inversion. If you hold a piece of paper with                      printed on it up to a 
plane mirror, you will see                       in the mirror. The image is a horizontal 
reversal of the reflected object—the left side appears on the right and the right 
on the left, but up is still up and down is still down. The question is: why does 
a plane mirror produce an image that is transposed horizontally and not verti-
cally? Or as a child might put it on seeing its image in a mirror: how does the 
mirror know to turn me from left to right but not upside down? Geometrical 
optics will explain what we actually see, but as it is indifferent to vertical and 
horizontal, it will not answer the question in the terms in which it is asked. 
The problem, therefore, is not with the facts, but with the particular way in 
which they are being thought about, or expressed. Adults are often unable to 
see that there is a problem, as they have become accustomed to the properties 
of mirrors and how we talk about them. This is similar to many people’s reac-
tion to the problem of vision, as Francis Crick observes: 
 I am often asked by nonscientists, usually at the dinner table, what I am 
working on. When I say I am thinking about some of the problems of the 
visual system of mammals—that is, how we see things—there is usually a 
slightly embarrassed pause. My questioner is wondering why there should 
be any difficulty about something as simple as seeing. After all, we open our 
eyes and there the world is, large and clear, full of objects in vivid Techni-
color, without our having to make any appreciable effort. It all seems so de-
lightfully easy, so what can be the problem?196
 Philosophical problems are like the problem of mirror inversion. The 
physical facts are usually clear, and where they are not known it is the busi-
                                                   
196 Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis, p. 23 
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ness of science, not philosophy, to discover them. A philosophical problem has 
to do with how we look at a situation, and this is often well concealed from us. 
This is because the way we look at a situation has to do with our own function-
ing, which we take for granted, not with the laws of physics. Science estab-
lished its laws by abstracting from our own way of looking at things; in order 
to understand ourselves we have then to reconstruct the way we look at things 
within the knowledge science gives us. Two important philosophical problems 
that touch directly on physics are the direction of time (the laws of physics are 
independent of it) and the interpretation of quantum theory (there is no inter-
pretation of it consistent with our naturally developed concepts, but this is no 
handicap for non-philosophically minded physicists). As seen in Part I, a new 
advance in scientific knowledge activates philosophy to account for it in hu-
man terms—philosophy itself does not produce knowledge. The philosophical 
problems considered in this essay are of such a kind. 
 To see how philosophy overlays human values and interests onto physical 
facts, it is worth returning to the mirror inversion problem. Table 2 displays 
the physical facts. By a vertical or horizontal rotation of the image is meant its 
rotation through an angle of 180º about a vertical or horizontal line through 
its centre (corresponding respectively to a horizontal or vertical reversal of its 
appearance). Note that a rotation of an image changes its parity (equality with 
object), and a further rotation restores parity. If one rotation is vertical and 
the other horizontal, both left–right and up–down reversal occurs, otherwise 
the original view is restored. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MIRROR IMAGES VIEWED FROM A VERTICAL POSITION 
ORIGINAL IMAGE 
view from direction 
of mirror 
ob- view of image rotated about 
the horizontal 
rotated about 
the vertical 
A 
B 
C 
D 
horizontal 
* 
* 
* 
TABLE 2
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* 
 133
 
 
 
 
 The ideal mirror view of object A, B or C is the normal front view (indi-
cated by an asterisk). As the image is a rotation of this view about the vertical, 
we say that the image is a horizontal reversal of the object. How do we account 
for the lack of vertical–horizontal symmetry in this statement? Just by the fact 
that it is viewing from a vertical position that is under consideration. If we 
were considering viewing from a horizontal position in a fixed direction, left or 
right, then the words ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ would need to be interchanged 
in the above conclusions. The case of object D, a figure with near vertical 
symmetry, appears to be different from the others. Because of the near sym-
metry, in this case the ideal mirror view has the head in the same direction as 
the image (indicated by an asterisk), which is of course near to how we nor-
mally see ourselves when lying on our side, so that we are inclined to say in 
this case that the image is a vertical reversal of the original. This is not so in 
the case of object A, which is also in a sense lying down, because a word has no 
symmetry and needs to be upright for comprehension. We can conclude, 
therefore, that the way we describe a mirror image depends upon (a) the 
symmetries of the object in so far as they interest us, (b) what aspect of the 
object we need to see preserved in the image, and (c) from what orientation we 
view the image. 
 If there is difficulty in uncovering the effects of human values and inter-
ests on descriptions of observed phenomena as simple as mirror images, how 
difficult it must be to uncover such effects when the description is preserved in 
philosophical discourse where the phenomena are far more complex and hu-
man values and interests are far from being understood and agreed upon! 
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